For a democratic antiwar position on the invasion of Ukraine

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Faced with the invasion of Ukraine by the regime of Vladimir Putin, the antiwar movement has seen the development of very contrasting positions. They all have in common that they all claim peace, a word behind which very diverse, even opposing attitudes can be placed.

There are, on the one hand, calls for an unconditional ceasefire, which suggest, or even openly assert, that NATO states should force the Ukrainians to stop fighting by ceasing to provide them with the means for their defense. This position, though it may emanates in some cases from authentic pacifism and from a real concern to spare human lives, is highly problematic nevertheless because it does not define the conditions of the desired ceasefire. In the tradition of the antiwar movement, any call for a cessation of fighting in the event of an invasion of one country by another must be accompanied by the demand for the withdrawal of the invaders, failing which it can legitimately be suspected of wanting to ratify the acquisition of territory by force.

On the other side are antiwar activists for whom opposition to the Russian invasion and support for the right of Ukrainians to fight for the liberation of their territory is the priority consideration. While this starting point is certainly more legitimate because it takes the side of the victims of aggression, it can nevertheless end up setting the bar for peace too high. In some cases, there is even no question of a ceasefire: peace is defined as having as a necessary condition the withdrawal of Russian troops from all parts of internationally recognized Ukrainian territory, which include not only the entire Donbas, but also Crimea annexed in 2014.

Whatever the intention behind such a position, it risks being confused with that of Ukrainian ultranationalist hardliners. It also risks finding itself at odds with the majorities of public opinion in Europe and North America which, while sympathizing with the Ukrainians’ fight for self-defense, cannot identify with a hardline stance likely to considerably increase the risks of a general conflagration, including a nuclear war, in addition to its crushing cost in times of acute global economic crisis.

How then to define a democratic anti-imperialist antiwar position, both truly pacifist and concerned with peoples’ rights? Such a position should be inspired by the same parameters that have determined the antiwar position in the face of previous wars of invasion in contemporary history, while taking into account, of course, the present situation on the ground.

In the face of the ongoing war of invasion in Ukraine, a democratic antiwar and anti-imperialist position should include the following demands:

  1. Ceasefire with the withdrawal of Russian troops to their positions of February 23, 2022.
  2. Reaffirmation of the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force.
  3. Negotiations under the aegis of the UN for a lasting peaceful solution based on peoples’ right to self-determination: deployment of blue helmets in all the disputed territories, both in Donbas and in Crimea, and organization by the UN of free and democratic referendums including the vote of refugees and displaced persons from these territories.

The Ukrainian left should also determine its position on the terms for ending the war, as it cannot adhere unconditionally to the view of Ukraine’s government. That said, unless there is a political upheaval in Russia which would radically change the situation, the withdrawal of Russian troops even just from the territories conquered since February 24 is itself a very difficult objective to achieve: it presupposes a major amplification of the Ukrainian counter-offensive, with quantitatively and qualitatively increased support from NATO countries, and an increase in the economic pressure exerted by these same countries on Russia.

This objective could be achieved much more quickly and at much less human and material cost if China, the only state with a decisive influence on Moscow’s position, joined in this effort, which corresponds to the principles of international law that it continues to invoke: sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, peaceful resolution of conflicts. The antiwar movement should exert pressure on China to do so, while criticizing belligerent attitudes towards Beijing, especially those of Washington and London, which do a disservice to this purpose as well as to the cause of world peace.

 

[For a response by Jean Vogel, see here. For Achcar’s rejoinder, see here. For further discussion, see the ESSF website.]

Statement by Ukrainian Feminists in Solidarity with Iranian Women

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We, Ukrainian feminists, express our solidarity with Iranian uprising, triggered by the brutal murder of Mahsa Amini by the Iranian Morality Police. Thousands of women responded to this crime by going out on the streets, cutting their hair and publicly taking off and burning hijabs as a symbol of their oppression. What started as a protest against police brutality and obligatory hijab, quickly transformed into a general resistance of the Iranian people against the patriarchal and dictatorial mullah regime and the authoritarian form of capitalism that it represents. The grassroot mobilization is today being joined by schoolgirls, students, trade unions, ethnic minorities, and people from other social groups affected by the economic crises, high food prices, social cuts, and privatization. This new wave of struggles thus continues and expands the series of uprisings against socio-economic inequalities, political oppression and ethnic discrimination that shook Iran during the last decade.

Slogans “Woman, life, freedom” and “Death to the dictator” have been spreading from Iranian Kurdistan all over the country and to squares all over the world. Crossing the boundaries of social groups and classes, this wave of resistance holds the figure of an Iranian woman in its center – the one who struggles for her own and others lives. We express our support of the protesters’ demands, including:

  • Change of dictatorial regime and democratization of political life;
  • Reduction of socio-economic inequality, development of social protection, guarantee and respect of labor rights;
  • Women’s autonomy over their bodies and lives, including right for women to choose whether or not to wear hijab;
  • Justice and protection against violence in public and private spaces.

The popular uprising in Iran is facing severe repression. Hundreds of demonstrators have already been murdered, wounded or arrested. But the Iranian state is not only oppressing its own citizens. It also provides support for other oppressive and imperialist regimes. During the last few weeks, Iranian drones employed by the Russian army have killed tens of civilians and destroyed countless housing and critical infrastructure objects in Ukraine. The fight of the Iranian people for their own freedom is also a fight for the freedom and the security of ordinary Ukrainians.

For eight months now, Ukrainian men and women have been resisting Putin’s imperialist aggression. Iranians continue to struggle against their own dictatorial, ultraconservative regime and elite-profiting economy.

Freedom for Iran! Freedom for Ukraine! All together we will win!

Signed by:

Organizations
NGO Feminist Workshop
NGO Sotsialnyi Rukh (Social Movement)
Feminist Lodge
NGO Girls
NGO “Women’s Association “Sphere”
Gender Stream
Feminists of Kyiv, Independent English-language media
Democracy Development Center
Rural women in Ukraine
Public Alliance “Political action of women”
NGO “Centre of Gender Culture ”
Gender in Detail expert resource
Syria Solidarity Australia
Syria Solidarity NYC

Individual signatures
Daria Saburova, researcher, member of the “European Network of Solidarity with Ukraine”
Oksana Dutchak, sociologist, co-editor of Commons/Spilne
Viktoriia Pihul, feminist, activist, member of “Social Movement/Sotsialnyi Rukh” Council
Iryna Zahladko, writer
Oksana Kis, historian of women
Nastey Teor, visual artist and graphic designer
Maryna Lykhoshva, IT Analyst
Dr. Svitlana Babenko, docent, head of MA Program “Gender Studies”, Faculty of Sociology, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv
Artur Sumarokov, playwright & cinema critic
Zhabka Anastasiia, student
Marta Romankiv, artist
Ira Lobanok, musician/music producer
Oksana Briukhovetska, artist, curator, MFA candidate at Stamps School of Art & Design, University of Michigan
Maria Podzerey, IT-worker
Anastasia Shevelova, artist, graphic designer, photographer
Liliia Hryhorieva, JSC “Ukrtelecom”, member of the trade union of telecommunications workers of Ukraine
Kateryna Polevianenko, UI/UX designer
Anya Kudrinova, teacher, “Teach for Ukraine” fellow
Fishchenko Anastasiia, student, grassroot activist from the collective Solidarity Kitchen
Polina Vyzhak, advisor in Adolescent Girls Advisory Council and Artist Changemaker Advisory Council by Global Fund for Women
Dr. Tamara Martsenyuk, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (Ukraine)
Hanna Ariabinska; CO “Positve women”
Marta Chumalo, vice-head of Center “Women’s perspectives”
Lisovska Olena, proofreader
Kateryna Semchuk, co-editor of “Political Critique”, queer feminist
Tamara Khurtsydze, a student of the master’s program in gender studies
Andreia Fedorchenko
Karyna Lazaruk
Anna Pochtarenko
Anna Chumak
Hanna Manoilenko
LAM Chi Leung
Lidiia Pivtorak
Daria Getmanova
Anastasia Riabchuk
Kulik Nadia
Kseniia Liashko
Polina Zyryanova
Tetiana Hanzha
Iskander Daiana
Bondarchuk Dar‘ia
Valeriia Zubatenko
Sofiia Bondaruk
Lilya Badekha
Zakrevska Yelyzaveta
Mariia Tonkonoh
Evgenia Stepko
Brian Gibbons
Linda Mann
Olesya Bondarenko
Ted Zuur
Charles Pierson
Cheryl Zuur and John Reimann, co-chairs, Ukraine Socialist Solidarity Campaign
Judith Lienhard
Emmett Doyle
Beth E. McGarry, RN, M.Ed
Bushra A
Anita D Baker
Adrian Ivakhiv
Mat Ward
Marina vishmidt
Farah Ghadernia
Mudassir Nadeem

Reposted from Feminist Worksop

Sign here

“Professor Oscar-René Vargas must be released. His physical integrity assured, as well as all his rights.”

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Oscar-René Vargas, a 77-year-old citizen of Nicaragua, is an economist, historian and current affairs analyst in Central America whose qualities are recognized in academic circles, especially by those who have constantly defended the social and democratic rights of the Nicaraguan people in the face of various authoritarian regimes.

However, we learned of his “sequestration” –- his de facto arrest and imprisonment –- ​​by the police of President Daniel Ortega’s regime on Tuesday, November 22, 2022. This arbitrary act shocks us deeply, especially since it prolongs a series of arrests of people critical, from various angles, of the current Nicaraguan regime.

Oscar-René Vargas is renowned for his numerous historical works -– more than 35 works -– on Nicaragua, as well as for his commitment, from the mid-1960s, against the Somoza dictatorship, his support for the initial government of the FSLN , and his support for the popular movement of demands that emerged in 2018. The commitments mentioned here reflect the ethical and political rectitude of Oscar-René Vargas, his attachment to democratic rights, and therefore to freedom of expression as well as that of of organization.

We ask the Nicaraguan authorities to fully respect the physical integrity of Oscar-René Vargas, all his rights of defense and his immediate release. Any possible future procedure must absolutely obey respect for human rights and international legal standards.

This requirement is in accordance with the Estatuto sobre derechos yguarantees de los Nicaraguenses, adopted by the Governing Board of National Reconstruction of the Republic of Nicaragua on August 21, 1979 and with the judgment passed in 1980 by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ, Geneva ) which welcomed “the humanitarian concerns of the [new] government” (p. 6).

Our support for this call addressed to the present authorities of Nicaragua echoes these principles and values ​​that Oscar-René Vargas defended then and still defends.” (November 23)

*****

First signatures gathered since November 23, closing on December 5

Central and South America
Mexico
Dr. Elena Lazos Chavero, Profesora-Investigadora Titular C, SNI III, Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, Cd. Universitaria, Coyoacán, Ciudad de México
Manuel Aguilar Mora, escritor and professor, Universidad Autónoma de la Ciudad de México (UACM)
Rodrigo Díaz Cruz, professor-investigador Departamento de Antropología, UAM-I, México
Carmen de la Peza, professor-investigadora Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Departamento de Communication y Educación, UAM-X, México
Ana Lau Jaiven, professor-investigadora Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Departamento de Política y Cultura UAM-X, México
Ma. Eugenia Ruiz Velasco, professor-investigadora Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, UAM, México
Gisela Espinosa Damián, professor-investigadora Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Departamento de Relaciones Sociales UAM. Directora de la revista Veredas , Mexico
Ángeles Eraña, professor-investigadora of the Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, IIF, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, UNAM, México
Luis Bueno Rodríguez, professor-investigador Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, UAM, CILAS, México
Gilberto López y Rivas, Profesor-investigador Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, INAH, Morelos, México
Alicia Castellanos Guerrero, profesora-investigadora jubilada UAM-I, Mexico
Arturo Anguiano, professor-investigador Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, UAM, México
Sonia Comboni Salinas, professor-investigadora Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, UAM, México
Noemí Luján Ponce, professor-investigadora UAM, Mexico
Fernando Matamoros, professor of the Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, BUAP, México
Araceli Mondragón, professor-investigadora Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, UAM, México
Marcos Tonatiuh Águila Medina, professor-investigador Departamento de producción Económica, UAM-X, México
Mary Rosaria Goldsmith Connelly, professor-investigadora UAM-X, Mexico
Germán A. De la Reza, Profesor-investigador, UAM-X, Mexico
Telésforo Nava Vázquez, professor-investigador, UAM-I, Mexico
Adolfo Gilly, professor emerito, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, UNAM, Mexico
Gerardo Ávalos Tenorio, professor-investigador of UAM, Mexico
Margarita Zires, Profesora-investigadora of UAM, Mexico
Luis Hernández Navarro, Editorial Coordinator of La Jornada , Mexico
Mary Rosaria Goldsmith Connelly, professor-investigadora UAM-X, Mexico
Germán A. De la Reza, Profesor-investigador UAM-X, Mexico
Telésforo Nava Vázquez, Profesor-investigador UAM-I, Mexico
Julio Muñoz Rubio, Profesor Biólogo, Facultad de Ciencias, UNAM, México
Massimo Modonesi, Professor of Political and Social Sciences, UNAM, México
Dr. Gilberto Lopez y Rivas, professor investigator of INAH Morelos, Mexico
Carmen Aliaga, UAM Xochimilco, Mexico
Enrique Dussel Peters, Full Professor, Facultad de Economía de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), México
Alberto Arroyo Picard, Profesor Jubilado, Universidad autónoma metropolitana (UAM), México
Felipe Echenique March, investigator, Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, México
José Manuel Juárez, professor-investigador of the Universidad autónoma metropolitana (UAM), México
Dr. Alejandro Valle Baeza, full professor, Facultad de Economía de la UNAM, Mexico
Arturo Taracena Arriola, Profesor Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
Carlos Alberto Rios, Historian. Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana, Azcapotzalco, Mexico
Jérôme Baschet, historiador, Universidad Autonoma de Chiapas, México
Argentina
Maristella Svampa, investigator of CONICET, Argentina
Horacio Tarcus, Director of the Centro de Documentación e Investigación de la Cultura de Izquierda (CeDinci), Argentina
Rubén Lo Vuolo, Economist of the CIEEP, Argentina
Valeria Manzano, National University of San Martin, Argentina
Pablo Pozzi, Professor Consulto, University of Buenos Aires, Argentina
Pablo Bertinat, professor of the Universidad Tecnológica Nacional, Argentina
Mario Pecheny, Director del área de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades del Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicac (CONICET), Argentina
Julián Rebón, professor of the Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
Roberto Gargarella, Professor University of Buenos Aires, Conicet, Argentina
Dra Ana Teresa Martinez, Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo Social (INDES), Universidad Nacional de Santiago del Estero/Consejo de Investigaciones Científicas y Tecnológicas (UNSE-CONICET), Argentina
Gabriel Puricelli, Professor, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, University of Buenos Aires, Argentina
Eduardo Lucita, Economistas de Izquierda (EDI), Argentina
Sebastián Carassai, Investigador del CONICET, Regular Profesor, University of Buenos Aires (UBA), Argentina
Pablo Stefanoni, journalist, responsible for the review Nueva Sociedad , Argentina
Carlos Abel Suarez, Clasco, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Rolando Astarita, economist, Universidad Nacional de Quilmes and Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
Brazil
Valério Arcary, professor titular aposentado do Instituto Federal de Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia de São Paulo, Brasil
Forrest Hylton, Visiting Professor of History, Universidade Federal da Bahia, Brasil
Ricardo Antunes, Full Professor, Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP), Brasil
Breno Bringel, professor of the Universidad Estatal de Río de Janeiro, Brasil
José Mauricio Domínguez, professor of the Universidad Estatal de Río de Janeiro, Brasil
Pablo-Henrique Martins, Federal University of Pernambuco, Brasil
Paulo Nakatani, full professor at the Federal University of Espírito Santo, Brasil
Virgínia Fontes, historiadora, Universidade Federal Fluminense, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Ricardo Musse, Professor associado no departamento de sociologia da Universidade de São Paulo (USP), Brazil
Osvaldo Coggiola, professor titular, História contemporânea, Universidade de São Paulo (USP), Brazil
José Arbex, professor, Pontificia Universidade Catolica de São Paulo (PUC_SP), Brazil
Jorge Nóvoa, Full Professor, Universidade Federal da Bahia, Brazil
Nara HN Machado, Emeritus University Professor, Porto Alegre, Brazil
Robert Ponge, Professor, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil
Luiz Renato Martins, professor, historiador, Universidade de São Paulo (USP), Brazil
Leda Paulani, full professor, Faculdade de Economia e Administração, Universidade de São Paulo (USP), Brazil
Rosa Maria Marques, Full Professor at the Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo , Brazil
Carlos Zacarias, Professor, historian of the Federal University of Bahia, Brazil
Bolivia
Mario Rodríguez, Fundacion Wayna Tambo, Bolivia
Elizabeth Peredo Beltran, Psicóloga e Investigadora, Observatorio de Cambio Climático y Desarrollo – OBCCD, Bolivia
Colombia
Muricio Archila, Professor Titular (pensionado), Universidad Nacional de Colombia
Daniel Libreros Caicedo, economist, professor, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá
Alejandro Mantilla, professor of the Universidad Nacional de Colombia
Costa Rica
María Esther Montanaro Mena, cédula 1-0922-0124, Universidad de Costa Rica
Hans Nusselder, Consultor-investigador en desarrollo rural, San José, Costa Rica
Ecuador
Miriam Lang, professor at the Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Ecuador
Alberto Acosta, economist, former President of the Asamblea Constituyente de Ecuador
Chile
Dr. Haroldo Dilla Alfonso, Profesor Titular, Director of the Instituto de Estudios Internacionales (INTE), Universidad Arturo Prat, Chile
Guatemala
Ana Silvia Monzón, FLACSO, Guatemala
Dominican Republic
Virtudes de la Rosa, professor of the Univerrsidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo
Uruguay
Ramiro Chimuris, economist y abogado, Universidad de la República, Uruguay
Isabel Koifmann, trade unionist, Cooperativa Magisterial, Uruguay
Daniel Ceriotti, licenciado en Nutrición, Universidad de la República, Uruguay
Ernesto Herrera, periodista, Uruguay
Aldo Marchesi, Centro de Estudios Interdisciolinarios, Universidad de la República, Uruguay
Venezuela
Edgardo Lander, Central University of Venezuela

United States
Jeffrey L. Gould, Distinguished Visiting Professor of Modern History, School of Historical Studies, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ, USA
Barbara Weinstein, Silver Professor of Latin American History, New York University, USA
Justin Wolfe, Associate Professor of History, Tulane University, USA
Jocelyn Olcott, Professor of History, Duke University, USA
Michel Gobat, Professor of History, University of Pittsburgh, USA
William I. Robinson Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Global and International Studies, Latin American and Iberian Studies, University of California-Santa Barbara, USA
Dan La Botz, Member of the Editorial Board of New Politics , New York, USA
Steven Volk, Professor of History Emeritus, Oberlin College, Ohio, USA
Dr. Julie A. Charlip, Professor Emerita, Latin American History, Whitman College, USA
Clara E Irazábal Zurita, JEDI Officer, ADVANCE Professor, School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation, University of Maryland, USA
John L. Hammond, Professor of sociology, City University of New York, former collaborator in the Casa del Gobierno, Estelí, 1985-86, United States
Rosalind Bresnahan, California State University San Bernardino (retired), USA
William Bollinger, Latin American Studies, California State University, Los Angeles, USA
Carlos Forment, professor, New School of Social Research, New York, USA
Greg Grandin, Chair Vann Woodward, Professor of History, Yale University, USA
Arturo Escobar, Prof. Emerito de Antropologia, U. of Carolina del Norte, Chapel Hill, USA
Amy C. Offner, Associate Professor of History, University of Pennsylvania, USA
William Aviles, Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska at Kearney, USA
Howard Winant, Distinguished Professor Emeritus, Department of Sociology, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA
Stephen R. Shalom, emeritus professor, William Paterson University, New Jersey
Noam Chomsky, Institute Professor emeritus MIT, Laureate Professor U. of Arizona
Bill Fletcher, Jr., past president, TransAfrica Forum
Alan Wald, H. Chandler Davis Collegiate Professor Emeritus, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
E. Ahmet Tonak, Professor of Economics, Hampshire College, USA
Canada
Jeffery R. Webber, Associate Professor, Department of Politics, York University, Toronto, Canada
Australia
Viviana Canibilo Ramírez, BA (Hons), Dip. Ed., Investigadora Independiente, Senior Teacher of Spanish & Home Economics (retired), NSW & Queensland Depts. of Education (1980-2016), Australia
Robert Austin Henry, Honorary Associate, School of Humanities, University of Sydney, Australia
France
Michael Löwy, Emeritus Research Director at CNRS, France
Eleni Varikas, Emeritus Professor at the University of Paris 8, France
Catherine Samary, economist, Paris Dauphine University
Gustave Massiah, former teacher at the Paris La Villette School of Architecture, France
Claude Serfati, economist, IRES, Paris
Franck Gaudichaud, university professor in Latin American history at Toulouse Jean Jaurès University, France
Christian Tutin, Emeritus University Professor, Paris-Est, France
Pierre Salama, Emeritus University Professor, Economist, Paris-Nord University, France
Jean Malifaud, lecturer at Paris Didedot University, mathematician, France
Alain Bihr, Honorary Professor of Sociology, University of Bourgogne-Franche-Comté (Besançon), France
Roland Pfefferkorn, Emeritus Professor of Sociology, University of Strasbourg, France
Bernard DREANO, economist, President of CEDETIM (Centre for studies and initiatives for international solidarity), France
Natacha Lillo, lecturer, Paris Cité University, France
Thomas Posado, doctor in political science at the University of Paris-8, France
Bruno Percevois, retired pediatrician, France
Olivier Compagnon, historian, Sorbonne Nouvelle University (Institute for Advanced Studies in Latin America), France
Hadrien Clouet, sociologist, deputy for Haute-Garonne
Hubert Krivine, Emeritus Professor of Physics, Pierre and Marie Curie University, France
Luc Quintin, MD, PhD, anesthesiologist (retired), senior investigator (retired), France
Claude Calame, Director of Studies, School of Advanced Studies in Social Sciences, France
Evelyne Perrin, sociologist, Stop Précarité and LDH 94 – French League for the Defense of Human Rights, France
Pierre Cours-Salies, professor emeritus Paris-8, France
John Barzman, Emeritus Professor of Contemporary History, University of Le Havre Normandy, France
Isabelle Garo, Philosopher, France
Christian Mahieux, Union Syndicale Solidaires, International Trade Union Network of Solidarity Aid Struggles, France
Carlos Agudelo, Sociologist, Associate Researcher URMIS, IRD – CNRS – University of Paris – University Côte d’Azur, France
Bruno Percevois, retired pediatrician, France
Natacha Lillo, lecturer, Paris Cité University, France
Laurent Faret, Professor of Geography at Paris-Diderot University, France
Janette Habel, Lecturer at the University of Marne-la-Vallée and at IHEAL, France
Ludivine Bantigny, Historian, Paris, France
Pierre Khalfa, Economist, Copernic Foundation, France
Nicole Abravanel, School of Advanced Studies in Social Sciences, France
Christiane Vollaire, Philosopher, Associate Researcher at CNAM, Paris, France
Esther Jeffers, Professor of Economics, University of Picardie Jules Verne, France
Gilles Bataillon, Sociologist, School of Advanced Studies in Social Sciences, Paris, France
Pierre ROLLE, sociologist, University of Paris-Nanterre, France
Pierre Dardot, philosopher, University of Paris Nanterre, France
Edgard Vidal–Martinez, Center for Research on Arts and Language (EHESS-Paris), France
Christian Laval, Emeritus Professor of Sociology, Paris-Nanterre University, Paris, France
Marc Perelman, Emeritus Professor of Universities, Paris Nanterre University, France
Michel Cahen, CNRS Emeritus Research Director at Sciences Po Bordeaux, France
Josette Trat, sociologist, former teacher-researcher at the University of Paris 8, France
Robert March, Emeritus Lecturer, Faculty of Architecture, Paris, France
Jacques Généreux, University lecturer at Sciences Po. Paris, France
Charlotte Guénard, economist, University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne-IEDES, Paris, France
Belgium
Bernard Duterme, Director CETRI – Tricontinental Center, Belgium
Mateo Alaluf, Honorary Professor Free University of Brussels, Belgium
Andrea Rea, professor at the Free University of Brussels, Belgium
Pierre Marage, Professor Emeritus of the Free University of Brussels, Belgium
Anne Morelli, Professor Emeritus of the Free University of Brussels, Belgium
Marcelle Stroobants, Emeritus Professor of the Free University of Brussels, Belgium
Jean Vogel, teacher Free University of Brussels, Belgium
Éric Toussaint, Doctor of Political Science from the Universities of Paris 8 and Liège, Belgium
Hugues Le Paige, journalist-director, Belgium
Isabelle Stengers, Emeritus Professor Free University of Brussels, Belgium
Francine Bolle, professor at the Free University of Brussels, Belgium
Esteban Martinez, professor Free University of Brussels, Belgium
Fréderic Louault, professor Free University of Brussels, Belgium
Margaux De Barros, Researcher at the Free University of Brussels, Belgium
Laurent Vogel, associate researcher at the European Trade Union Institute, Belgium
Christine Pagnoulle, Honorary Professor at the University of Liège, Belgium
Sylvie Carbonnelle, Assistant in charge of exercises, Institute of Sociology, Free University of Brussels, Belgium
Jean Vandewattyne, Professor, University of Mons, Belgium
Douglas Sepulchre, assistant at the Free University of Brussels, Belgium
Riccardo Petrella, Emeritus Professor of the Catholic University of Louvain (B), Political Economist, Belgium
Perrine Humblet, Professor Emeritus of the Free University of Brussels, Belgium
Corinne Gobin, Emeritus Professor of the Free University of Brussels, Belgium
Michel Caraël, Professor Emeritus of the Free University of Brussels, Belgium
Willy Estersohn, Journalist, Belgium
Jean Puissant, Emeritus Professor Free University of Brussels, Belgium
Ralph Coeckelberghs, former Secretary General of Socialist Solidarity-NGO active in Nicaragua, Belgium
Eric Corijn, Professor of Urban Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), Belgium
Pierre Galand, Emeritus University Professor, ULB, Belgium
Alexis Deswaef, lawyer at the Brussels Bar and vice-president of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Belgium
Patricia Willson, Faculty of Philosophy and Letters, University of Liège, Belgium
Sixtine Van Outryve, doctoral student in law, Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium
Maria Cecilia Trionfetti, researcher, Faculty of Philosophy and Social Sciences, Free University of Brussels, Belgium
Louise de Brabandère, doctor affiliated with the Institute of Sociology of the Free University of Brussels (ULB), Belgium
Netherlands
Tatiana Roa, professor Center for Latin American Research and Documentation Cedla, Amsterdam University, Netherlands
Britain
Alex Callinicos, Emeritus Professor of European Studies, King’s College London
Gilbert Achcar, Professor, SOAS, University of London
Alfredo Saad Filho, Professor, King’s College London
Elisa Van Waeyenberge, Professor, SOAS, University of London
Chris Wickham, Chichele Professor of Medieval History emeritus, University of Oxford, Great Britain
Mike Gonzalez, Emeritus professor, Glasgow university, U.K.
Ken Loach, filmmaker

Spain
Jaime Pastor, Professor of Political Science at the National University of Distance Education (UNED), Madrid, Spain
Marcos Roitman, Professor of Sociology at the Complutense University of Madrid, Spain
Luisa Martín Rojo, Catedrática de Lingüística of the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain
María Trinidad Bretones, titular professor of Sociology at the Universidad de Barcelona, Spain
Antonio García-Santesmases, catedrático de Filosofía Política of the Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia , Spain
Roberto Montoya, writer and periodist, Spain
Carlos Prieto Rodriguez, Professor Emeritus of the Complutense University of Madrid, Spain
Ángeles Ramírez, full professor of social anthropology at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain
Fernando Álvarez-Uría, Catedrático de Sociología of the Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM), Spain
Julia Varela, Catedrática de Sociología of the Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM), Spain
Álvaro Pazos Garciandia, professor of Social Antropology of the Universidad Autónoma Madrid, Spain
Carlos Giménez Romero, professor of Social Antropology of the Universidad Autónoma Madrid, Spain
Juan Carlos Gimeno Martín, professor of Social Antropology of the Universidad Autónoma Madrid, Spain
Marta Cabezas Fernandez, professor of Social Antropology of the Universidad Autónoma Madrid, Spain
Virtudes Téllez Delgado, secretaria académica, Universidad Autónoma, Madrid, Spain
Alba Valenciano i Mañé, professor of Social Antropology of the Universidad Autónoma Madrid, Spain
Alessandro Forina, professor of Social Antropology of the Universidad Autónoma Madrid, Spain
Fructuoso de Castro, professor of Social Antropology of the Universidad Autónoma Madrid, Spain
Pilar Monreal Requena, professor of Social Antropology of the Universidad Autónoma Madrid, Spain
Alicia Campos Serrano, professor of Social Antropology of the Universidad Autónoma Madrid, Spain
Juan Ignacio Robles Picón, professor of Social Antropology of the Universidad Autónoma Madrid, Spain
Paloma Gómez Crespo, professor of Social Antropology of the Universidad Autónoma Madrid, Spain
Héctor Grad, professor of Social Antropology of the Universidad Autónoma Madrid, Spain
Virginia Vaqueira, professor of Social Anthropology of the Universidad Autónoma Madrid, Spain
Carlos Taibo, professor of Ciencia Política de la Universidad Autónoma Madrid, Spain
Maria de la Válgoma, titular professor of Derecho Civil, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España
Alberto Riesco, Professor Complutense University of Madrid, Spain
Julia Peregrin Caballero, Socióloga, Experta en Cooperación Internacional, Madrid, Spain
Italy
Luigi Ferrajoli, professor emerito di “Filosofia del diritto” presso the Università degli Studi Roma Tre, Doctor honoris causa of many universities: Buenos Aires (UBA), Universidad Nacional de La Plata, Universidad de la Repubblica del Uruguay, Academia Brasileira de Direito Constitucional (Curitiba, Brasil), etc.
Pietro Basso, Professore associato di Sociologia – Università Ca’ Foscari / Venezia, Italy
Riccardo Bellofiore, Economista, Italy
Michele Fatica, professor emerito di storia moderna e contemporanea at the Università “L’Orientale” di Napoli, Italy
Paolo Barcella, Professore associato, Dipartimento di Lingue, Letterature e culture straniere, University of the studi di Bergamo, Italy
Portugal
Alda Sousa, University of Porto, Biomedical Sciences, Portugal
Jorge Sequeiros, University of Porto, Medicine, Portugal
Ana Campos, New University of Lisbon, medicine, Portugal
Francisco Louçã, University of Lisbon, economy, Portugal
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Director Emérito Centro de Estudos Sociais, Portugal
Switzerland
Jean Ziegler, emeritus professor of sociology at the University of Geneva, vice-president of the advisory committee of the United Nations Human Rights Council, Switzerland
Sébastien Guex, Honorary Professor University of Lausanne, Switzerland
Bernard Votat, Ordinary Professor, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
Sandra Bott, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Letters, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
Silvia Mancini, Honorary Professor, Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
Malik Mazbouri, Lecturer and Researcher, Faculty of Letters, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
Jean Batou, Honorary Professor, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
Joseph Daher, Visiting Professor, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
Stéfanie Prezioso, Associate Professor, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Lausanne, Switzerland, Member of the Federal Parliament
Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, Associate Professor, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
Nils de Dardel, lawyer, former federal parliamentarian, Geneva, Switzerland
Romolo Molo, lawyer, Geneva, Switzerland
Hans Leuenberger, retired ICRC delegate, Switzerland
Nelly Valsangiacomo, Full Professor, Faculty of Letters, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
Charles-André Udry, economist, Editions Page 2, Switzerland
Nicolas Bancel, Full Professor, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
Pierre Eichenberger, Lecturer and Researcher, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
Pierre Frey, Honorary Professor Federal Polytechnic School, Lausanne, Switzerland
Caroline RENOLD, lawyer, Geneva, Switzerland
Pierre STASTNY, lawyer, Geneva, Switzerland
Maurizio LOCCIOLA, lawyer, Geneva, Switzerland
Christian Dandres, Lawyer, Member of the Federal Parliament, Geneva, Switzerland
Emmanuel Amoos, Member of the Federal Parliament, Valais, Switzerland
Laurence Fehlmann Rielle, Member of the Federal Parliament, Geneva, Switzerland
Nicolas Walder, Member of the Federal Parliament, Geneva, Switzerland
Dr Martine Rais, physician, Switzerland
Cédric Wermuth, Member of the Federal Parliament, Aargau, Switzerland
Pierre-Yves Maillard, Member of the Federal Parliament, Vaud, Switzerland
Sébastien Chauvin, Associate Professor, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
Michel Ducraux, retired ICRC delegate, Switzerland
Cécile Péchu, Lecturer and Researcher, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
Matthieu Leimgruber, Ausserordentlicher Professor Forschungsstelle für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Universität Zürich, Switzerland
Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi, Full Professor, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
Katharina Prelicz-Huber, Member of Federal Parliament, Zurich, Switzerland
Lisa Mazzone, Member of the Federal Parliament, Geneva, Switzerland
Brigitte Crottaz, Member of the Federal Parliament, Vaud, Switzerland
Léonore Porchet, Member of the Federal Parliament, Vaud, Switzerland
Christophe Clivaz, Member of the Federal Parliament, Valais, Switzerland
Delphine Klopfenstein-Broggini, Member of the Federal Parliament, Geneva, Switzerland
Natalie Imboden, Member of Federal Parliament, Bern, Switzerland
Balthasar Glättli, Member of the Federal Parliament, Zurich, Switzerland
Hans-Peter Renk, retired librarian, Le Locle, Switzerland
Sergio Rossi, Full Professor, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences and Management, University of Fribourg, Switzerland
Christian Marazzi, Professor, La Scuola universitaria professionale della Svizzera italiana, Lugano-Tessin, Switzerland
Spartaco Greppi, Professor, Dipartimento di economia aziendale, sanità e sociale, SUPSI, Lugano-Tessin, Switzerland
Austria
Dr. Leo Gabriel, Periodista y Antropólogo, Austria
Christian Zeller, Professor für Wirtschaftsgeographie an der Universität Salzburg, Austria
Germany
Dr. Manfred Liebel, Prof. em. Technische University Berlin, Germany
Dr. Betina Kern, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany from 2008 to 2012 in Nicaragua, Germany
For the latest signatories, see here.

What if We Cancel the Apocalypse?

How the aesthetic, utopian yet pragmatic movement of Solarpunk reimagines a future without a climate catastrophe
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Futuristic concept of cities in the middle of the ocean (Camillo Pasquali, aka millisworlds)

This article originally appeared in New Lines Magazine.

 

In the popular imagination, the future as we know it is currently occupied by various apocalyptic scenarios, as we see in the ongoing predominance of blockbuster movies along these lines. The doom and gloom that is so common on social media (bringing us the term “doomscrolling”) seem to be stuck in a repetitive loop that provides no way out. It is indeed a very common recurrence on social media to see reports on global warming followed by statements such as “we are doomed” or “I can’t handle this anymore.”

What if, instead, we cancel the apocalypse?

Enter Solarpunk. By its simplest definition, Solarpunk is a literary and art movement which imagines what the future could look like if the human species were actually to succeed in solving the major challenges associated with global warming, from reducing global emissions to overcoming capitalist economic growth as the primary motor of human society. These seemingly titanic tasks are actually pragmatic necessities dictated by scientific knowledge. We know, for example, that it is simply impossible to have infinite economic growth on a finite planet. And yet, this impossibility is exactly where we are still heading towards as a species.

We know, in other words, that we need to move towards a situation in which there is some kind of equilibrium between our species and the rest of the natural world. Some popular films already do this — think of Marvel’s Wakanda in “Black Panther” or Hayao Miyazaki’s films. But what is often missing — the gap that Solarpunk is trying to fill — is a positive futurism grounded in our present world. This is why Solarpunk emphasizes community-building and mutual aid. Its imagined futures lie at the intersection of both positive and negative scenarios, all of which are possible, incorporating everything from degrowth or postgrowth to Indigenous rights, feminism, racial justice and decolonization.

Solarpunk is therefore highly pragmatic, while maintaining a utopian spirit. That is, its utopias are not rooted in a desire to avoid dealing with the hardships of the modern world. On the contrary: Solarpunk is a recognition that the modern world is oversaturated with despair and helplessness, and in that context hope can be a radical act. This is what motivated Gerson Lodi-Ribeiro, the Brazilian editor of the first (as far as I can tell) anthology on Solarpunk, published in Portuguese in 2012. When asked by Sarena Ulibarri, who wrote the preface to his edited collection “Solarpunk: Ecological and Fantastical Stories in a Sustainable World,” why he chose Solarpunk instead of the more established Cyberpunk, he replied that Brazil’s “fantastic literature biosphere,” as he called it, was already “polluted” with coal and petroleum. In other words, we are already highly familiar with dystopian and post-apocalyptic futures, and it seems like they have run their course — or at least should have.

This reflects a problem climate scientists have been facing, namely: How do we, as a species, actually effect the change we know is needed? And why is it so difficult to imagine alternatives in the first place? This is what motivated a recent public discussion I had with the climate scientist Julia Steinberger, a lead author on one of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) assessment reports. As a climate scientist, Steinberger knows firsthand that there is a serious rift between what we should be doing as a species to reduce the dangers of global warming and what we are actually doing. It is why she suggested to the Théâtre Vidy-Lausanne in Switzerland to hold this discussion on the theme of “from the IPCC to Solarpunk.”

In our conversation, Steinberger emphasized that we currently have “an incredible amount of knowledge about our situation and where we’re heading.” This knowledge has been mostly obscured by decades of lobbying by the fossil fuel industry, as well as the politicians and media personalities who saw it in their best interest to deny or downplay the urgency of global warming. This has led to two parallel worlds: on the one hand, the world of climate scientists and other experts, as well as climate activists, who are painfully aware of the ever-growing presence of global warming; and, on the other, the consumerist world, where it is still considered “normal” to, at best, treat global warming as a long-term concern rather than one deserving urgent action in the present. This is a world where we continue to destroy rainforests to make way for livestock and oil exploration, where flying everywhere for leisure is still considered ethical, and where vegans are the exceptions rather than the norm. In other words, if we accept the science, the only conclusion is that there is a strong disconnect between what is and what should be considered “normal.”

The idea of a “normal” is what Solarpunk can challenge, by means of such actions as strikes, protests, campaigning and so much more. Take, for example, “The Boston Hearth Project,” a short story by T.X. Watson featured in “Sunvault: Stories of Solarpunk and Eco-Speculation” (edited by Phoebe Wagner and Brontë Christopher Wieland), published in 2017 and set in 2022. The protagonist, Andie Freeman, is applying to a university and has to answer the following essay question: “When have you worked well as part of a team?” Instead of the usual answers — working in an NGO or a private company, for example — Andie tells the story of how a group of people took over a building in Boston to shelter homeless people and protect them from the winter. The context is set at the start of the story: Climate change has made weather patterns more erratic, which in Boston has translated into homeless people dying from exposure to the cold. Rather than dealing with the issue, the city of Boston opted to build a “custom-engineered closed system” called the Hale Center, where rich people could go to avoid dealing with the misery of the outside world.

The Hale Center is a “smart building,” meaning it functions as a self-sustaining ecosystem with water filters, oxygen scrubbers, carefully-controlled algae population and so on. It has huge triple gates that can slam the building shut to “manage its climate internally in extreme weather.” This is meant to keep “undesirable” people out — the homeless, in this case — but the activists used that technology against its intended purpose, i.e., for the homeless and against the police and government.

The plan was to occupy it, take over system control, let homeless people in and fight off the cops who would inevitably seek to take back the occupied building. The story shares similarities with popular movies and series like “Ocean’s Eleven” and “Casa de Papel” (“Money Heist” in English). The differences, however, are crucial. First, climate change is the problem that the protagonists are trying to tackle. Second, rather than stealing money to enrich themselves, the activists are taking a taxpayer-funded building being used for exclusive purposes and converting it into a functioning public space.

After successfully entering the building and kicking the guard out, they let in 200-odd homeless people to find shelter from the cold. When the police inevitably arrive, the activists trap them between two of the gates and use the building’s heating control to increase the temperature to 115 F (46 C). This forces the cops to remove their armor or risk heatstroke. At that moment, ten activists who were waiting in a different, cooler room, allow the cops to enter in small numbers at a time, disarm them, destroy and throw their weapons away, then let them go out in nothing but T-shirts and underwear. The irony of the situation is hard to miss: In the Boston winter cold, the cops cannot survive without going back to their homes, a right denied to the homeless. Only through direct confrontation was that made apparent.

The Solarpunk element of the story is the idea that climate-related challenges are going to increase, yet by thinking and organizing together we are able to arrive at concrete solutions to specific problems. Unlike the more common climate-related apocalyptic stories we’re all familiar with, agency is given back to humans who, when sufficiently organized, are able to change their living conditions. Another important Solarpunk feature is the fact that Andie is disabled and a wheelchair user, which in no way prevented them from achieving their goal of creating a better society. Rather than being referred to in a passive way as someone devoid of agency, Andie is one of the leaders of the operation, using Augmented Reality to guide in teammate Juniper before three other organizers pick them and their equipment up to follow Juniper into the building.

The group successfully withstands a 49-day siege by the police, partly thanks to a social media team that was able to build popular support and bring the city to the negotiation table. After the siege, the Boston Hearth Project is officially recognized by the city and renamed the Boston Hearth Homeless Shelter. New York and Portland followed suit, turning over building projects to activists to avoid similar hostile takeovers. As the building was designed to protect the indoors against the outdoors elements, the Boston Hearth Project led to a 92% decline in deaths by exposure in winter. Andie finishes their university application by saying they hope this experience in team-building makes them a great candidate.

The story is an example of why Solarpunk came out of, and was a response to, Cyberpunk. Unlike Cyberpunk futures, famously defined by the author Bruce Sterling as a “combination of lowlife and high tech,” Solarpunk futures are stubbornly positive visions of a world of “highlife,” where tech is neither necessarily high nor low, but rather adapted to the needs of humankind and the natural world. In “The Boston Hearth Project,” “high tech” such as Augmented Reality and the “smart” building are used as tools needed to fight for a greater good, but they are just as important as the “low tech” equipment such as Andie’s wheelchair. Solarpunk refuses to accept that Cyberpunk futures are the only ones capable of motivating change in the present. There are only so many ways one can be told that the future is going to be dark. At some point, there has to be concrete imaginaries readily available for anyone who wishes to cancel the apocalypse. Solarpunk can provide a much-needed critique of the hegemony of apocalyptic visions of the future.

This does not mean that we should pretend everything is fine. The growing awareness of terms such as “climate anxiety,” “climate grief” and “ecoanxiety,” usefully explained by the French Green politician Melanie Vogel as the result of experiencing the climate crisis yet simultaneously seeing nothing done to tackle it, is a good indication that everything is not fine. Rather, Solarpunk is merely the conclusion that daily anxiety and grief are simply not sufficient. They more often than not lead to paralysis, which in turn can lead to a learned helplessness and despair and render us unable to handle the realities of an increasingly warming world. With global warming already making so much of our world worse, recognizing what we have and what we can build is a must. As Kevin Kahakula’akea John Fong writes in a different context, “Finding joy in the struggle requires us to look, hear, feel, and receive deeply … to hold onto them, and let them be a salve of comfort and respite as we struggle to fill the void left by the loss of loved ones, of work, school, our connections with family and friends, our daily routines, our communities, and even life as we once knew it.” The worse the suffering and pain caused by climate change get, the more Fong’s words ring true.

While a blog post titled “from steampunk to solarpunk,” notably published amidst the 2007-2008 financial crash, may mark the first use of the term, it also seems to have been coined independently in many other places and in different languages at different times. This is likely owing to the widespread understanding of the term cyberpunk, and a subsequent need to respond to it with something positive and seemingly sustainable. Indeed, in these spaces, sibling genres such as ecopunk, greenpunk, hopepunk, eco-speculation and others are also imagined, written, drawn and talked about, and they are sometimes used interchangeably with Solarpunk. It is only in recent years that the term Solarpunk has become a way for people to self-identify. Clearly, all these terms, and the many ways and places where they have arisen, reflect a desire expressed by many around the globe to, as it were, cancel the apocalypse.

Andrew Dana Hudson’s book “Our Shared Storm: A Novel of Five Climate Futures” is an example of a book that is not Solarpunk, but serves a similar purpose. (Hudson has also written Solarpunk stories as well as an analysis of the political dimensions of the genre.) The book consists of five different stories set in Buenos Aires, 2056, during yet another round of the UN climate negotiations known as “the Conference of the Parties,” or COP. Each of Hudson’s stories adapts one of the IPCC’s five Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (or SSPs), scenarios of projected socioeconomic global changes up to the year 2100, better known as SSP1 through to SSP5. We can simply think of them as different scenarios of what our world could look like in the coming decades based on the different actions we do or do not take today and in subsequent years. Though climate scientists have questioned the usefulness of SSPs in terms of accuracy, what Andrew Dana Hudson does in the book is a helpful exercise in thinking through future possibilities.

Each of the five SSPs requires certain actions to be taken for it to become more likely. For example, SSP1 projects a world of sustainability-focused growth and equality, while SSP3 projects a fragmented world of “resurgent nationalism” and SSP5 a world of rapid and unconstrained growth in economic output and energy use. The SSPs alone, however, don’t say much. They are just projections, after all, which depend on actions taken in the present and near-future. But achieving the better scenarios rather than the worse ones requires a vision of the future which is able to encompass the required complexities. In other words, we have to actually have some idea, or multiple ideas, of what it is we are trying to build, not just in terms of wishing for a more just world in a broad sense, but also in terms of visualizing the textures, colors, smells, sounds and emotions of this future world we need and want. What does housing look like in a greener city that is oriented towards the commons and which allows and even encourages its inhabitants to live in dignity? Is there room for rewilding projects in cities? Are people generally happier in this future? If so, why? What has changed in their material reality that makes such happiness more reachable?

This is one reason why we need a multiplicity of genres, as Solarpunk alone cannot supply the entire human species with enough stories and imaginaries to tackle a problem as multilayered and complex as global warming. Our Shared Storm shows how a certain Solarpunk “spirit” can permeate non-Solarpunk stories and serve the same purposes. The goal is similar but the paths taken can be different. As Solarpunk stories are meant to find ways to cancel the apocalypse, being able to picture that apocalypse and its various permutations is obviously useful.

Similarly, Solarpunk is in conversation with and can encompass Afro, Indigenous, disability and queer futurisms, feminism, anarchism and other anti-authoritarian leftwing currents, decolonial practices, and any movement or school of thought which seeks to better our living conditions while respecting planetary boundaries. In an article titled, “In Search of Afro-Solarpunk,” Rob Cameron argues that neither the “arc of history” (to quote Barack Obama’s adaptation of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.) nor science fiction naturally bend towards justice, which is why “both must be bent.”

“There is no just future,” he continues, “built atop (or buried under) the dystopian wreckage of an environment in freefall.” In other words, canceling the apocalypse can only be done with the acknowledgment that justice can only be achieved through human action, and such action can be informed by Solarpunk futures.

For that reason, it is normal to see conversations around Solarpunk stories turn into mutual aid tips, self and collective care, unionizing and so on, reflecting “a fundamentally DIY impulse.” One example is “permablitzing” guides. The Trinidadian YouTuber Andrewism, who incidentally also has a “What is Solarpunk?” video, has a useful guide to the basics of permablitzing and how to do it. Essentially, permablitzing is an informal gathering of two or more people dedicated to learning how to grow edible gardens, share skills regarding permaculture and sustainable living, and create communities in the process.

In a Solarpunk world, it is not enough to learn how to garden alone, even though it can be a healthy and meditative process in itself. Instead, knowledge should be shared with the intent of building community and the commons, thereby posing a challenge to the aforementioned combination of “lowlife and high tech” that already saturates current imaginaries of the future. Permablitzing is a form of Solarpunk in action. It is not sufficient to tackle global warming, but it can help provide a space for empowering individuals to see the future as their own, something to be acted upon and shaped. Those who cannot, for various reasons, take part in the act of gardening itself can still participate in a permablitzing through conversation, assistance or moral support. They can help design the garden, pick which vegetables to grow, spread the word, bring in funds and so on. There is always a role to play regardless of one’s abilities.

This is why I say that Solarpunk is both pragmatic and utopian. It has to incorporate the latter because that allows us to push the boundaries of what is considered possible. At the same time, being pragmatic is a way of bringing back the reader (or listener) to the present after temporarily escaping into a Solarpunk story. For example, a Solarpunk story set in Gaza in the year 2040 could imagine climate change-related challenges that the Palestinians there would be facing then, and imagine ways of solving them. This would be told in a story in a setting with its own specificity which differs from, say, a story set in Paris in that same year. A Solarpunk story set in Gaza 2040 would therefore have to respect the specific history of that city while also trying to imagine what it could look like free of colonialism, apartheid, patriarchy and other forms of oppression. In that world, are there still two nation-states (Israel and Egypt) restricting the freedom of movement of Palestinians in Gaza? What is the access to resources such as water like? Could permablitzing be one tool against societal atomization brought about by an oppressive state? What are the heatwaves like? Are they dealing with droughts? Is the Mediterranean a source of recreation and abundance, or an intimidating body of water rendered more dangerous by global warming? How are relations with their neighbors?

I chose a less usual example to argue that Solarpunk should — and, to some extent, already does — challenge the centrality of cities such as London, Paris, New York and so on, simply because those cities already receive a lot of attention in our collective imagination. Think of how frequently stories are set in those cities versus a Kinshasa, a Tripoli, a Cuzco or a Port Moresby. Global warming is already affecting our world, and we know the impacts are being felt disproportionately on the peripheries, in the Global South. The Middle East is already the world’s most water-short region, while states like Qatar and Saudi Arabia remain among the world’s most prolific producers of global warming-inducing fossil fuels. The region’s water supply has shrunk to a quarter of its 1960 level and there are real risks that the area historically known as the Fertile Crescent (from Iraq to Israel-Palestine, taking in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan) will, according to the Arab Forum for Environment and Development (AFED), “lose all signs of fertility if the situation continues as it is.”

As the challenges won’t be the same, neither can the Solarpunk stories aiming to provide different frameworks for those wishing to affect the present. The myriad of futures require a myriad of imaginaries able to deal with them. Solarpunk both tracks and guides our responses to climate change, giving us a way out of apocalyptic despair which only hampers our ability to deal with what is, after all, already an emergency.

The Decline of Rentier Communism in Cuba

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Since July 11, 2021, when there were many street protests throughout the nation’s territory, Cuba has been in a state of persistent agitation. According to the Cuban blog El Toque, between September 28 and October 12, ninety-two protests took place in thirty-six municipalities, twelve of them located in Havana’s metropolitan area. These were due to a large extent to the damages caused by hurricane Ian, including a nation-wide blackout. Many Cubans went out to protest in the streets, helped by the darkness that made more difficult their identification by the repressive organs of the state. Although this blackout was very extensive and long-lasting, it has not been the only one in recent times caused by the lack of maintenance, official negligence, and energy shortages due to a significant degree to the reduction of oil shipments from Venezuela. The long blackout resulted in thousands of Cubans losing their refrigerated food, worsening the already critical food situation.

The shortage of energy sources and the poor and inadequate upkeep of the electrical plants in Cuba is part of a broader economic crisis that has affected the country for a long time. International left circles attribute the responsibility for that crisis to the United States’ economic blockade, which has been in force since the beginning of the 1960s. There is no doubt that the blockade, which deserves to be regarded as criminal, has damaged the island’s economy as for example in its obstructions of Cuba’s economic relations with other countries, because of the American retaliations against foreign capitalist firms and individuals who invest in Cuba. During the presidency of Donald Trump, the economic blockade was deepened by restricting the number of airline flights and the limited financial and commercial transactions that had been formerly allowed. In addition, Trump designated Cuba as a “state sponsor of terrorism,” a serious accusation with negative political and economic consequences. For its part, President Joseph Biden’s Democratic Party administration has made no major changes in Cuba policy and has maintained the designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism. However, the Biden administration did relax the restrictions on the sending of money remittances to Cuba, allowed more flights, and permitted some categories of U.S. citizens to travel to the island.

Nevertheless, the very nature of the economic system that prevails in the island has been more important than the U.S. blockade as a cause of Cuba’s problems. This system promotes far greater indifference, apathy, and lack of responsibility and incentives, be they economic or political, than would be the case if there were democratic control by the workers and the nation in general, especially in the predominant state economic sector. The apathy and lack of incentives is reflected in the fact that only 55 percent of Cubans in their productive years participate in the labor force, one of the lowest rates in Latin America.

Additionally, the blundering politics of the Cuban government have worsened the gravity of the economic problems in the country. This was the case of the long postponed monetary unification, to make the Cuban peso the only currency in circulation thereby eliminating the CUC, a species of substitute for the dollar and the euro created in 1994. The government decreed that the supposed monetary unification would occur on January 1, 2021, based on a 1 to 24 ratio between the dollar and the Cuban peso. But such an exchange rate was in fact very generous given the state of the Cuban economy because it assumed a notable increase in the productivity of labor, which of course did not occur in the absence of the indispensable structural transformations. The proposed monetary exchange also ignored the considerable scarcity of dollars and euros due to the major reduction in the number of tourists because of the Covid pandemic. The numbers speak for themselves. In 2017, tourism in Cuba reached its historic peak with 4,143,000 tourists. Trump’s hostile measures against Cuba, which made the visits of people residing in the U.S. to Cuba more difficult, was the principal factor in the reduction of the number of visitors to 3,651,000 in 2019. But the expansion of the Covid pandemic delivered a mortal blow to tourism when the number of visitors to Cuba dramatically went down to 1,085,000 in 2020 and only 356,000 in 2021. It is not surprising that because of the pandemic, the GDP dropped 10.9 percent in 2020. It is true that it grew 1.3 percent in 2021, although over a lower base.

Faced with the economic situation in Cuba at the end of 2020, Cuban economists like Carmelo Mesa Lago, among others, predicted that the monetary unification would not be successful and would provoke a high rate of inflation. Indeed, the rate of inflation rapidly rose to 77.3 percent in 2021. Meanwhile, the shortage of dollars and euros led to a considerable rise in their values, to the extent that as I am finishing this translation on November 14, the US dollar is worth 178 pesos or 7.41 times the official rate of 24 to 1.

The shortage of dollars and euros had widespread repercussions, both social and political. The Cuban economy increasingly came to depend on Cubans abroad, with the creation of the MLC (Monedas Libremente Convertibles – Freely Exchangeable Currencies) stores that only accept currencies such as the dollar and the euro. It is worth mentioning the very high prices that prevail in those stores, taking advantage of the absence of alternatives for Cuban consumers. The obligation imposed on those consumers to deposit the money coming from foreign remittances in MLC credit cards, serves the purpose of minimizing any leaks from the remittances for other purposes not controlled by the monopolistic and undemocratic Cuban state.

The social consequences of the predominant role assumed by the foreign remittances are enormous, because only 40 percent of the Cuban population receives them (obviously in substantially varying quantities). That implies that 60 percent of Cubans do not get them and therefore confront great difficulties in obtaining food and other essential articles that are only available for those who have access to foreign currencies. It is very important to note that the Afro-Cuban population is very disproportionally represented in that 60 percent. It is very evident that inequality and poverty have significantly increased in Cuba, although this cannot be documented with the relevant statistics because the authorities have not published them for over twenty years. Faced with such a situation, one would expect an increase in state social expenditures, but the opposite has occurred.

The legalization of small and medium-sized enterprises (PYMES) in 2021, which allows private companies to employ as many as 100 workers, has created a new economic and social phenomenon the consequences of which we cannot yet entirely appreciate. So far, we must note that some of the new rich owners of the PYMES are linked to the Cuban government, and particularly to State Security (Seguridad del Estado). This seems to be the case of the apparently successful Jona’s Surl, a shoe factory located in Camajuaní in Central Cuba. Its legal advisor is a man called Yoandry Riverón, identified as “agent Cristian” of State Security, involved in the expulsion of several students and professors from the Universidad Central de Las Villas. In this context, the resemblance between this and what has happened in the Russian Federation, is not surprising. As we know, the siloviki, the “strong men” close to Putin, come from the Russian secret and intelligence services, the police, and the armed forces. It is also the case of Putin himself, who was for many years a state security agent of the USSR in Germany. This group has played a critical role in the development of authoritarian capitalism in that country.

The Rentier State

One of the significant causes of the decline of the Cuban economy and society in the last several years is its growing rentier tendency, which has become particularly noticeable among its ruling circles. We can clearly understand the nature of rentier economics in the classic case of the owners of property in the cities, who obtain profits not through the productivity of their invested capital, but primarily because of the economic and social changes in the geographic spaces within which their properties are located. As we know, the improvements that a proprietor may make in a house or apartment form a relatively small part of the commercial value of that property, compared with the value of the land on which it was built. Hence the American expression common in real estate circles, “location, location, location” to refer to the source of the value of the real estate they are buying and selling.

With respect to land ownership, Karl Marx – who always tried to avoid the use of moral and ethical categories in his economic analyses – nevertheless argued in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 that landlords’ rights had their origin in theft. In that context, Marx extensively cites Adam Smith with approval when the latter argued that landlords love to reap where they never sowed and demand a rent even for the natural produce of the earth. Such rentier politics and attitudes frequently encourage an economically opportunist attitude because they allow obtaining maximum advantage from the situation in which owners find themselves since the rate of profit does not primarily depend on what proprietors may do to improve their holdings.

This was the case of the prerevolutionary Cuban big landlords and can also express itself in an indifferent if not hostile attitude towards the productivity of agriculture and of manufacturing industry in extractivist economies such as that of the big oil-producing countries. This is the case of Venezuela, for example, a rich nation due in great part to the accidental fact that it possesses rich oil reserves in its territory, where we can notice the indifference to if not the abandonment of agriculture, a development that took place long before the economic crisis of recent years.

Rentier Economics and Politics in Cuba

By the time of the post Second World War period, the economic ups and downs created by the cyclical nature of the world’s consumption of sugar, encouraged in the island a climate of uncertainty that had an impact on all social classes, although obviously to very different degrees. The rentier mentality that resulted from such a situation affected broad sectors of the wealthy classes in a way that discouraged entrepreneurship and risk taking. In 1951, the already classic Report on Cuba published by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (predecessor of the World Bank) pointed out that Cuban banks had a high degree of liquidity and the profits accumulated by Cuban capital tended to be exported or invested in real estate or financial speculation inside the country.

Beyond this phenomenon, the dependency on a single economic activity and product encouraged a fatalist attitude towards economic diversification, expressed by the sugar magnate José Manuel Casanova with his famous phrase, “there is no country without sugar.” It is not surprising that an attitude expressed by important sectors of the ruling class influenced the peoples’ mentality to reinforce the importance of fate and chance and the notion that the favorable circumstances that people may encounter should be put to maximum advantage, even for reasons that these people themselves may not have yet understood. These were some of the principal manifestations of the rentier ideology of those years.

It is true that the first years of the revolution witnessed a rebellion against many old Cuban ills, including rentier ideology and practices. These would be fought with an agrarian reform that would transform agriculture into a modern sector and with social justice, and with a rapid industrialization based on the same principles. In addition, the proposed changes for both sectors were conceived in the context of creating a balanced economic development for the country without the eight-months long “dead season” of the sugar industry for rural workers or the massive unemployment for the fifty thousand young people that, according to the estimates, joined the labor force every year.

Nevertheless, by the end of the sixties, and to a certain degree facilitated by the far-fetched and fanciful economic ideas and practices of the government, as well as by the lack of experience of most of the new administrators, the international division of labor was imposed by the powerful pressures of the Soviet Union’s empire. The leaders of the USSR succeeded in convincing Fidel Castro that Cuba should fully return to the kingdom and cult of sugar. Fidel Castro fulfilled his part of the agreement, way beyond what the USSR might have expected, with the disastrous 10-million-ton sugar crop campaign in 1969-70. Fidel Castro’s campaign not only failed, but also disorganized the rest of the Cuban economy with the diversion of resources, such as the transport of raw materials and consumer goods, to incorporate them into the sugar campaign.

While it is true that in subsequent years important changes were made in the sugar industry, such as the mechanization of the gathering and collection of sugar cane, there was not at the same time an integral modernization of the industry. The huge land extensions reserved for the cultivation of sugar cane were ill-treated for many years, including the years immediately preceding the crisis of the nineties. As a result, these lands suffered erosion, overexploitation, salinity, high acidity, inadequate drainage, and compactness. The big sugar crops of the eighties worsened those problems. Average production of sugar in the first half of the eighties was 7.35 million of tons, while in the second half of that decade it was 7.48 million tons. In 1988-1989 the sugar crop was 8.1 million tons. A consequence of these huge sugar crops was that according to the information provided by the Cuban Ministry of Agriculture in November of 2009, 70 percent of the arable land lost considerable fertility.

Thus, long before the crisis of the nineties the Cuban government had adopted a type of rentier politics, perhaps because it became accustomed to and took for granted Soviet subsidies year after year and did not even consider that there might be great reductions, let alone their complete elimination. It was perhaps due to this kind of rentier politics that the Cuban government made insufficient efforts to diversify agriculture during the relatively good years of the eighties. This would have included the production of renewable energy based on bagazo (leftovers of sugar cane after it has been ground in the sugar mills), alcohol, paper, and animal feed, besides of course using sugar to develop ethanol, which was the diversification road followed by other sugar giants such as Brazil.

In contrast with other Soviet-type states, Fidel Castro’s Cuba almost never developed a serious developmentalist orientation, and it is highly doubtful that the present political bureaucracy has that orientation, beyond mere survival. On one hand, this has been a good thing to the extent that the country did not develop a systematic economic growth offensive in Stalin’s or Mao Zedong’s style, who totally ignored working class and popular welfare. Nevertheless, it is important to note the innumerable government campaigns to increase the rate of exploitation of urban and rural workers as well as peasants through the grossly misnamed “voluntary labor,” “socialist emulation” and other manipulative techniques. To a great extent, such campaigns were caused not only (as the Cuban government argued) by the U.S. imperialist blockade, but also by the systematic inefficiency and waste of time and resources by the island’s political bureaucracy.

The great emigration from 2021 to 2022

Today, the government’s rentier practices manifest themselves in its exploitation and dependence on the remittances sent by the growing number of emigrants. This politics and attitude are also reflected in the systematic exploitation of the Cuban emigrants by their own government as in the cases of the high cost of all kinds of passports, licenses and permits. For example, Cubans abroad must pay 225 dollars to renew their passports.

It is worth noting in this context that since November 2021 the government of Nicaragua, which is very close to Cuba’s, has allowed the free entry of Cuban citizens and has become the indispensable bridge to undertake the costly and dangerous road to the United States. Such Nicaraguan “liberality” has facilitated what has become one of the biggest emigration waves in Cuba’s history. During the U.S.’s last fiscal year – from October 1, 2021, to September 30, 2022 – almost 200, 000 Cubans entered the United States as asylum seekers or refugees, which is much higher than the 125, 000 Cubans who departed from the Cuban port of Mariel and entered the United States in the spring of 1980. As usually happens with relatively voluntary emigration waves, the people who leave are the younger and potentially more productive part of their home countries.

Considering the demographic crisis that Cuba has been undergoing for several decades, with an increasing proportion of retirees and older people, the current migratory wave will worsen the lack of demographic equilibrium, and the corresponding economic problems. But in the meantime, the 200,000 Cubans who have just emigrated will send remittances to their families. Nevertheless, a time will come when so many people will have left that far fewer will remain to expect, receive, and even demand that they be sent remittances.

In what economic activities is capital invested in Cuba?

Cuba saves and invests a very low proportion of its GDP (Gross Domestic Product), and certainly much less than it is necessary for a sustainable economy to grow and be able to significantly improve the standard of living of its population. Aside from that, it is worth noting how the distribution of state investments minimizes economic transformation activities such as agriculture, in favor of the construction of new hotels, many of which will be administered by foreign firms (especially Spanish ones). According to figures provided by the National Office of Statistics and Information – Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas e Información (ONEI) — in 2021, the year in which the pandemic wreaked major havoc in Cuba, 35.2 percent of state investments were made in tourism, 2.9 percent in agriculture, cattle and forestry, 1.2 percent in education and 1.7 percent in public health and social assistance. This has been the pattern of investment during the last several years. What is ironic and shocking is that – as was pointed out by the Cuban economist Pedro Monreal – even though in the three years before the pandemic the rate of hotel room occupation was low (around 50 percent between 2016 and 2020) the Cuban government kept increasing its tourist investments.

The situation we just described leads us to two conclusions. In the first place, we see the similarity between what was observed by the Report on Cuba at the beginning of the fifties and what is taking place now in terms of the rentier options chosen by the current government. In the second place, these options demonstrate the great power, without accountability to the people, that has been acquired by government groups such as GAESA (the business arm of the Cuban Armed Forces) that administers a huge economic emporium and plays a critical role in the construction of new hotels. This institution acts more to enlarge its own power and influence than to achieve a significant improvement of the Cuban economy. Here we can see how democratic control from below of the most important decisions, and public protest, not only constitute real democracy and the self-determination of people but are an economic necessity for the working class and the people in general. Instead of spending fortunes to build new hotels for non-existing tourists, the government should be forced to improve agriculture, provide a better supply of energy and electricity, and start a long-range program to improve housing.

The Erosion of the Legitimacy of Rentier Communism in Cuba

 There are clear signals that the legitimacy of the Cuban regime has declined in the last few years. We must consider the substantial changes in the generational composition of the Cuban population. Approximately one third of the people were born since 1990, when the Soviet bloc collapsed. This generation continues to experience crises after more crises. Their parents and grandparents also went through many crises, but at least enjoyed the compensation of the social mobility of the first revolutionary decades, especially Black Cubans. It was then a very austere social order that nevertheless guaranteed the satisfaction of the most basic needs.

While such a demographic change is occurring, the historic generation of political leaders is gradually meeting its inevitable biological destiny and dying. This was the case of Fidel Castro who retired for health reasons in 2006 and died ten years later. His younger brother Raúl, who is already 91 years old, substituted for him for several years, and although on several occasions has continued to appear at public events, retired from the presidency of the republic in 2018 and from the leadership of the Cuban Communist Party in 2021. Other historic figures like José Ramón Machado Ventura and Ramiro Valdés Menéndez are both over ninety years of age and no longer members of the Political Bureau of the Cuban Communist Party, although the latter continues to hold a high government position as vice president of the Council of State. Many armed forces generals, including those who fought in Angola, Ethiopia, and other African countries, have retired, or died.

The present president, Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, was born after the victory of the revolution in 1959, as is also the case for Prime Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz. Both are typical of the second generation of bureaucrats, who did not participate in the guerrilla insurrection in the mountains or in the even more difficult and dangerous urban struggle against the Batista dictatorship. Their popular support and prestige, like that of the other members of their generation of leaders, are far below that of the historic leaders.

In the popular explosions that have taken place since 2021, thousands of Cubans have publicly insulted Díaz-Canel with an obscene epithet signifying that he is a very bad person. It is hard to imagine the Cuban masses yelling the same insult at Fidel Castro or even at Raúl Castro. To sum up, this is the price that these purely bureaucratic leaders must pay for replacing the historic leaders. Of course, much more important is that these new leaders do not have the political capital or capacity of their predecessors to stay indefinitely in power.

 

Samuel Farber was born and raised in Marianao, Cuba. He has written many books and articles about that country as well as about other political topics. He is a retired professor at the City University of New York (CUNY). The above essay is a translation of an article with the same title that appeared in Spanish in La Joven Cuba, the most important left-wing Cuban blog, on November 7, 2022.

Czech Grandmothers with Ukraine

A Conversation with Czech Activist Anna Ŝabatová
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[Prague] Anna Ŝabatová knows what it is to fight Russian imperialism. In the 1970s she and her husband Peter Uhl, who died last year, were active in Czechoslovakia in the movement for democracy, human rights, and national sovereignty. Both served time in prison for their opposition to the government. Today Ŝabatová has joined a group of women who are fellow veterans of the fight against the Czech Communist government and the Soviet Union’s domination of their country in a network called Grandmothers with Ukraine.

As a student activist in the early 1970s, Ŝabatová was arrested by the Communist government for her involvement in distributing leaflets during the parliamentary elections and sentenced in November 1971 to three years in prison, but was paroled in December 1973, though she could no longer continue her university studies in philosophy. In 1977 she signed Charter 77, a citizens’ initiative criticizing the “political and state power” for violating human and civil rights that it had promised to respect when it signed the final act agreement of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975. In 1978 she became co-founder of the Committee in Defense of the Unduly Prosecuted.

While her husband was imprisoned from 1979 to 1984, she continued their political work, publishing the movement’s newspaper Informace o Chartě 77. While working and raising three children she continued to be active as the spokesperson for the Polish-Czechoslovak Solidarity campaign.

After the Velvet Revolution, the mass movement that ended Communist rule in December 1989, she worked at the independent East European Information Agency and also returned to her studies at the university. In the Czech Republic, she served in government in 2001 as deputy public defender of human rights. She continues her political work today.

“I tend to be a pacifist,” said Ŝabatová, “and I was on 24 February when Russia invaded Ukraine, but when I saw what was happening, I thought, Ukraine has to defend itself. The Ukrainians must defend themselves and we must support the Ukrainians.”

When Ukrainian refugees from the Russian war on Ukraine began to arrive in the Czech Republic, Ŝabatová volunteered to take in a Ukrainian woman and her child. They stayed with her for five weeks until she and her fellow solidarity activists were able to find the woman an apartment of her own.

As the war went on, Ŝabatová and a group of other like-minded women of her age who had long been involved in the fight for democracy and national sovereignty in Ukraine decided to form Grandmothers with Ukraine. She says that the majority of Czechs support Ukraine. The Social Democratic Party supports Ukraine, but the Communist Party is ambivalent. Neither party is currently in government.

The Czech left is weak, she says, with no seats in parliament at present. While the Pirat party is sometimes described as the country’s left party, she says they are not really. Still there are leftwing publications online such as A2LARM and Denik Referendum. Ŝabatová is currently involved with people in the Social Democratic and Green parties to form an alliance, officially approved by those parties, to run a slate in the Prague municipal elections.

Deconstructing Campist Narratives on Ukraine

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This is part 3 of a 3-part series. Read part 1 here and part 2 here.

Many analyses tend to present the “Western left” as a vague and meaningless amalgam, making no separation between the many thousands of movements and many millions of thinkers within it. Here I refer specifically to the “anti-war left” as a subunit of the “Western left” to identify the main culprit of campist sentiment, instead of grouping all progressive movements across Europe, North America, and Australia/New Zealand into collective guilt for the behavior of one faction. In this series, “anti-war left” does not necessarily refer to every organization that may espouse occasional campist tendencies, but rather the organizations that specialize in campist activism and campist thought leading.

Imagine If the US Invaded Mexico Today

The campist binary on Ukraine insists, ad nauseum, that there is a NATO and a Russia. Forget all social nuance whatsoever, let us reduce everything to two structural monoliths so that thinking is more convenient and less nuanced.

Let us consider a scenario on the opposite end of the campist binary, which has already been presented in a more abstract world systems assessment by Chomsky. An event that could very plausibly become a reality someday: the US invades Mexico for the purpose of annexing land, extracting resources, and causing total destruction under the pretext of fighting cartels. The Mexican resistance happens to be armed by the Russian and Chinese states. The resistance, comprised of a large portion of the Mexican population fighting for their homeland and livelihood, is likewise led by a Mexican regime that is the exoskeleton of its oligarchy, antagonizing workers and favoring nationalists. Eliminating the cartels acts as the most likely casus belli of this hypothetical invasion, the US version of “denazification.”

Now imagine “anti-war left” logic on Ukraine applied to this scenario, Mexicans must be conflated with cartels, or even the reactionary forces of the Catholic Church. Suddenly the territorial integrity of the US state is legitimate, the Russian and Chinese states are fully responsible for the invasion simply because they pulled the bordering ruling class into their sphere of influence. This is simultaneously laughable and concerning to think about, given the fact that this invasion is not an impossible one at all (it happened already in 1846). Now compare this scenario to Ukraine. In both cases, the conquest-driven exchange of a property system from domestic to colonial necessitates resistance. It would only be ethically consistent as an internationalist to support the resistance in both cases, as both cases are populations in self-defense. It would be entirely inconsistent to support one resistance but not the other.

Conflation of World Systems Analysis With Social Analysis

Fusion of neorealism with campism yields a quite literally nearsighted approach to international relations. First, it suggests that the nation-state system is a zero-sum game between a binary of two powers where one must be prioritized over the other. Second, that the US is the sole problem with all nation-states, functioning as this unipolar monolith of global oppression that must be the sole priority in all organizing, while every other power structure across the world is irrelevant no matter how close or distant its relations with the US.

Centering of the US as a monolith of structural hegemony implicitly antagonizes the interconnected struggles of all marginalized populations by reducing their conditions to an actor that is often only indirectly involved, if at all. Take the historical marginalization of the Tigrayan people in Ethiopia for example, who have been oppressed by Ethiopian power structures for centuries. There is no world systems analysis that can explain how domestic Ethiopian power structures have oppressed Tigrayans for centuries. Though foreign actors have manipulated these power structures and worsened them, world systems analysis does not and cannot address the social foundations of the problem. This likewise applies to a large portion of historically marginalized peoples across the world, Ukrainians included.

Attempts to conflate world systems analysis with social analysis often culminate in social Darwinism, whether intentionally or unintentionally holding ethnic hegemony as a valid status quo. The US is not responsible for creating most of the world’s social power structures, but it is responsible for manipulating them. The US has manipulated Ukrainian power structures to their own disadvantage, but it certainly has not created them. To say that the US has created Ukrainian power structures is to say that the US was present in the time of Kievan Rus and responsible for the separation of Ukrainian identity from Russian identity over a millennium ago, long before “the West” even existed as a coherent political bloc. Well hmm, this delusion of Ukrainians appearing out of nowhere and having no valid identity sounds quite familiar.

Immediate Disarmament as a Privileged Expectation

In the US “anti-war left” in particular, intellectual laziness on internationalism is often derived from the privilege of not living next to a state power that will brutalize and murder everyone around you. Many elements of the Eastern European left, for example, feel that membership in NATO is more of an existential topic than a political one. This is held to the degree that questioning NATO membership is sometimes perceived as favoring annexation.

It is difficult for a lot of folks in the US to conceptualize what external threats feel like since there are none surrounding the US. Virtually all threats in the US derive from the state, not from external powers. This ignorance of the largely white US “anti-war left” also stems from the colonial reality of not being connected to ancestral homeland, nor having a strong will to defend the land one lives on from invasion. This seems to link to internalized white guilt, not being able to understand what it feels like to live in an ancestral homeland, but instead refusing other European peoples the right to defend their own. Reductive analysis from “anti-war left” organizations in the US is therefore understandable given their colonial environment, but not excusable.

In fighting only against US imperialism, the “anti-war left” tends to become desensitized to all other sources of imperialism in the world. When one lives next to the Russian state and their family has been coerced by Russian power structures for centuries, it is reasonable that one would find a net positive in state collective security to deter imminent invasion, even if from NATO, one of the most destructive pacts in modern history. The “anti-war left” tends to conflate this existential understanding with unconditional support for NATO, when in reality that is not at all the sentiment.

Poland’s Razem Party, one of the largest left-wing organizations in the country, is highly critical of NATO’s imperialist nature yet still believes in its immediate necessity in Poland to prevent invasion, which Poland knows very well in its history. This is not supporting NATO as an imperialist structure, but rather understanding the immediate necessity of self-determination through the only vehicle of security available. Its end goal in this pursuit is NATO’s abolition, using NATO as a vehicle to gradually disarm its militaries in unison with global disarmament. In the words of Razem Party:

Specifically, we expect the Western left, instead of routinely resorting to NATO criticism, to actually come up with alternative proposals on how to guarantee security of Eastern Europe, the Baltic and Nordic countries in the face of Russian imperialism on the continent. Razem, therefore, proposes the development of a European security strategy as a key element to maintaining peace.”

Is one supposed to cancel the large portion of the Eastern European left who find the only mechanism of collective security available to be a temporary existential necessity to prevent invasion? Is one supposed to delegitimize their existence upon hearing this perspective without even asking for their rationale? Apparently all progressive blocs are supposed to be a policy monolith devoid of regional and dialectic nuance. This is the US-centric nature of the “anti-war left,” which holds a brazen superiority complex over international movements.

If we have to choose between compromise and genocide, we will choose our people.”

-Mazloum Kobanî

Of course, this analysis does not by any means serve to justify the existence of NATO. Slovenian socialist thinker Slavoj Žižek has given some questionable takes in this regard, advocating the expansion of NATO in order for the Ukrainian resistance to succeed. With the Russian state’s nuclear posturing and long-war strategy, it is evident that any possible expansion of NATO would not make much of a difference in the outcome of the war. It would simply make NATO more powerful and more imperialist than it already is, for no cogent reason.

Nobody should have to choose between imperialist collective security and invasion. However, that is the hegemonic constellation of police states that humanity is currently thrust under. There must be no shame in a population choosing collective security with hegemonic powers if it averts subjugation and genocide, but this does not warrant the existence of state collective security in the first place, nor does it warrant the state in general. The idea of hegemony is often a more immediate reality than the Western left realizes. Populations must often choose a collective hegemony to prevent another from invading and committing atrocities. This is precisely where the temporary appeal to NATO emerges from in Baltic and Eastern European leftist circles. It is not meant as political support by any means, but rather as a temporary existential necessity. NATO is very much a threat to Eastern Europe in that it militarizes the neoliberal order, but even so, this is a smaller threat relative to the Russian state for many neighboring countries.

Separation of the existential threat imposed on the Ukrainian people with the Ukrainian state itself is absolutely crucial in this understanding. Critique of the Ukrainian state is of utmost importance, but so is the necessity of popular self-defense amid the grasp of an invading empire. The Ukrainian people are fighting for their homes and their lives, the Russian state is invading them. This is a relationship that cannot be buried under assertions of Western involvement and pontifications about “inter-imperialism.” The Ukrainian people are not NATO, nor is NATO the Ukrainian people. One is an ethnic group, the other a state institution. Conflation of the two amounts to a deeply flawed social analysis rife with dehumanization and social Darwinism.

As stated by Razem Party: “Acknowledging Russian imperialism does not contradict a critique of the USA but rather allows us to move beyond Cold War, or even colonial, ways of looking at geopolitics.” With social nuance in mind, “inter-imperialism” and “denazification” narratives are two wings of the same bird, conflating states, institutions, and fascist subcultures with an entire population just trying to survive in its homeland. The “anti-war left” has long been overdue to discard neorealism as an explanation in its analysis of international relations, yet it holds neorealism as a norm without even realizing its inherent contradictions. This, in turn, perpetuates Cold War modes of thought.

Just because an imperialist power exploits the resistance of a population for its own interests, that does not mean the resistance itself is imperialist in nature. The analysis of “anything the West arms is inherently imperialist” runs inconsistent with OSS backing of the Viet Minh, CIA backing of the Mujahideen, and US backing of numerous other perceived “anti-imperialist” movements throughout modern history. The US has aligned with supposed adversary states on numerous occasions, such as aligning with the Soviet Union on the 1962 Sino-Indian War at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example. Many tend to forget that the CIA has historically been both pro-communist and anti-communist, its preference dependent on US imperialist interests at any given time.

The Ukrainian state is not an imperialist state, nor does it have the capacity to be one. It is, however, backed and manipulated by imperialist powers. The Ukrainian resistance is an ethnic group resisting foreign domination, relying on the Ukrainian state as its vehicle of self-defense. The Ukrainian resistance must accept any support that is offered in order to avert the total subjugation and assimilation of Ukrainians, and this support is often only accessible through the state.

The idea that Ukrainians must lay down their arms is not only insensitive but also social Darwinist to a degree, flirting with a Hobbesian conclusion that the “weak” must capitulate to the “strong” in order to reduce collateral damage. This conclusion wholly rejects social analysis and contradicts the fact that collateral damage began the moment the Russian state invaded. Where analysis must begin is in understanding that the Russian state chose this violence, and the West inflamed it, not the Ukrainian people in either case. While the West has exacerbated tensions leading up to the invasion and armed Ukrainian forces, this does not mean the Ukrainian resistance is a proxy monolith. This is a population, an ethnic group, fighting against occupation and annihilation at the hands of one of the most powerful imperialist states on the planet.

Confronting Militarization Ethically

Thus, with the existential situation of the Ukrainian people in mind, the topic of armament is a tricky one. It is entirely reasonable for an internationalist to be in favor of blocking weapons shipments to Ukraine in principle, as it inconveniences the Western military-industrial complex. Billions of taxpayers dollars have been spent flooding the Ukrainian military with weapons as millions lay starving on the streets across the West, many dying on the sidewalk in plain view without any public services to speak of. There is no excuse for domestic mass murder in the pursuit of global imperialism. As the saying goes: “When our turn comes, we shall not make excuses for the terror.”

The material reality of weapons being in the hands of the Ukrainian people, however, is disconnected from this terror. Read carefully here: transferring material that does not change the neoliberal status quo in the West makes no justification for the neoliberal status quo nor the West, but neither does it negate justification for self-defense. To say that weapons alone are the problem and that they are just now causing mass poverty in the West because of Ukraine is to say there is a new terror, when in reality this terror has already existed since the dawn of capitalism and imperialism.

To put it more simply, the problematic part of weapons shipments to Ukraine is not the weapons shipments themselves, but rather the US and capitalism. The Ukrainian people have every right to wield these weapons in self-defense, but nobody should be paying for them, and the military-industrial complex should not exist at all. Regardless, at this point in the conflict there is no possible reversing of military aid to Ukraine. Instead of this futile idealist focus on ending arms shipments, what an internationalist actually has control over must be considered here.

The very few instances of arms shipment blocking in the West have been from groups entirely unaffiliated with the big “anti-war left” engines, instead they have been independent labor unions. The two most notable actions occurred in Pisa, Italy and Thessaloniki, Greece, initiated by the Unione Sindicale di Base and a coalition of 12 Greek unions respectively. Neither action accomplished a permanent diversion, nor have they been repeated as of fall 2022. It is somewhat odd that many “anti-war left” organizations in the US have been silent on weapons shipment blockages, rarely reporting or endorsing these instances. Organizations in Europe, however, have been far more vocal about them.

While the blocking of shipments to Ukraine is usually well-intentioned, critique of this action is also warranted, as there are clear repercussions to the Ukrainian people. Proponents tend to neglect how this action inherently favors the Russian war machine and naturally tips the balance in favor of the Russian state. Other actions can be done instead that do not give the Russian state disproportionate power, such as confronting the elite who enabled this war in the first place, being politicians, diplomats, oligarchs, and generals. Everyone can act in what they specialize in and brainstorm accordingly. If one has a computer sciences background, hacking and leaking sources of coercion should be the first thing to come to mind. If one has an artist background, tag and wheatpaste the hell out of the military-industrial complex. If one has a mutual aid background, mutual aid is the most necessary response to a crisis anywhere in the world, whether that means supporting displaced communities where one is or going to the location in need of support if asked and if able to do so.

Even something as simple as disseminating resources with those affected by conflict is far more important than meticulously searching for someone to blame and being perpetually angry about a situation one cannot change as an individual. There are actions for every capability and every set of expertise. Actions against militarization are weakened when homogenized into the “anti-war left” engines, as they nullify everyone’s collective capabilities. Arms shipment blocking is a well-intended action necessary to combat the military-industrial complex, but it is not one that leads to any meaningful change or relief in the case of Ukraine.

We did not see any energy in blocking shipments when the Turkish state invaded Afrin, when the Ethiopian state invaded Tigray, nor have we seen this passion for blocking shipments to Indonesia, Morocco, and many other Western-backed genocidal states. Sudden prioritization of blocking shipments to Ukraine in some Western movements seems to come from a Eurocentric understanding of internationalism. In the case of Ukraine, this action inherently favors the agressing war effort over the defending one, contradicting the both-sidesism analysis of “anti-war left” movements. If one sets aside the idea of state institutions for a moment, one may find that blocking arms shipments to Ukraine empowers an invasion by the 5th largest military in the world while weakening self-defense of the highly vulnerable population it is invading.

With all this in mind, blocking arms shipments is usually justified to combat any military-industrial complex. For Ukraine, however, this actually creates a net negative of harm and does not lead to any meaningful change. Preventing Ukrainians from having weapons would actually prolong the war, as negative peace would lead to decades, if not centuries of recurring conflict. The intention in the shipment blocking, as suggested by the Greek union coalition statement on Thessaloniki, is less so ending the war and more so contesting NATO. This is a very worthy intention, but it is one that requires ethical actions that do not have unethical repercussions.

Redeeming the “Anti-War Left”

It should be noted that this series is not meant as a character assassination of the “anti-war left,” nor as a critique of its contributions against US imperialism, but rather as a call to question its harmful complicity with state power structures and its normalization of performative activism in relation to the Russo-Ukrainian War.

In its defense, the “anti-war left” is a powerful engine of organizing that has contributed a significant amount to international consciousness in the West, otherwise its statements would be irrelevant. It is the go-to bloc for any baby internationalist looking to expand their understanding of internationalist organizing in the West. The “anti-war left” holds a presence in virtually every large city across the West and has been active in its current form since the beginning of the Cold War, rising not coincidentally alongside realist and neorealist thought. Yet, as flawed as it is, the “anti-war left” is still (usually) one step up from the “praxis is calling everything I don’t like revisionist” crowd of hardline Marxist-Leninists. It is not devoid of organizing value by any means. One should never underestimate the “anti-war left” as an ideational force nor dismiss it as an internet subculture.

Though its policy (and lack of policy) aligns with campism more times than not, it also encourages baby internationalists to seek deeper nuance beyond the prescribed soundbites. The “anti-war left” is excellent in its critique of Western imperialism and corresponding world systems. In fact, it is so good at defining world systems that it neglects social nuance in the process, relying on regurgitated state narratives and direly obsolete neorealist approaches to fill in the gaps. At the end of the day, approaches favoring Chinese and Russian imperialism to US imperialism might as well just conclude with “my colonial status quo is better than your colonial status quo, and there are only two you can choose.”

Campists will argue that not centering the US in all organizing is an excuse for inaction, but what action does the “anti-war left” actually commence beyond performative campaigns that follow weak traditions of social democracy? Calling your senator made you feel good, but did your senator comply? Signing a petition made you feel good, but what did it accomplish? Organizing a local rally of “Ukrainians don’t deserve solidarity because NATO and Nazis” made you feel good, but how are you actually changing anything? Are you actually helping anyone? These are mechanisms the “anti-war left” uses to rationalize its own inaction while claiming everyone else isn’t doing anything. Calls to action with anything more substantive than the social democracy routine are almost never to be found, mutual aid for affected populations even rarer.

One would think, in condemning inaction, the “anti-war left” engines would at least officially endorse arms shipment blockages and act to make them more frequent? We have scarcely even seen this. Instead, the “anti-war left” traps itself in a cycle of self-perpetuating symbol and performance following the traditions of social democracy.

Everyone is “anti-war” as a vague umbrella term, but peace studies as a field includes a wide range of theories from liberal pacifism to neorealism, many of them of greater symbolic value than practical value in this pursuit. The “anti-war left” as a political bloc within this field insists that the end of war can be achieved by jumping from point A to point Z without considering every letter in between, being a complex set of social relationships, state hierarchy, hegemony, power structures, power relations, and political metaphysics that world systems analysis fails to realistically consider. It attempts to reduce social concepts to neorealist soundbites that accomodate world systems analysis when in reality they cannot be reduced to soundbites at all. In theory, the “anti-war left” presents a peaceful socialist utopia that catches the eye and harbors an intense feeling of internationalist agency. In practice, it is really just advocating status quo negative peace with some aesthetical anti-US flavoring. Few recent conflicts have shown this more glaringly than the Russo-Ukrainian War has.

Just as there is nuance in all things, there is nuance to the “anti-war left.” Organizations or journals such as Left Voice may have a campist approach to one issue, and an entirely anti-campist approach to the next. This is not to reduce solidarity and support of platforms that hold mixed approaches, but rather to critique them when these backward tendencies are prevalent so that they do not slip further onto the path of social Darwinist thought. Given its size and agency, the “anti-war left” must be held to some standard of critique with its proven susceptibility to social democratic relapse.

For starters, there must be an internal mechanism of critique. In most of the “anti-war left” engines, DSA and PSL especially, dogmatic campism is enforced through a strong-chair committee system. In some cases, if a chair decides they do not like the political makeup of the committee body, they will simply onboard as many members needed to suit their preferences. This almost always leads to anti-authoritarian members being drowned out and campists becoming a majority in “anti-war” committees. For a personal example, in one DSA chapter that shall not be named, the chair of the chapter international committee curiously onboarded a wave of Dengist-aligned members to support a pro-Belt & Road Initiative “Hands Off China” campaign while non-Dengist members were driven out. One sees this first hand if around these “anti-war” committees long enough, and the author certainly has.

Given its many internal problems and exclusionary history, it is thus no surprise in the least that the widely influential “anti-war left” has missed so heinously on Ukraine. For those of us organizers who take action for all marginalized peoples and their fight for self-determination, we will not cave to campist propaganda on Ukraine nor on any crisis, and we will continue to be a presence of dissent against campism until grassroots internationalism is realized. For now, the “anti-war left” engines are not effective nor credible vehicles of internationalism, and Ukraine has reflected this the most obviously.

Actualizing an Internationalist Approach to Ukraine

Puppet masters around the world attempt to coerce and co-opt Ukrainian self-determination with their own interests in mind, both normatively and militaristically. Meaningful analysis of Ukraine must center its population, not the state, and not the institutions manipulating the state. Neorealist assumptions tend to dehumanize populations in self-defense by conflating them with states and backers. In refusing to take a side, the “anti-war left” always ends up taking a side, and often the side of the oppressor.

On the same hand, meaningful solidarity with the Ukrainian people must not be Eurocentric, nor can it be selective. Western fixation on Ukraine has led to widespread ignorance of invasion and genocide in other parts of the world. Populations affected by imperialism in the Global South are selectively ignored wherever energy is expended on the spectacle in Ukraine.

Economic instability has been felt as a result of billions of taxpayers dollars pouring into Ukraine while inflation makes itself known, but this is nothing new. It is an inherent and predictable component of capitalism that has existed for centuries and cannot be changed overnight. Actions countering this must not expect some sudden diplomatic solution or capitalist collapse, they must be practical: reducing harm, confronting oppressive structures, and confronting the elite as much as possible while ensuring the lasting self-determination of all marginalized populations.

Contrary to campist assumptions, the invasion of Ukraine is not a war against NATO nor the West. It is a war against the Ukrainian people. NATO, the militarized wing of Western neoliberalism, has undoubtedly taken advantage of Ukraine to expand its power, playing a large role in inciting the invasion. Yet, at the same time, NATO is not actually a main actor in the war itself. It is indirectly involved, but not directly.

The discussion of NATO is irrelevant on the ground of Ukraine when everyday people are being slaughtered, when an apartment building was just bombed to ashes across the street, when a hospital was just obliterated with Kalibr cruise missiles and body parts of children are scattered around your neighborhood. The vast majority of those affected by this invasion are not in any way responsible for the flaws of the Ukrainian state, nor even the existence of the Ukrainian state to begin with. Much like the peoples of Kurdistan, Syria, Palestine, Burma, Afghanistan, Yemen, and so many other destabilized regions of the planet, those who suffer most are humans who bear no responsibility in the decisions of state, party, and oligarchy. Yet, at the same time, many of them choose to resist foreign aggression to defend their homes, their livelihoods, and their families. They have a right to self-defense against colonial occupation, even when their only vehicle of this resistance is through a capitalist state.

As described by Ukrainian progressives themselves, solidarity with the Ukrainian state negates solidarity with its population. The carceral Ukrainian police state, with its cesspit of an oligarchy led by Zelensky, must be removed from all traces of solidarity. It must also be understood that the Russian speakers of Donbass have been marginalized by the Ukrainian state, and that this is partly what the Russian state abuses as a casus belli. Though the people of Donbass have a right to self-determination as do all populations, the Russian state has distorted their interests to fit its hegemonic model. This has been emulated in the fascist structure of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics respectively.

The most salient progressive route Western radicals can take is actively supporting those who fight for a future of progress in Ukraine, not standing on the sideline while exuding meaningless statements that favor Russian occupation. There are numerous groups on the ground fighting for this future in Ukraine, and they have been ignored entirely by the “anti-war left.” “No war but class war” is often thrown around aimlessly by campists and socialist pacifists, meanwhile those who are actually fighting the class war in Ukraine have been routinely snubbed and written off as fascist sympathizers.

Expectations in solidarity must be predicated on social realities in marginalized and targeted populations, not wishful idealism that will never materialize. If one’s support for a protest movement or resistance is predicated on socialist utopia, one will simply be perpetually angry. Populations fight for immediate relief with the vehicles at their immediate disposal far more often than they fight for a long-term political structure that has failed to communicate and resonate with them.

Liberal and reactionary factions alike often take advantage of this urge for immediate relief, toying with the narratives to simply reshuffle the incumbent system with a fresh oligarchy and ruling class. Progressive radical movements, already suppressed and muted by the state, most often fail to instantly resonate with a large portion of the general population. Class consciousness and intersectionality are a long-term process, not a short-term one. It must be recognized that this does not in any way delegitimize the causes and goals of mass protests, which again are often focused on immediate relief. Just because a protest movement becomes co-opted, this does not mean the movement’s intentions are invalid by any means.

Though it is often liberals who are viewed as the disarmers of marginalized populations in Western society, the “anti-war left” is not far off. When an organization claims resistance but also advocates the disarmament of marginalized populations across the world, one should be concerned. Liberals, social democrats, and the “anti-war left” often share this disarmament mentality in common, even when it leaves populations facing genocide with nothing to defend themselves. The “anti-war left” bears ethical intentions yet perpetuates what it is fighting against through a confused and contradictory set of statist policies.

Lobbying for the war to suddenly end with diplomacy is a cop-out from supporting affected populations. Considering the futile nature of expecting immediate disarmament, the act of blocking arms shipments is an ethical dead-end that amounts to more harm than benefit. Meaningful action is not found in the social democratic routine of the “anti-war left,” it is found in black bloc and mutual aid.

Just as there is a degree of selective solidarity required to solely block weapons shipments to Ukraine, disproportionate support for Ukrainian anti-authoritarians at the expense of movements in the Global South also clearly derives from a Eurocentric standpoint. Even with these problems, flawed action is better than no action. It has become clear that the “anti-war left,” has no practical or ethical answer on Ukraine. This war has exposed the broader pattern of the “anti-war left” becoming an obsolete organizing vehicle stuck in Cold War thought processes, which are sourced in a confused neorealist campism.

Campism does not know how to separate states from nations, nations from populations, and populations from communities. Its social understanding starts and ends at states and organizations. One must separate the Ukrainian state from the Ukrainian people, and one must separate the Ukrainian people from the ethnic minorities of the region, otherwise keep the words “proletariat” and “worker” the hell out of one’s mouth. Ukrainian anti-authoritarians require special consideration and solidarity in this resistance, as they hold the ideational tools of sustainable autonomy that inevitably confront Ukraine’s crony capitalist oligarchy, which happens to control the state through Zelensky.

May the Ukrainian resistance prevail against colonial occupation, and may all states feel the accountability of young resisters powered by a force more mighty and more immortal than any structure of coercion: internationalism.

The Ukraine Discourse and Its Consequences

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This is part 2 of a 3-part series. Read part 1 here and part 3 here.

The Russo-Ukrainian War is a conflict that exposes the deep chasms on what self-proclaimed internationalists perceive as internationalism, what self-proclaimed anti-imperialists perceive as anti-imperialism, and even what self-proclaimed socialists perceive as socialism. Many organizations of the “anti-war left” in the West have taken a route of intellectual laziness, frequently regurgitating Russian state narratives directly from the Kremlin as they are most convenient to counter Western state narratives. Contrarily, anti-authoritarian thinkers, including Ukrainian progressives, more often perceive the conflict as an opportunity to dig deeper through a maze of social layers, condemning NATO imperialism while also holding that a population has a right to defend itself. The “anti-war left” relies on its convenient neorealist Cold War binaries of West vs. East, while others have moved on from these obsolete binaries in an increasingly multipolar society.

Ethical Solidarity

The question of solidarity in Ukraine is indeed a question that comes with many layers, even when considering progressive forces. Campist approaches tend to homogenize their solidarity into a vague umbrella of the “working class” whereas anti-authoritarian approaches tend to take a more specialized approach to solidarity, emphasizing the class war components of the war and progressive forces on the ground.

While RevDia and other radical units have called for international membership, internationalists should not be passing up or abandoning movements such as the Rojava revolution to join the Ukrainian resistance. This comes off as Eurocentric and misguided when there are already tens of thousands of foreigners fighting for Ukraine, compared to a small handful in Rojava, Burma, West Papua, and other regions of the Global South that are likewise facing existential threats and in need of volunteers.

It must be understood that liberation movements of the Global South are vulnerable as a result of the Ukraine attention vacuum. Police states are once again abusing the neoliberal sphere of consensus as an opportunity to strike a little more quietly but with just as much damage. Solidarity in every struggle for autonomy must not shift just because a European population is in a period of self-defense.

To phrase this in a way that makes sense to some Westerners:

Ukraine is being invaded in Kurdistan, Ukraine is being invaded in West Papua, Ukraine is being invaded in Western Sahara, Ukraine is being invaded in eastern Congo, Ukraine is being invaded in Chiapas, Ukraine is being invaded in Armenia, Ukraine is being invaded in Tamazgha, Ukraine is being invaded in Azawad, Ukraine is being invaded in Tigray, Ukraine is being invaded in Wallmapu, Ukraine is being invaded in the Amazon, Ukraine is being invaded across the Global South. All struggles against state hegemony are interconnected, and one must never feel that Ukraine necessitates more solidarity than anywhere else.

Prioritizing support for Ukrainian anti-authoritarian groups has led some movements of the Global South to feel abandoned by internationalists. This Eurocentrism is something that Western anarchists must review and question more deeply. For internationalists thinking of a region in need of assistance, Ukraine should not be the first to come to mind. On the other hand, elements of the Ukrainian left have expressed their abandonment by the “anti-war left” in the conflict, suspended in the common narratives that there is no Ukrainian left and that the Ukrainian people are a fascist or reactionary monolith. Many in the Ukrainian left now identify campism as the most serious problem blocking international solidarity.

Responses From the Global South

The Ukrainian state has spared no subtlety accepting ethically questionable support from some of the world’s most hegemonic and genocidal states, leading various marginalized populations to adopt an adversarial stance against the Ukrainian resistance. Incidents of racism in Ukraine as well as the rejection of displaced Afghans in favor of the whiter Ukrainians by Western states has led to an overall negative perception of the Ukrainian resistance among some diaspora populations. This racism begins in European identity itself, with codified separation of Russians from Europeans. Some Western states refused to accept Russians fleeing the mobilization but wholeheartedly accepted displaced Ukrainians. This is nothing short of Russophobia and Fortress Europe in plain sight, then externalized onto diaspora populations from the Global South.

It does not end at the Ukrainian state when the UN approves of genocide abroad in the name of Ukrainians, however. In September 2022, Ukrainian UN Peacekeepers departing the Democratic Republic of Congo were transported back to Ukraine via Ethiopian Airlines, an airline known for its complicity in the Tigray Genocide. The Ukrainian state happens to share a Bayraktar brotherhood with the Ethiopian state under their mutual support from the Turkish state. This partnership has also antagonized the Tigrayan people, who are suffering from genocide at the hands of the Ethiopian and Eritrean states.

Responses to Ukraine among progressive movements outside of the West yield a much wider set of nuances. By accepting a Turkish security pact and massive Bayraktar drone contract without hesitation, the Ukrainian state has alienated numerous communities around the world impacted by Turkish imperialism. The targeted Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), for instance, has understandably taken a more cautious approach to the war, identifying the Eurocentric double standards of the Ukraine spectacle in Western society.

Potential backing from Wagner Group and the Russian military incentivizes separatist movements to support the Russian state, particularly for movements in the Global South and the liberalized post-Soviet realm respectively. Some movements may look to historical Russian intervention in Abkhazia and Donbass as indicators that backing or security guarantees from a great power may eventually become a reality, opening up a new window of opportunities to resist. In the Rojava revolution, for example, Russian military presence has helped deter invasions from the Turkish state. This is a strategically-minded policy in a movement, aiming to harness an imperialist power for the immediate relief of a marginalized population. From a lens of self-determination, this is permissible so long as it is not abused to replicate coercive structures. One must distinguish existential appeasement policies from genuine Ukrainian state antagonization of marginalized populations through its cooperation with imperialist powers.

The Zapatistas (EZLN) have generally taken an anti-state and anti-capitalist stance to the war, clearly identifying the Russian state and capitalist interests as the main culprits. Though Zapatista communiques have not explicitly lent support for the Ukrainian resistance, they do not deny its necessity either, taking an approach that does not fall in line with the “anti-war left.” The communiques identify capitalist interests as the main cause of the invasion, but also that these capitalist interests are rooted in Russian statism first, then externalized through invasion, which necessitates resistance. Some signs from the March 2022 Zapatista march against the invasion read: “Stop the wars of capitalism that murder and conquer the people of Ukraine for economic, political and ideological interests,” and “Wake Up peoples of Mexico and the world because one day sooner or later they are also going to wage unjust wars against us, we must organize.”

The official Zapatista communique from March 2022 emphasizes the Russian state as the “aggressor force,” and goes on to assert that their solidarity lies with those who “are engaged in the struggle for life in Ukraine and Russia…l@s ucranian@s and rus@s who fight in their geographies for a world with freedom.” The statement concludes: “Without bending, we shouted and called to shout and demand: Out with the Russian Army of Ukraine.” Some have interpreted the Zapatista statements as full-on support for the Ukrainian resistance, however, it appears the Zapatistas want to express their solidarity with certain elements of the resistance without any room for misinterpretation as the state.

Unlike with most organizations to the north of the Mexican border, the solidarity in the Zapatista responses evidently has an object and a subject, being the Ukrainian people in their fight for self-determination, but also Russians who are in resistance against their state. This is a consistent anti-war statement, being one that identifies defense of autonomy as a fundamental right, but also one that identifies the state capitalist nature of the tensions that led to the invasion. There is no talk of “inter-imperialism” anywhere to be found, because the Zapatistas realize that the Ukrainian state is hardly an imperialist state. They also realize that it is certainly not an anti-imperialist one. The Zapatistas make a point to separate the Ukrainian state from their idea of the “resistance” in Ukraine, that it is a capitalist state invading a population and a land who are also unjustly represented by a capitalist state, and that the Ukrainian resistance must both be against the invading forces and against the Ukrainian state. The communique mentions in the fifth section:

Fifth.- In short, these our relatives, who also raise the flag of the @libertarian, stand firm: in resistance those who are in the Donbas, in Ukraine; and in rebellion those who walk and work the streets and fields of Russia. There are detainees and beaten in Russia for protesting against the war. There are murdered in Ukraine by the Russian army.

It unites them among themselves, and them with us, not only the NO to war, but also the repudiation of ‘aligning’ with governments that oppress their people.

In the midst of confusion and chaos on both sides, they are held firm by their convictions: their struggle for freedom, their repudiation of borders and their nation states, and the respective oppressions that only change flags.”

Though this may sound ambiguous at first, when one connects the dots it becomes apparent that the Zapatista statements fall directly in line with Ukrainian anti-authoritarian forces on the ground without directly mentioning them. Ukrainian anti-authoritarian units were lesser known at the time (and still are due to censorship and selective solidarity), but were still very much present and gaining traction. The statement does not identify which organizations it is referring to in particular, but one can infer based on the “flag of the @libertarian” that at least one anti-authoritarian militia was part of this communication, given that a seemingly negligible number Ukrainian left-libertarians have opposed resistance to the invasion. If taken literally, it would be a reasonable hypothesis that Black Flag Ukraine was included, given that they are among the most visible flag-wavers among the Ukrainian left-libertarian bloc and also one of the more established groups. They also happen to have their own militia, fighting on the frontlines against the invasion.

Certainly these responses differ widely from the pseudo-internationalist approaches commonly found in Western organizing circles. The Zapatistas acknowledge the presence of Ukrainian progressives on the frontlines and hold solidarity with them. Why is that so hard for the “anti-war left” to do?

Deconstructing the “Anti-War Left”

As Marxist-Leninism scholar Tom Dale suggests in his piece “Lenin, Ukraine, and the Amnesia of the ‘Anti-war Left’,” many elements of the “anti-war left” in the West hold ambiguous analyses of Ukraine pockmarked with glaring contradictions and inconsistencies. Some have been blacklisted in anti-war circles (author included) for their belief that Ukrainians have a right to self-determination and self-defense against an imperialist power, while they are often welcomed in many anti-authoritarian circles that hold a more consistent analysis of self-determination. A prominent “anti-war leftist” of DSA who will not be named here said of the Dale piece: “the article is a polemic in favor of US war policy in Ukraine wrapped in a veil of pseudo-Marxism and totally devoid of the kind of concrete analysis of concrete conditions that the author laments.” He went on to explain: “As socialists our primary responsibility is to oppose/resist the war policies of our own government.”

Sounds great, but what does that actually look like? The “anti-war left” response to Ukraine has been a strictly performative one, pouring energy into vague statements while refusing to support even the most basic relief efforts for affected populations. In many cases, the “anti-war left” looks fruitlessly to US Congress and Nancy Pelosi for a diplomatic solution in the classic social democratic move of appealing and appeasing instead of resisting. It is rather odd when an organization suggesting that the US is at the core of all imperialism also turns to the US for a resolution while legitimizing both its diplomacy and electoralism. Nothing says controlled opposition like the “anti-war left” lobbying the US while claiming to be a front of resistance to it. Strictly performative “anti-war” campaigns have popped up in cities across the West while affected populations have been entirely ignored, diverting solidarity from those who need it.

Democratic Socialists of America (DSA)

DSA’s response to Ukraine, and armed conflict in general, is mostly controlled by a small handful of its International Committee membership in the Anti-War Subcommittee (which is nearly impossible to get accepted into). Much like the other “anti-war left” engines, DSA’s positions suggest that Ukrainians are monolithic “working classes” that have no right to defend their home. DSA’s ignorance on Ukraine has been pointed out by Ukrainian progressives themselves.

DSA International Committee (DSA IC), a member of the Peace in Ukraine Coalition, has notably echoed the inconsistent campist approach to Ukraine. In its first and only recent statement on Ukraine in January, which has been widely critiqued by socialists, DSA IC referred to Maidan as the “2014 US-backed Maidan coup,” completely neglecting Ukrainian progressive perspectives on Maidan and choosing to obscure all social nuance. DSA National Political Committee (DSA NPC), on the other hand, took a more mild approach in its February statement. Instead of reducing the entire conflict to the US and calling Maidan a US-backed coup, DSA NPC calls to “accept any and all refugees resulting from this crisis” and withdraw the US from NATO. In DSA NPC’s defense, the statement makes a coherent proposal, being to accept refugees. Still, there is no plan of action that is attached to this proposal, nor any resources to support said refugees.

DSA’s “Resources & Actions” tab on the Ukraine page includes nothing to support anyone affected by the war. Instead it is a laundry list of apologia articles to defend the DSA’s statements, some articles even framing DSA as an innocent victim to undue criticism. DSA couldn’t be bothered to even link something as simple as nowar.help for said refugees seeking support. This is nothing new, however. DSA’s responses to every crisis from Afghanistan to Burma have been devoid of any mutual aid. This is when an internationalist starts to understand that DSA IC and NPC don’t really care about helping anyone, they just care about the symbol.

DSA International Committee’s August 2022 panel on Ukraine featured no more than two Ukrainians on a panel of six guests, being Olena Lyubchenko and Yurii Sheliazhenko. A self-identified pacifist, Sheliazhenko has been especially tokenized as a mouthpiece for DSA and other “anti-war left” organizations to support narratives of “inter-imperialism,” platformed for the purpose of policy self-validation. Platforming of Yurii also serves to detract attention from the many radical progressive groups on the forntlines, including Ukrainian feminists. This then reinforces the common dehumanizing assertion that anti-authoritarians are meaningless Western simps, and that revolutionary feminists are devoid of meaning in Ukraine. Though DSA tends to frequently flirt with campist thought, it has at least included anti-campism as an element of controlled opposition within the organization.

Nonetheless, the DSA IC has firmly embedded itself in the campist organizing bloc, placing DSA in the Peace in Ukraine Coalition alongside a large portion of “anti-war left” organizations in the West. DSA IC (really only the Anti-War Subcommittee) and CODEPINK have led this coalition, making them arguably the most influential organizing vehicles for Ukraine. CODEPINK and DSA IC mimic each other frequently, lobbying US Congress and holding feel-good events that do nothing for anyone.

DSA IC and NPC certainly do not reflect the whole of DSA, however. Fellow DSA dissident Dan La Botz has been a crucial voice in actually using DSA to support those affected by war. In his meaningful response to Ukraine, La Botz has shown once again after the unpopular purge of Palestine Solidarity Working Group that the DSA central committees are out of touch with local and regional chapters.

International League of People’s Struggle US (ILPS-US)

Updated policy on Ukraine among the “anti-war left” has certainly been few and far between. Take ILPS-US, for example, a well-respected organization in the “anti-war left” that has not made any new announcement or statement on Ukraine since February. After giving a highly reductive analysis of the prelude to the war, ILPS-US concludes its first statement on Ukraine with:

What’s happening in Ukraine elucidates the corrupt nature of imperialism and inter-imperialist struggles. The battles between the West and Russia during the height of a global pandemic are deplorable…Working people do not support inter-imperialist war!”

This was followed by another statement:

Russian intervention comes after 8 years of US and NATO intervention. The ILPS-US stands with all peoples fighting for independence and sovereignty from the forces of US-led imperialism and their fascist puppet regimes.”

Is Donbass alluded to in “all peoples fighting for independence and sovereignty from the forces of US-led imperialism,” or does this include any portion of the Ukrainian population at all? Is the Russian state a “fascist puppet regime” of the US? If it is only Ukraine, then how is this an “inter-imperialist” conflict at all? These concepts must be clearly defined and not danced around in an unintelligible blurb that reeks of campism.

Though it is perfectly reasonable that the Russian state is categorized as imperialist, this analysis completely fumbles in its interpretation of Ukraine as somehow being an equally imperialist power due to its backing from NATO, reducing the Ukrainian resistance to “battles between the West and Russia.”

ILPS-US also states: “This is an anti-Russia campaign and doesn’t address any concrete issues we’re currently facing.” The “Ukraine as an anti-Russia” hypothesis suggests that the Ukrainian people are collectively responsible for the Russian state’s dissatisfaction. It is curious that many “anti-war left” organizations have adopted this position, which lies at the heart of the Russian state casus belli. Claiming “anti-war” nonpartisanship while insisting that the Russian state’s casus belli is legitimate houses a hypocritical and aimless analysis that favors the invader.

On the contrary, the Russian state has abused Donbass as an anti-Ukraine, utilizing Donbass as a justification to invade the entire region. After just barely gaining Yanukovych in 2010, the Russian state adopted an irredentist policy encompassing all of Ukraine, claiming the Ukrainian state as its own property.

From there we must look at the larger “anti-war left” engines, Party of Socialism and Liberation (PSL) second among these organizing giants behind DSA.

Party of Socialism and Liberation (PSL)

Though PSL has renewed its statements since the beginning of the invasion, its approach has not changed in the slightest. PSL’s main statement from February has already been unpacked thoroughly by Socialist Alternative, so we will not go too in-depth on what has already been rejected. That being said, some of its points are concerning enough to include here, given that they have been doubled down on and emulated by organizations across the West. PSL states:

While we do not support the Russian invasion, we reserve our strongest condemnation for the U.S. government, which rejected Russia’s legitimate security concerns in the region with total intransigence that they knew could provoke such a war. This is the consequence of decades of U.S.-NATO bullying and humiliating Russia…The role of the U.S. antiwar movement is not to follow the line of countries in conflict with U.S. imperialism, but to present an independent program of peace and solidarity and anti-imperialism…The menace of war can only be defeated by international solidarity among the peoples of the world and a resolute struggle against U.S. imperialism, which must demand the abolition of NATO. No war on Russia!”

Again we see easily spoken buzzwords that are attached to no object or subject. It is implied that peace will suddenly appear if NATO is abolished, contradicting this idea that the Russian state is half of the “inter-imperialism” in Ukraine. Solidarity is mentioned aimlessly, this time with nothing connected to the word. PSL then ends its statement with a laughable “No war on Russia!” as if this is an invasion of Russia. PSL claims not to follow the line of countries in conflict with U.S. imperialism, but then what line is it following if only condemning one imperialist power and not the other? Certainly one of neither practical nor ethical significance.

Act Now to Stop War and End Racism Coalition (ANSWER Coalition)

Though it is one of the larger “anti-war left” engines, we need not include any sizable description here on ANSWER Coalition’s dizzying information warfare designed to disarm populations and keep police state regimes in pristine condition from Ethiopia to Myanmar. ANSWER Coalition has long earned its reputation of being a defender of hegemonic states and ruling classes, standing with anyone who opposes the US no matter how genocidal. Few organizations in the West more naively encapsulate in their policy “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”

Though highly influential in the “anti-war left,” ANSWER Coalition is even too campist for the Peace in Ukraine Coalition, being one of few “anti-war left” engines in the US not to join. Answer Coalition still collaborates extensively with many of its member organizations, however, including CODEPINK.

Progressive International

Progressive International, an ideologically diverse coalition of progressive movements and organizations around the world (some arguably reactionary), opted to give an extremely short three-sentence response to Ukraine in March 2022:

War is a crime.

We stand with the victims of the Putin government’s brutal invasion in Ukraine and with the people in Russia suffering from a war that the people did not choose.

We call on progressive forces to push for an immediate diplomatic solution that protects all refugees, guarantees the universal right to self-determination, and moves to dismantle all military-industrial alliances like NATO that endanger peace across the world.”

The statement reflects a balance of many conflicting approaches in Progressive International, yet shows arguably the most equal parity of influence from both campists and those in favor of self-determination in all reviewed statements. NATO is directly mentioned in the statement, but not the Russian equivalent CSTO, perhaps exhibiting slight dominance from campists. When a coalition has ardent campist organizations like Qiao Collective in the same room as ardent anti-authoritarian ones like New Bloom, it is surely difficult to make a consensus beyond two or three short sentences.

This may reflect the broader problem of Progressive International being a feel-good coalition in name only that does not actually lead meaningful policy, as it is inherently bogged down in a range of schisms and contradictions. In February 2022, Razem Party withdrew from Progressive International followed by the departure of Ukrainian progressive journal Spilne in April, both citing its perceived lack of concern for Ukrainian self-defense. So, there clearly was not even a consensus after all.

People’s Summit

This year’s People’s Summit includes not just actions but also a series of conferences within the belly of the beast, as Guevara would say. It is an important presence of dissidence against the most destructive empire on the planet. It is not a summit that is actually internationalist, however, as there is a highly selective criteria for which marginalized populations get solidarity and which do not. This is because a large portion of its panel guests are associated with state ruling classes.

In one concerning example, in the Democracy Beyond the US Empire forum on September 24, 2022, Eritrean diplomats were invited no less than three weeks after the Eritrean state launched its second invasion of Tigray and extended the Tigray Genocide, which the Eritrean state had already been participating in for two years. The People’s Summit preconception that the Eritrean state is anti-US is questionable, given that there is a history of incumbent Eritrean dictator Isaias Afeworki begging the US to build a military base then turning on the US for a Russian base instead when the US declined.

The People’s Summit, organized by “anti-war left” engines including CODEPINK and ANSWER Coalition, legitimizing a regime currently causing immense violence, war, and destruction in East Africa while sending indigenous populations to the brink of extinction. Why not just invite the Russian state too? Why not invite every imperialist state if the injury of some has no relevance to the injury of all? To People’s Summit, if you can have genocidal powers boost your anti-US talking points then surely the struggle of their subjects is meaningless.

The host of one People’s Summit forum, in his opening statement, said:

We also know who our enemy is. We know who the enemy of the planet is, we know who the enemy of humanity is, and that is the one and only US empire.” This sounds wonderful until “one and only” suggests all imperialism and all suffering is grounded in the US alone, and Eritrean diplomats are sitting in the room right after helping their regime rape and slaughter thousands.

Trotskyist Responses

Trotskyists appear to be the most conflicted on Ukraine, with one faction supporting the Ukrainian right of self-determination, another taking the “inter-imperialist war” route, and another yet claiming that the Russian state is not imperialist at all.

Sam Carliner of Trotskyist-aligned Left Voice falsely claims that “Ukraine lacks a progressive movement in the struggle for its independence from both reactionary blocs in action,” being the pro-West and pro-Russia camps. Once again, this analysis entirely neglects the progressive blocs that do in fact exist in Ukraine, and also reduces the Ukrainian people to being a reactionary monolith. One would be curious to know Carliner’s opinion of Hamas and reactionary elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in relation to Palestine if reactionary elements of a nation are to define solidarity with a marginalized ethnic group, and why he would be neglecting the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in this assessment. By this logic, because every ethnic group has a set of reactionary political factions, we should just forget self-determination in its entirety.

It is worth noting that Trotsky himself played a major role in Ukraine’s messy political destiny, having led the betrayal of the Black Army in 1919 from which he then blamed the ensuing chaos on Stalin alone. Trotsky was tasked with the early phases of state collectivization in Ukraine, enforcing its annexation through bloody purges and peasant massacres. Without Trotsky’s betrayal of the Black Army, the social and political situation of Ukraine would be unrecognizable in relation to today’s Ukraine. In fact, the Soviet Union may still exist if anti-authoritarians were not purged. Nonetheless, Trotsky did provide credible insight on Stalin’s enabling of the Holodomor in Ukraine.

Noam Chomsky

At 93 years of age, Chomsky is still in his peak discursive form. One has to hand it to him. Chomsky has notably sided with the “anti-war left” in his analysis of Ukraine. A rare miss, but not a surprising one given his past analysis of the Yugoslav Wars, which was clearly complacent toward the Serbian state. This is important because Chomsky is one of the leading intellectuals of the Western left. Whatever he says is usually followed and repeated by a large number of organizations and thinkers.

Chomsky’s modus operandi of analysis on Ukraine has generally been to expose the US instead of making a complete analysis of social conditions, or providing a practical proposal beyond “diplomacy.” For internationalists, looking to Chomsky on whom to support and what should be done in this conflict is about as effective as looking to a stone to become liquid on its own. The connection is just never really there, and if it is, it would take millennia of external pressure to achieve. Thankfully Chomsky stops short of faulting Ukrainians for the conflict and dehumanizing them, but framing Ukrainian self-defense as some US proxy ragdoll is one of Chomsky’s weaker assessments in his tenure.

In Chomsky’s defense, he is among few in the “anti-war left” who have actually updated their responses since the beginning of the invasion, first calling for Ukraine to capitulate and now calling for broader negotiations since the Ukrainian resistance currently has momentum. In his recent interview on New Politics, he states that “Ukraine should receive weapons for self-defense” but does not seem to offer any extension of this assessment beyond conflating it with NATO. Nonetheless, much of the “anti-war left” has clearly gobbled up his initial points and repackaged them in their statements.

Responses of Symbolic Nothingness

In most statements from the “anti-war left” there is no clear object or subject of solidarity described beyond this monolith of “working people” and “workers.” At best, the statements yield extremely vague criteria of solidarity that hold no material significance, throwing both Ukrainian and Russian “working people” into a category that does not exist on the ground. Homogenizing an invading military with a defending population is not how solidarity works. Throughout human history, there has never been a single conflict that is so simple one can say “solidarity with working people” and call it a day thinking some form of progress is being accomplished.

At worst, the statements dehumanize Ukrainians by conflating them with Western imperialism and make no attempt at even seeking a subject of solidarity outside of the Russian state.

Anti-war left” statements have been inconsistent soundbites that bear little nuance even from a dialectic materialist standpoint. Mixed journals such as Left Voice make an attempt to analyze imperialist interference at the expense of social analysis while campist journals such as People’s World have blamed the conflict entirely on “Ukrainian fascists.” The responses are all similar in that they meticulously seek someone to blame, meanwhile development of solidarity for the invaded population is brushed off as an afterthought if not altogether ignored. They strictly emphasize that there is someone to be blamed and nobody to be supported, that “working people” are most affected yet are apparently undeserving of any further consideration. It is as if the statement itself is more important than the actual reality on the ground.

Anti-War Left” as a Philosophy of Contradictions

One of the big victories of the CIA has been creating a situation in which large groups of western leftists assume, without any evidence, that any genuine act of working class revolt against oppression in a foreign country must have been secretly organised by the CIA.” -Zoe Baker

Anti-war left” philosophy, in holding sedentary resistance against US policy supreme, contradicts grassroots internationalism, holding most significantly the interconnectedness of all struggles. The former tends to isolate populations and confine them to struggle solely against their own states, while the latter tends to emphasize breaking communication barriers and forming a global front that contests all imperialism. The “anti-war left” is therefore incompatible with grassroots internationalism. This is evidently reflected in the frequent emulation of destructive Kremlin narratives and hypocritical legitimization of US diplomacy. While claiming to fight imperialism, the “anti-war left” has succumbed to just about every imperialist actor involved.

Perhaps most importantly, the “anti-war left” policy of selective solidarity for marginalized populations makes it pseudo-internationalist. Organizations such as ANSWER Coalition and PSL have directly supported US policy in some cases without asking questions, as we see with the Tigray War. In fact, ANSWER Coalition and PSL have been among the Ethiopian state’s most vocal genocide supporters in the West, trying to create a US-Ethiopian state dichotomy that doesn’t actually exist at all. Western backing of the Ethiopian state is completely neglected while regime narratives of anti-Tigrayan racism are normalized.

The “anti-war left” has also, on occasion, shown its support for fascist protests in Europe. The International Magazine, a widely acclaimed campist magazine, tweeted its endorsement of the September 2022 fascist protests in Czechia simply because they were anti-EU and anti-NATO. Normalizing fascist collaboration seems to follow a concerning legacy of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) making tactical alliances with the Nazis in the 1930s. While the KPD antagonized anarchists by taking a complicit position with the Nazis back then, many in the “anti-war left” today antagonize anarchists by taking a complacent position with the Russian state today. Some even condemn the formation of grassroots resistance against the US, such as the formation of autonomous zones that create de facto dual power, simply because anti-authoritarians are involved.

Overall the “anti-war left” is not anti-war by any means, but rather pro-intrastate war that results from status quo negative peace, police statism, and broken diplomacy. There are only rare anti-authoritarian exceptions to this, such as Socialist Alternative, who may flirt with “anti-war left” identity but generally espouse anti-campist views. Socialist Alternative is one of very few large socialist organizations in the US that takes a unique approach to the conflict, insisting that “the Ukrainian people have a right to resist imperialism” while calling for the “forming of democratically run, multi-ethnic defense committees linked to working-class structures, like the unions that Zelensky attacked prior to the war.” Other movements such as Disrupt Land Forces also emphasize demilitarization while supporting defense of self-determination.

When one perceives internationalism as “leaving people to solve their own problems” while encouraging an isolated and sedentary position against one’s own occupying state, one contradicts and delegitimizes the inherent interconnectedness of human struggle, and therefore delegitimizes internationalism. It is more or less to say to marginalized populations: “Want to resist? Stay isolated, nothing else matters and nobody should help you.”

The perils of “anti-war left” gatekeeping can be just as destructive as this pseudo-internationalist mentality, withholding solidarity for a population simply because it does not fall into the Marxist-Leninist-Hoxhaist-Maoist-Sankarist-Kropotkinite-Unicornist-Saxophonist interpretation of never-never land and the political metaphysics of a cumulonimbus cloud. The excuses for withholding solidarity are often extremely childish. The Workers League of Australia’s excuse for denying Burmese people solidarity in the wake of the 2021 military coup, for example, was that rebels fighting the military were supposedly US-backed “terrorists.” This was accompanied by no credible context to speak of. To hell with even critical solidarity for the immediate relief of a population, we’ll just full on reject its humanity entirely.

One should never call themself an internationalist if there is a gag rule on solidarity for any marginalized population. This includes the Russian-speakers of Donbass in the east of Ukraine, Hungarians and Romanians in the west of Ukraine, and Romanis spread across Ukraine, all of whom marginalized by an ethnocentric state power structure that makes little effort to recognize their existence.

Now, when a population’s freedom contradicts the power monopoly of the Chinese state, all bets for “anti-war left” solidarity are off. The word “Uyghur” has become synonymous with terrorism and Adrian Zenz in the eyes of much of the “anti-war left,” with no functional understanding of their social situation as an ethnic group beyond Chinese state narratives, no communication with Uyghurs themselves, and no consideration of their revolutionary history in the East Turkestan People’s Revolutionary Party. Imagine making exceptions to the basic human rights of all marginalized populations simply “cause the US agrees,” as if the validity of a population’s human rights is determined by what the US thinks. This is accompanied by the pervasive preconception that supporting a population’s self-determination means justifying US intervention to achieve it.

Not much energy will be wasted here on neoconservative perspectives on Ukraine with the “nuance is when map” crowd of the Institute for the Study of War and other military sciences think tanks that promote deeply fascist Fortress Europe narratives. It should be worth noting, however, that both neoconservatism and campism stem from the same international relations theory tree. They both hold similar understandings of states and conflict, as they are both tied to realism. Regarding interpretation of international relations: liberalism, social democracy, campism, and neoconservatism are all closer to one another on the theory tree than they may appear on the surface. All insist the state to be the supreme actor of international relations with little to no social nuance required.

Likewise, little energy will be wasted critiquing the liberal approach, sometimes known as the North Atlantic Fellas Organization (NAFO), the opposite pole of the campist approach which tends to defend the Ukrainian police state itself as well as Zelensky. This is the most common mainstream approach found in the West, which campists and internationalists both counter. Liberal parties in Europe have cracked down heavily on members who express dissent with unfettered flooding of Western taxpayers money into Ukraine, going as far as banning their own delegates.

Subconscious Neorealism and Competing Internationalisms

The “anti-war left” tends to perceive all interstate wars from a monolithic lens, reducing the state as the central unit of analysis while entirely ignoring social nuances of the populations involved. This approach does not come out of nowhere, in fact, it has unmistakably Eurocentric foundations following a history of Cold War-spawned neorealist thought. Obsolete neorealist-aligned approaches have not changed in any meaningful way since their beginnings in post-WWII realist thought, sharing many state-centered commonalities with liberal approaches to international relations. There is a reason why notorious realist Henry Kissinger holds a nearly identical approach to Ukraine as the “anti-war left.”

University of Chicago academic John Mearsheimer, for example, has held a considerable influence over this neorealist approach shared by many liberal and “anti-war left” circles alike. Mearsheimer, a supporter of Bernie Sanders, is a social Darwinist zealot whose tendencies can be viewed clearly in a brief list of his quotes. Among them: “In the anarchic world of international politics, it is much better to be Godzilla than Bambi,” and “Great powers must be forever vigilant and never subordinate survival to any other goal, including prosperity.” Though Mearsheimer has been widely critiqued for his social Darwinist tendencies, he also shares a nearly identical approach to Ukraine as the “anti-war left,” as he is one of the academic influencers of its policy.

Much of the neorealist school follows the legacy of Hans Morgenthau, who popularized realist thought in a series of publications following WWII in which he insisted that states are the central actors of international politics, and that human power is rested in them alone. Tracing realism back even further we find its roots in Thomas Hobbes, who laced social Darwinism with nihilism to create what we know of today as the realist school of international relations. Considering the Eurocentric roots of realism and its corresponding philosophies that have also influenced Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches to international relations, it is not a surprise that many neorealists hold the European republican nation-state model as a static political system that cannot be altered in any way. It is thus also unsurprising that any neorealist-influenced approach will reduce analysis to states and institutions, constantly seeking a binary of West/East, US/Russia, NATO/China, etc., without considering the social reality of the populations most directly affected.

This subconscious neorealism is often complemented by meaningless soundbites from Twitter and Reddit, where the “anti-war left” forges its echo chamber in a maze of catchy buzzwords and glittering generalities. When one refers to the “Western left,” the “anti-war left” is an unmistakable pillar of it. Though the largest “anti-war left” organizations are based in the US, their influence has seeped across a sizable amount of self-described anti-imperialist groups in Europe such as Young Struggle, and occasional movements of diaspora populations such as International League of People’s Struggle (ILPS) serving the Philippine diaspora. These organizations are rarely conscious of where their lines of thought actually come from and what they have fused with.

Neorealism has been adopted by state socialists and twisted into campism. Internationalist labor organizer Dan La Botz explains: “Campists argue that those who criticize the so-called anti-imperialist nations (Russia, China, etc.) place themselves on the side of U.S. imperialism.”

Campist,” then, is a more theory-based version of the term “tankie,” which traces back to proponents of the 1956 Soviet Invasion of Hungary, although the two may arguably be interchangeable. Campism is countered by a more intersectional internationalism, which we deem here as “grassroots internationalism.” La Botz describes grassroots internationalism interchangeably as “socialist internationalism,” expressing with the example of Uyghur persecution:

The truth is that socialist internationalists who support the Uyghurs do so despite the fact that the U.S. government says it supports them. We do so for our own reasons and while continuing to oppose U.S. imperialism. We do so because the Uyghurs, like the Poles and the Irish in Marx’s time, have a right to self-determination, and shouldn’t be politically, economically, and culturally subjected to China’s authoritarian state and its Han nationalism.”

If every struggle against state and capitalist power structures is interconnected, then internationalism is, in itself, the interconnectedness of these struggles.

The Class War In Ukraine

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Ukrainian anarchists providing relief to massacred Kyiv suburbs/ From enoughisenough14.org/2022/04/11/ukrainian-anarchists-take-part-in-relief-to-population-of-the-massacred-kyiv-suburbs-ukraine/

 

This is part 1 of a 3-part series. Read part 2 here and part 3 here.

As the invasion of Ukraine drags on and escalates sharply to nuclear posturing in what is now its ninth month, approaches to the war have scarcely changed or even been adjusted slightly from anyone at all. Despite a rapidly changing social and political environment on the ground, many have stayed entrenched in their initial thoughts and policies from February, some even firmly affixed to their seven-year-old reaction to Maidan. Admittedly I was part of this crowd prior to February, reluctant to expend much energy on a European frozen conflict between two capitalist states surrounded in a mainstream circus of Cold War rhetoric. As the conflict has evolved, it has become increasingly difficult to ignore the position and resistance of Ukrainian progressives in this conflict. In a sea of policy platitudes, many have either forgotten entirely about Ukrainian progressives or muted them out to promote an unreasonable idealism that is completely isolated from reality on the ground.

In the Ukraine discourse, it has become increasingly important to include elements of the war that were less visible in its prior phases, such as the recent rise of progressive armed forces in Ukraine who counter both Ukrainian statism and the Russian invasion. Understanding Ukrainian progressive responses to the war is paramount in any internationalist analysis, separating these perspectives from Western approaches both in the “anti-war left” and mainstream politics.

This piece is not intended to redundantly deconstruct Russian state narratives which are already frequently questioned, but rather to uplift Ukrainian progressive perspectives and review responses particularly among the “anti-war left,” which has displayed its normative complicity with the Russian war machine while careless of its consequences to the Ukrainian people. Here it is elucidated in extensive detail the grassroots internationalist approach to Ukraine: that the Ukrainian people have a right to defend their self-determination and autonomy, that the Russian state is the aggressor, and that the West has taken advantage of Ukrainian politics for its own imperialist benefit.

NATO-Bucharest 2008: Roots of Russian State Insecurity

Before conceptualizing any discourse, one must conceptualize the nuances of the conflict itself. Most internationalists can agree that NATO expansionism is a central factor in understanding the political context of the Russian state’s casus bellis in Ukraine and elsewhere. While the invasion of Ukraine is a unilateral act of the Russian state, one cannot ignore the historical context of the Russian state’s relations with the West, and likewise Western relations with the Russian state. The role of the West in enabling conflict, destabilizing Ukraine by abusing the state as a proxy, is a fundamental component to this concept of Russian state aggression in the country.

The NATO-Bucharest Summit of 2008 showed the first major effort of NATO’s attempted expansion into Ukraine. Despite Russian attempts to normalize relations with NATO following its 1994 membership in the Partnership for Peace, these prospects were definitively killed in 2008. NATO took a clear adversarial approach to the Russian state by offering membership to the Georgian and Ukrainian states, upsetting a Russian state that had just watched NATO consume seven states in Eastern Europe four years prior and use them to help install pro-Western governments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Fresh off the Chechen Wars, the Russian state was uneasy seeing NATO expansion whilst trying to suppress numerous separatist movements across the country. At this point it was clear that the Russian state would not be admitted into NATO, but rather that NATO was its adversary. The Russian state then pulled an Uno reverse card and backed separatist movements in Western-backed states, culminating in the Russian invasion of Georgia just four months after the summit in Bucharest. From then on, co-optation of separatist movements for Russian political dominance (hegemony) became a primary policy for the Russian state.

The Russian state was hurrying to pre-empt a perceived threat to Russian power. This threat was never really actualized, as neither the Georgian nor Ukrainian states joined NATO, and no separatist movements in Russia were backed by the West. Perceived threat of Ukrainian NATO membership was, as we know, eventually met with the same response as Georgia. Contestation of regional hegemony by fellow police states undoubtedly hurts Putin’s pride most directly, as he is an ex-KGB godfather of modern police statism. NATO expansionism has driven Putin to the point of paranoia, so much so that he has made it his goal to make the Russian state as imperialist as possible.

Western incitement of the Russian state near its borders is not an isolated incident, it is a pattern that has carried on since the Russian Revolution. As Noam Chomsky has declared repetitively, to the degree that his analysis flirts with state reductionism, the US and NATO have knowingly, intentionally, and provocatively encroached closer and closer to Russia in an intrusive cycle that keeps hegemonic tensions heightened and military-industrial complex capital flowing. This behavior is not isolated in a broader context either. Brinkmanship is common behavior among imperialist states, the Iranian and Israeli states clashing over Syria, the Japanese and Chinese states saber rattling over islands in the South China Sea, to name only two current examples out of dozens.

Chomsky may not be wrong when he says: “It is hard to imagine that any Russian government would tolerate NATO forces in Ukraine. That has been understood for 30 years by high-level U.S. officials who have any knowledge of the region, and it’s even more unlikely now.” Given the Russian state’s political demographics, let alone its history, it would likely require some form of inorganic regime change for a Russian state to be friendly to NATO in its current manifestation.

A cogent point that Chomsky makes is that the US has discouraged diplomatic negotiation, and is thus likely prolonging the war. This analysis has a valid premise in that the US itself has legitimized Russian state propaganda by acting as though it is the arbiter of diplomacy for the Ukrainian state and its guarantor of security. Chomsky’s analysis disregards Russian state intentions in this invasion, however, which have been to conquer Ukraine. Negotiation can only go so far when an invading state will accept nothing less than annexation. Diplomacy outside of absolute appeasement has been off the table since the annexation of Crimea.

While Chomsky’s analysis counters Western prejudice effectively and is overall consistent on state relations, it fails to present a broader social picture on the ground of Ukraine beyond states. Instead, it seems to reduce the conflict to states as the sole actors. Many elements of the “anti-war left” have adopted Chomsky’s assessment and hold it as the supreme explanation of the war, often reappropriating his assessment with Kremlin-injected social thought in areas that he has neglected in the analysis.

A large portion of anti-authoritarian internationalists and Ukrainians alike would much rather fight a hard-fought resistance to secure lasting self-determination than a diplomatic appeasement that leads to lasting suffering under a colonial military regime. Though Chomsky’s intentions are in a benevolent place, his proposals are unreasonable given the fact that a diplomatic resolution leading to positive peace is virtually impossible with the ruling classes in play. Immediate diplomacy is not possible when an invading party does not want the invaded party to exist. The “just let the Russian state colonize and ethnic cleanse because peace” approach puts any thinker on a path to social Darwinism, and Chomsky is clearly not immune from this. All roads lead to Rome just as all Western “anti-war left” talking points lead to “weak must submit to strong” talking points.

Invasion via Social Weaponry, Not “Inter-Imperialism”

In all conflict, one must begin at the human level in its relationship with power structures. While Russophobia has increased exponentially in the West, the Russian state outright dehumanizes Ukrainians in its propaganda and channels this through mass murder of the population, a convenient narrative carried on from centuries of anti-Ukrainian sentiment exacerbated under Soviet rule. The Russian Revolution did not end Russian hegemony in the Russian Empire, it rebranded it. The Ukrainian ethnicity was reduced to “kulak” by Russian power structures in 1917 just as it is reduced to “Nazi” in 2022. In reality, neither kulaks nor Nazis have come even remotely close to comprising a majority of the Ukrainian population nor its state government at any point in history. The dehumanizing mental gymnastics that rationalized the Holodomor are the same abused to rationalize the Russian state’s invasion today.

Needless to say, the Ukrainian people are disproportionately affected by Russian hegemony, and the vast majority of the population either supports or participates in self-defense. The shallow narrative that the Russian population is somehow falling victim to NATO in this process places Russians with Ukrainians in a false equivalence. The nuance to this is really more simple than it appears: most Russians are absolutely fine, most Ukrainians are not. There is a sizable gap in ethics between a short period of controlled inflation in Russia and missiles leveling entire cities in Ukraine, not that either are justified in any way.

Even with the mobilization, only a small fraction of Russia’s population is being thrown into the invasion, many of them ethnic minorities so that the Russian gene pool can be preserved as much as possible. Meanwhile, the entire population of Ukraine is existentially obligated to defend its homeland and support the war effort. Life carries on relatively normal in Russia while self-defense is now the priority in all facets of Ukrainian society. Narratives falsely equating the questionable effect of Western sanctions to the sheer destruction enacted on the Ukrainian population serves the Russian war machine and the Russian war machine alone. Though the West has clearly attempted to weaponize this conflict against the Russian people, it has largely failed to do so. The impact of sanctions on Russia has been exaggerated, and they have also hurt Western economies to a significant degree.

Even with all of the West’s malevolence in mind, emphasizing blame for the conflict on NATO frames the Russian state as a victim, insisting that the Russian elite somehow require sympathy. From this analysis, it was only because NATO incited tensions that the Russian state invaded, therefore it is apparently an “inter-imperialist” conflict. The population defending its homeland from invasion then gets conflated into the “inter-imperialist” label, as if there is no distinction whatsoever separating the intentions of Russian and Ukrainian forces. Somehow it is assumed that the Ukrainian population is at fault for resisting invasion from the Russian state, at fault for defending itself from annihilation, at fault for defending its homeland from absolute destruction. It is assumed that both sides are just workers blindly being manipulated by the elite into conflict, and therefore the conflict is undeserving of closer social consideration. In many statements of the “anti-war left” there seems to be more solidarity for the Russian ruling class than for actual workers in this conflict.

This analysis completely neglects the relationship between an invading force and a population in self-defense, attempting to homogenize all actors under the reductive labels of “inter-imperialism” and “working people.” So many layers of social nuance are skipped over in this neorealist assumption of Ukraine as an imperialist monolith.

Colonization via State Capitalist Conquest

All efforts to render politics aesthetic culminate in one thing: war. War and war only can set a goal for mass movements on the largest scale while respecting the traditional property system. This is the political formula for the situation. The technological formula may be stated as follows: Only war makes it possible to mobilize all of today’s technical resources while maintaining the property system.”

– Walter Benjamin

The Russian state has abused its aestheticized nationalism as a mass movement against the Ukrainian people, from which the Russian property system annexes the one next door and strips it of domestic control, placing both systems further away from any path of deconstruction. The Russian state weaponizes sham referendums at gunpoint in Ukraine to codify its colonial property system. This system is what Ukrainian progressives fight against when they fight against the Russian invasion. With the age of mass surveillance and the Russian state among its top powers, it is exponentially more difficult to resist a property system of foreign occupation than one of domestic occupation in the case of Ukraine. So, when considering the long-term approach to resistance in Ukraine, it only makes sense to dedicate as much effort as possible to expelling Russian forces.

Benjamin’s idea of the wartime property system is reminiscent of Subcomandante Marcos’ megapole theory, being the duplication of corporate property systems across the world to expand a state’s oligarchal power through instability. The Russian state has emulated this imperialist property system closely in its occupation, enabling Russian corporations to exploit cheap labor from Ukrainian residents who have become severely impoverished from the invasion. “Special military operation” has been used by imperialist states as a rephrase of “conquest” in this sense, to expand their property systems as widely and as brutally as possible through invasion and ethnic cleansing. We see this as a recurring pattern with numerous imperialist states across the world, including the US, Turkish state, Indonesian state, Iranian state, Israeli state, Chinese state, and plenty others.

This scramble for state property in Ukraine is by no means limited to the Russian state, however. Zelensky’s wartime crackdown on unions, progressives, and the opposition bloc has significantly weakened Ukrainian labor rights, keeping property further away from the hands of workers and closer to the hands of the state. As a result, capital and state power concentrate further, and further, and further as a symptom of wartime late-stage statism. The Ukrainian ruling class has proven its disconnection from the resistance in that it has disadvantaged literally everyone on the frontline, who happen to be the exact same workers affected. These actions are not connected to the Ukrainian resistance, but rather a crime against its workers perpetrated by the Ukrainian ruling class.

One cannot help but think back to the wartime playbook of Lenin, who, once upon a time, eliminated workers’ autonomy and oversaw the massacre of thousands of striking workers to expand the Bolshevik monopoly on power. This was complemented by the Bolshevik policy of “war communism,” which culminated in subsequent peasant massacres such as those seen in Tambov and Sorokino, as well as the suppression of workers in Kronstadt.

Ukraine In the Context of the USSR, Orange Revolution, and Maidan

The Ukrainian state is, at the end of the day, a post-Soviet police state scarcely different in structure than any other liberalized Eastern Bloc state. The idea that the Ukrainian state is a “democratic” one is a delusion propelled by Western states and liberal media to separate Western-backed post-SSRs from Russian-backed post-SSRs. In reality, structural differences in the post-Soviet state constellation are generally nominal, and have been this way since the Soviet Union. Power is vested in a unitary republic and communities are entirely subordinate to the ruling class hegemony, which is propelled by an alliance between oligarchy and military.

It should not be difficult to ascertain that this reality has adversely impacted the Russian-speakers of Donbass, leaving them disaffected under Ukrainian hegemony after enjoying decades of structural privilege in the USSR. Following the Europhilic Viktor Yushchenko’s 2004 election in the wake of the Orange Revolution, the Ukrainian state ensured the social marginalization of Donbass for five years under Ukrainian nationalism. It was not until the Russophilic Viktor Yanukovych’s 2010 election that the entire sociopolitical perception of Ukrainian statehood was changed. In both cases, the elections were considerably narrow, nearly splitting the Ukrainian voting population in half. Taking advantage of the Ukrainian state’s duopoly, Yushchenko was narrowly elected by a 7.8% majority in 2004, almost entirely concentrated in the central and western regions. Yanukovych was narrowly elected by a 3.5% majority in 2010, almost entirely concentrated in the southern and eastern regions.

Suddenly Donbass became a domestic policy priority under Yanukovych in 2010 while state attention to the rest of Ukraine decreased. This shift to the opposite end of the duopoly then marginalized ethnic Ukrainians right back, Yanukovych pledging to change the official language of Ukraine to Russian and subvert local Ukrainian sectors with Russian ones. In the process of post-Soviet political mainstream reducing Ukraine to a binary between Europhiles and Russophiles, ethnic minorities in Ukraine have been entirely neglected by both reactionary ruling factions.

After four years of subjection to a repressive Russian satellite state attempting to shift the cultural and ethnic makeup of Ukraine, Ukrainians in the central and western regions desired a new government. This desire materialized into the 2014 Maidan Uprising. A layered analysis of Maidan from Ukrainian progressive perspectives can be found in Autonomous Workers Union’s 2014 interview “Maidan and its Contradictions.” As suggested by Ukrainian progressives themselves, labeling Maidan as a “color revolution” or “coup” serves to dehumanize the Ukrainian people, and this analysis happens to be rejected by a large portion of the Ukrainian left. Ukrainian progressives maintain that Maidan was fueled more by the urge to depart from Russian hegemony than to join European power structures, and that liberal opportunist parties abused this sentiment for Eurocentrism. A Ukrainian revolutionary syndicalist explained in the 2014 interview with Autonomous Workers Union:

“‘Europe’ was never actually the main aim of the protesters. Anti-government and anti-Russian sentiments were much stronger, so they naturally overtook the pro-EU rhetoric after the police crackdown of December 1, and now most people hardly even remember what the initial cause of the demonstrations was. Many people agree that the very term Euromaidan is already anachronistic. The far right groups, which initially had to hide their traditional attitude to the ‘liberal decaying EU’ in order to infiltrate the protests, now openly state that they don’t care about the EU and only want a regime change. This sentiment is accepted in the wide circles of the protesters.”

Another detailed analysis of Maidan can be found in CrimethInc.’s February 2022 interview: “Ukraine: Between Two Fires.”

In both the Orange Revolution and Maidan, protesters were not able to reverse many of the Ukrainian state’s structural problems, as the oligarchy continued to infiltrate the state through liberal opportunist parties. The most significant change was state favoritism toward either oligarchy, Yanukovych favoring fusion of the Ukrainian oligarchy with the Russian oligarchy and Poroshenko favoring fusion with the Western oligarchy. With the Western oligarchy now firmly integrated in the Ukrainian economy following Maidan, the Ukrainian state was able to successfully gather extensive military support from Western states without having to join NATO.

The blanket-statement ‘color revolution’ narrative treats people like children. It ignores their actual lived experiences and motivations and lumps all people into one neat little camp under the banner of forced nationalist identity. It’s monolithic thinking, and leaves no room for complex (and contradictory) ecosystems of social interaction.

It’s no different than right wingers here in the states saying that race riots are sparked by ‘outside agitators’ – as if black people can’t rise up on their own initiative without external, white influence.

Right now, there are Kurdish people in so-called Iran rising up and using this moment to take land back from their conquerors. Even before the CIA interventions and regime change in Iran, the state was a settler project on stolen indigenous land. Full stop. No amount of ‘socialism’ will amend that.”

-Payton (IG: @__black__velvet)

What is commonly attached to the “color revolution” analysis is dehumanizing Ukrainians as “fascists” and “Nazis,” conflating these terms with the Ukrainian ethnicity as a whole. Though fascists are certainly present in Ukraine and have materialized very noticeable armed forces, they are a virtually powerless minority with no stake in the executive chambers of the state and only a negligible representation in parliament. Putin himself has admitted that Ukraine’s far-right population is a minority (albeit with the intention of making it appear that there are more Russian nationalists). Contrarily, fascism is the very skeleton of statehood in Donbass, defended in its bulk by the likes of Wagner Group and openly neo-Nazi militias such as the Russian National Unity Volunteer Units, Interbrigades, Rusich Company, and many others. The misconception that neo-Nazi units only exist to the west of Donbass is rooted in Kremlin propaganda. In reality, far more neo-Nazi political power in the region can be found in Donbass than in the rest of Ukraine.

Conceptualizing the Post-Maidan Ukrainian Left and Its Responses

There is a pervasive stereotype that Ukrainian progressives have given up on organizing and have simply been absorbed into fascist militias and the National Guard. We know this is not true. The Ukrainian left never gave up on organizing, as this is evident in the numerous crackdowns on progressive groups that otherwise would not have happened. The Ukrainian state has censored and repressed the left severely, refusing to allow them a coherent militia presence of any kind up until the 2022 invasion.

Thus, Ukrainian progressives had to wait for the right time to organize, which happened to be the 2022 invasion. Since then, we have seen the rapid rise of Ukrainian radical left-libertarian and anarchist forces such as RevDia, United Anti-Authoritarian Forces of Ukraine, Arsenal Kyiv Hooligans, Black Flag Ukraine, Solidarity Collectives, Operation Solidarity, and others, who fight both the crony capitalism of the Ukrainian police state and the greater immediate threat of the Russian invasion. Belarusian anarchists and anti-authoritarians have also formed their own units within the Kastus Kalinowski Battalion. Evident in their ascending following base and membership, anarchist movements have expanded significantly in this conflict and their influence is growing in Ukraine. From the historic revolution of Nestor Makhno to his descendants in the Ukrainian anti-authoritarian forces today, the Ukrainian resistance has everything to do with class war, expelling imperialist occupation in order to fight for autonomy domestically.

It is somewhat of a miracle that anti-authoritarians have been able to form their own autonomous units and enjoy a steady supply of arms through the National Guard, but that is largely because Ukraine is now in an existential crisis. What is important here is not where the arms came from, but the fact that they now have this abundance of arms and will likely keep them for a very long time. The Ukrainian state’s rationale here is that anyone willing to fight the invasion will get free guns and ammunition. Because the Ukrainian state is forced to think in the short-term, it cannot immediately realize the future repercussions of this armament on its power structures. Because so many factions have been armed with a significant degree of autonomy, the state itself may very well be gradually losing its monopoly on power. In other words, Ukrainian anti-authoritarians just finessed the hell out of the Ukrainian state.

To confront feminist pacifism, Ukrainian progressive feminists wrote a manifesto in July which has since gained the endorsement of over 70 progressive organizations across the world. Ukrainian feminists assert that the invasion must be resisted by women, as gender violence and patriarchy are common pillars of the Russian war machine, and that telling a woman to disarm is essentially telling her to accept rape. In the words of anti-pacifist feminists in Ukraine:

Feminist solidarity must defend women’s* right to independently determine their needs, political goals, and strategies for achieving them. Ukrainian feminists were struggling against systemic discrimination, patriarchy, racism, and capitalist exploitation long before the present moment. We conducted and will continue to conduct this struggle both during war and in peacetime. However, the Russian invasion is forcing us to focus on the general defense effort of Ukrainian society: the fight for survival, for basic rights and freedoms, for political self-determination…

The Russian aggression undermines the achievements of Ukrainian feminists in the struggle against political and social oppression. In the occupied territories, the Russian army uses mass rape and other forms of gender-based violence as a military strategy. The establishment of the Russian regime in these territories poses the threat of criminalizing LGBTIQ+ people and decriminalizing domestic violence.”

Present on this progressive front in Ukraine is also the All-Ukraine Independent Trade Union of Ukraine (AUITU), which has joined the resistance both on the frontlines and on the civilian front. In the words of AUITU from March 2022:

The Independent Trade Union of Ukraine ‘Zakhist Pratsi’ is directly involved in the resistance to the invasion by Russian imperialism. We are fighting along side the working class and the Ukrainian people on various fronts of resistance. Some organizations of our union, such as the ‘Zakhista Pratsi’ miners’ union at the ‘Selidov-ugol’ firm, are protecting us and our future with weapons in their hands and in the most difficult conditions of the hostilities. Many activists of our union are now resisting the rocket and bomb attacks of the Russian troops, supporting the difficult conditions of the bomb shelters, saving their children and their families from certain death.”

In spite of Ukrainian state union crackdowns, AUITU finds the invasion to be an existential threat both to itself and its workers, and thus prioritizes self-defense against Russian occupation. In other words, this is the class war side of the resistance. AUITU went on to say that the invasion “united the trade union and labor movement in Ukraine” and that “we now need increasingly active international solidarity with our anti-imperialist resistance.”

Meanwhile, Ukrainian progressive Marxist-Leninist groups have failed to gain much traction at all. Progressive Marxist-Leninists, represented mostly by the Labor Front of Ukraine (RFU), currently hold a small presence relative to anarchists and other progressive movements in Ukraine. Though RFU dissents with reactionary Marxists, it has referred to anarchists as “Ukrainian bourgeoisie” and has thus antagonized a huge portion of Ukrainian progressives against its own benefit. It now has few progressive allies in Ukraine and is highly vulnerable to state repression. While anti-authoritarians have already organized effectively in both mutual aid and resistance, RFU has admitted it is still struggling to muster its own organizing response, citing lack of experience.

It also must be understood that the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) is not progressive by any measure. Much like the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU), KPU is a severely reactionary mass movement that has collaborated heavily with Nazbol fascists through the misnomer “Left Opposition” coalition. The reactionary tendencies of the KPU and SPU are described in Autonomous Workers’ Union journalist Denys Gorbach’s piece “After the ban: a short history of Ukraine’s Communist Party,” Ukrainian sociologist Volodymyr Ishchenko’s 2015 article “Kiev Has a Nasty Case of Anti-Communist Hysteria,” and an anonymous author’s 2018 article “An Investigation Into Red-Brown Alliances: Third Positionism, Russia, Ukraine, Syria, And The Western Left.”

The Ukrainian state banned the KPU and SPU not for their social tendencies, which happen to be very similarly reactionary to the Zelensky bloc and nationalist bloc but with Soviet flavoring. Rather, it has banned them because of their political threat to the Zelensky bloc and potential collaboration with the Russian state. Either way, both parties have been conflated with actual Ukrainian progressives and used by the Ukrainian state to dehumanize them.

Understanding the existence of Ukrainian progressives and solidarity with them begins with the fact that a large majority are anti-authoritarian, rejecting the Soviet model, European model, and Ukrainian nationalist model. Ukrainian progressives should not be criticized for prioritizing defense against a Russian state that happens to be annihilating the entire physical and social environment around them. Some in the Western left expect Ukrainian radicals to go full Rambo against domestic fascists in the middle of an invasion. This would be a death sentence.

Ukrainian anti-authoritarians have been underground for over a century. It is not like they do not know what they are doing. What is most important is not how the state reacts to anti-authoritarians, this we already know. Rather, it is how anti-authoritarians will have harnessed this struggle for autonomy to expand, gain experience, forge new pathways of resistance, and use other attributes to their advantage. As an international ally, one should leave Ukrainian progressives to what they find to be the most suitable path in liberation, and hold solidarity instead of constantly holding them under a microscope of judgment.

Explicitly maintained by a large portion of Ukrainian progressives, the Ukrainian people have a right to self-determination as do all communities and peoples, and the justification of self-defense against invasion is right there in that sentence. The Russian state, in planting its property system by force, attempts to colonize Ukraine and reverse the efforts of Ukrainian workers in their fight for autonomy. Ukrainian self-determination is plagued with imperialist masters in the Russo-Ukrainian War, yet this has no impact on the inherent value of self-determination and the class war side of the conflict. To be in favor of self-determination and class war is not to be in favor of war, it is to be in favor of autonomy exacted through self-defense.

Mike Davis (1946-2022): Miscellaneous Encounters with “A Real Marxist”

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Mike Davis when he worked for Verso publishers.

Mike Davis, the revolutionary socialist social and culture critic, has died. The Los Angeles Times, has written a comprehensive obituary about his very productive and complicated life.

I think it must have been 1967 when I first met Mike Davis. One day, studying with my friends Eric and Jeannie Baecht, fellow students at San Diego State, I told them that I was a Marxist. “Oh, you think you’re a Marxist,” said Jeannie. “We’ll introduce you to a real Marxist.”

She made a call and we drove to Mike’s house. Jeannie must have cued him as to why were coming, because when we arrived, he hollered to come in and we opened the door to find him sitting in front of a poster of Karl Marx, reading Das Kapital, as Bertolt Brecht’s “Three-Penny Opera” played in the background. “See,” said Jeannie, “He’s a real Marxist.”

Another time, we drove down to meet Mike who was working as a butcher or a driver for a meat market, I think it was down in San Ysidro, just on this side of the Mexican border. This seemed perfectly normal to me, since I had grown up in a family of bakers and grocers and my step-father for a while drove a truck for Safeway. And in those days, we all worked at something while going to school. I learned from reading the obituaries that Mike’s father had been a butcher, so perhaps that’s how he got into the job.

Perhaps it was the next year that Eric, Jeannie, and I drove up to L.A. to see Mike, who was then working at the Communist Party bookstore in Los Angeles. He had joined the party, but he was apparently not its most loyal member. As he walked us up and down the aisles of the store, he pointed at different sections and different shelves, pointing out sine books and giggling. “Look, I put Herbert Marcuse here.” And, “I put Leon Trotsky in here.” The idea of Trotsky infiltrating the Communist Party bookstore made us all laugh.

The next time I saw Mike was in 1988. Ken Paff, national organizer of Teamsters for a Democratic Union, and Mike who was then working for the leftwing publishing house Verso, had come up with the idea that I should write aa book about TDU. I was then living in L.A. and Mike came by my house in Echo Park to discuss the contract with me, telling me, “If you need anything while you’re writing this, I’ll be glad to help.” When I did have some question and tried to call Mike, he was nowhere to be found. Someone told he was getting married or getting divorced, there was a wife and a girlfriend, it was complicated. He did that a lot, marrying five times. (I am not criticizing. I have married four times myself, finally getting it right.)

In 1991, my wife Sherry and I were visiting L.A. and friends there suggested we go with them to hear Mike Davis who was giving a talk on his new book, City of Quartz. As I remember it, the event was in a big bookstore and there must have been a hundred people in the audience. Mike talked for perhaps an hour, a talk riddled with post-modern language and allusions to things I had never heard of. I couldn’t follow it. Later I read the book but was not moved by it, though it became a bestseller and catapulted Mike to fame and fortune as a winner of a McArthur “genius grant” of $500,000 in 1998.

Mike and I met too infrequently to ever become friends. I didn’t know him really. But I do know that he spent his entire life as a socialist activist, generously supporting every social and labor movement on the left. Toward the end of his life, concerned about what capitalism was doing to the planet, he had taken up the issue of climate change. As I had learned back in the mid-1960s, Mike was “the real Marxist.”

 

Stand Firm ILWU with Ukraine

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Back in March, the International Longshore and Warehouse Union took a fine position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  Its Coast Committee called the attack “an act of aggression that endangers a population of more than 40 million people.”  In a press release, the union stated that “Effective immediately, the International Longshore and Warehouse Union, with some 20,000 workers strong in 29 ports up and down the United States West Coast, will refuse to load or unload any Russian vessels or Russian cargo coming into or going out of all West Coast ports from Bellingham, Washington, to San Diego, California.”

In taking this action, the ILWU continued its tradition of standing up for justice.  In the past, it shut down ports to oppose the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  It took action against the government of apartheid-era South Africa and in support of Palestinian rights.  It wouldn’t load military cargo to the forces that overthrew the elected government of Chile.

But now a number of ILWU members want to overturn their union’s stand against aggression and punish the victims, the Ukrainian people.  In a statement published on October 3rd on the site Counterpunch they called for port actions “to refuse to handle military cargo by dockworkers around the world.”  This is plainly designed to stop the ability of Ukrainians to defend themselves against a Russian military which has an almost unlimited supply of weapons.

The reasoning behind this call is based on a completely skewed history of what has been going on in Eastern Europe.  Russia signed a treaty in 1994 to respect Ukraine’s borders, yet it has invaded Ukraine with the intent of ending the country’s independence and the Ukrainian identity.  The signers of the October 3 statement, however, claim the war was “provoked by U.S./NATO aggression”.   We have many positions about NATO, some quite negative, but we have to note that the alliance’s last significant expansion was in 2004.

Likewise, the supposed list of facts about a “U.S.-driven Maidan coup” that burned down a union headquarters or about “two newly-founded republics” or a brigade that killed 15,000 people in Ukraine’s Donbas are misleading, distorted or completely false.

Working people in Ukraine are solidly behind defense of their country.  Their unions spoke out the day after Putin’s February invasion. They asked for “solidarity” the fight against “Russian Federation aggression.” In April the Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Ukraine wrote a letter to union supporters in the UK.  After thanking them for support the Confederation explained, “Our brave medical workers save lives of civilians and soldiers.  Our railway and transport workers evacuate people from battle zones and carry cargo despite the shelling.” It also wrote, “Ukraine needs assistance, primarily military, financial and humanitarian aid.”

We current, retired or former union members, encourage the ILWU to reject this attempt to repeal its correct and powerful stand on Ukraine.
Amina S. Ali

National Writers Union *

 

Bill Balderston,

retired teacher; organizer with the Oakland Education Association *

 

Mark Baugher

Portland, Oregon USA

Former member, USWA Local 13 *

 

Robert Casanta

Association of Flight Attendants – CWA (retired) *

 

Emmett Doyle

Carpenters Union Local 68 *
Arthur Esparza,
member Carpenters Local 30

 

Ann Eveleth

anti-war activist

former member SEIU Local 500*

and South African Union of Journalists

 

Bill Fletcher, Jr.

National Writers Union; AFGE *

 

Phil Gasper

Member AFT, Local 243 *

 

Brian T. Gibbons

Former Teamster member Local 495 LA and steward Local 392 CLE *

 

Howard Hawkins

retired Teamster, Local 317, Syracuse, NY *

 

Stanley Heller

AFT West Haven, CT #1547 *

AFT New Haven (Retired) *

 

Scott Houldieson

Union activist UAW Local 551 Chicago *

Resident Highland, Indiana.

 

Meghan Keane,

former PSC-CUNY member *

 

Patrick Kearney
(retired) Local 777, United Association of Plumbers and Pipefitters *

 

Kieran F. Knutson

President CWA Local 7250 *

 

Traven Leyshon

president Green Mountain Labor council, *

district v-p VT AFL-CIO

 

Linda Mann

National Association of Letter Carriers (Retired) Branch 9 *

 

Bradley L Mayer,

former member, United Steel Workers of America *

 

Steve Ongerth

IWW (Bay Area General Membership Branch) and IBU (San Francisco Bay Area Region, ILWU affiliate) *

Bay Area, California

 

Frank Panzarella

retired Former President of International Association of Machinists and Aerospace workers Local 1990 *

 

Maria Constanza Pedraza

Retired Teacher, former executive board member United Educators of San Francisco (UESF),
former member Hayward Education Association (HEA) *

 

Charles Post

AFT 2334/PSC-CUNY *

 

John Reimann

Former recording secretary, Carpenters Union Local 713 *

Co-chair, Ukraine Socialist Solidarity Campaign

 

Rick Sprout

CSEA/ UUP (retired) *

New York State

 

David Turpin Jr.,

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 134, Substation Electrician *

 

Sherry Wolf

Member, CWA 1032 *

 

Cheryl Zuur

former president AFSCME Local 444 *

 

Ted Zuur

former member of HERE Local 2, San Francisco *
 (*union name and locals are for identification only)
To add your name to this letter send an email to:  StandFirmForUkraine@gmail.com   Make sure to include your current or past union affiliation

The Limits of Western Economic War with Russia and the Failure of Climate Policy

Anti-war protest in Lisbon
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Anti-war protest in Lisbon

Anti-war protest in Lisbon. Photo from Feminist Antiwar Resistance / @t_alexx_t

Russia’s war on Ukraine marks a historical turning point. The illegal annexation of four Ukrainian regions in September, and the nuclear threats issued, are a dangerous intensification. It is a matter of principle, in my view, that the labour movement and civil society internationally should support Ukrainian resistance, and I have written about that elsewhere.[1] In this article, I make an initial attempt to understand the economic war being waged alongside the military conflict, the resulting disruption of energy markets, and their place in the broader social and ecological crises shaking capital.

In the first section, I argue that the western powers’ economic war against Russia is reactive and limited; even now, sections of western capital hope to mend ruined business relationships with Russia. In the second section, I show that, until 2014, western policy was focused on integrating Russia into the world economy on the west’s terms: even after the Kremlin’s military intervention in Ukraine, the western response remained reactive. The third section is about the consequences of this year’s invasion for energy markets – in particular the European gas market – and for the energy transition. Narratives of “energy crisis” are being used to double down on fossil fuel investment and undermine the western powers’ commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, magnifying the impact of the war and climate crisis for the whole of humanity.

1. Economic warfare and its limits
The aim of the western powers’ sanctions on Russia is to try to discipline the Putin government, not to destroy it. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, and illegal annexation of four Ukrainian regions in September, marks the breakdown of the relationship established in 1990-92 between Russia and the European powers, especially Germany – a breakdown that those powers had desperately hoped to avoid. This breakdown will transform not only capital’s military arrangements in Europe, but also the energy system, in which cheap Russian gas has been a key element for four decades.

Three types of economic sanctions are being used against Russia: on finance; on trade; and on individual owners of businesses that have links to the Kremlin. The financial sanctions include the freezing of dollar-denominated Central Bank assets and restrictions on the use of payment systems; Gazprombank, through which payments are made for gas exports, is exempted. Trade sanctions are directed against exports, chiefly of oil and gas, and imports, especially high-tech ones. The sanctions against individual business people (freezing assets, denying visas, and so on) have “won the most publicity”, but are also the least effective, a survey by The Economist showed. It estimated that out of $400 billion blocked on paper, only $50 billion had been frozen.[2] Transparency International concurred: “While high-profile yacht seizures have been making international headlines, these are only a small fraction of kleptocrats’ illicit wealth stashed abroad.” The system that allows them to keep their assets out of tax authorities’ reach had been “abused for decades”.[3]

Here I summarise the effect of sanctions on oil and gas; some reasons for Russian kleptocrats’ impunity; and the effects on the Russian economy.

Oil
Russia is the third largest oil producer behind the US and Saudi Arabia. It accounts for 12-13% of world crude oil production, and refines more than half of this in Russia. About three quarters of the output is exported, mostly (about two thirds) as crude oil, some as refined products. Oil exports are the mainstay of the Russian economy, contributing about 45% of total export revenues and about one third of the federal budget.

So far, western sanctions on Russian oil have been limited: the most significant, an EU embargo on crude oil imports, will only take effect in January 2023, followed by an embargo on refined products in February.[4] Sanctions on Russian shipping and insurance, and financial sanctions, have made some impact. These measures reduced Russian exports to Europe and the US, but much of this oil was bought elsewhere, primarily by India and China, albeit at a discount. Before February, Russian production was just short of 12 million barrels per day (mbpd) and crude exports were about 5 mbpd. In the first six months after the invasion of Ukraine, exports to the US and Europe fell by 0.76 mbpd, but an extra 0.5 mbpd is going to Asian buyers. In March, the International Energy Agency forecast that, by next year, Russian oil production would fall by 3 mbpd, more than a quarter; in September it revised that to a 1.9 mbpd fall.[5]

While Russia is exporting less actual oil, it is earning far more from it, due to high prices. Oil prices rose steadily during 2021, as the post-pandemic economic recovery began. They surged above $120/barrel in February, straight after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and eased back to around $90/barrel by September. Russia’s fossil fuel export revenues (including oil, gas and coal) have soared: in the first six months since the invasion, they totalled $158 billion, including $43 billion for the state budget. More than half of this came from the EU.[6]

The G7 nations are considering imposing a price cap on purchases of Russian oil, e.g. by banning insurance services for ships delivering above a certain price – but there are doubts about its effectiveness.[7] Ever since sanctions were imposed on Iranian oil, traders worldwide have developed increasingly sophisticated methods of evading them. The western nations are also constrained by a shortage of refining capacity: as the EU’s measures take hold, more Russian oil may go to China and India for processing and re-export.

So sanctions on the oil trade have failed to stop Russia earning more export revenues in the short term, but will probably push down its oil output in the medium term. The greatest effect, though, will be felt over the long term, as cooperation with multinational oil companies and imports of western technology dry up.

In March, the three largest multinational oil investors in Russia – BP, Shell and ExxonMobil – said they would quit, along with other foreign companies. TotalEnergies of France, by contrast, has stayed. In August, a presidential decree forbid foreign investors to sell assets. The oil majors are now talking to the government, and Saudi, Chinese and Indian investors, about how to sell up. Russia relies heavily on imported technology and expertise for the complex upstream operations that contribute an increasing share of its oil output, and so this exodus could be damaging. In July, ExxonMobil recalled foreign staff from the Sakhalin I project that it operates in partnership with Rosneft, the largest state-owned Russian oil company, and output fell by more than 95%.[8]

Gas
Russia is the world’s second-largest gas producer; historically it was the largest, but in 2011 fell behind the US, as shale gas output rose there. Most Russian gas – just short of two-thirds in recent years – is consumed in Russia. In recent years Russia has begun to export relatively small volumes of gas via a new pipeline to China, and as liquefied natural gas (LNG) from projects in the Far East and the Arctic, but the bedrock of its export business has always been supplies via pipeline to Europe. Gazprom, the giant state-controlled gas company, has a monopoly over these.

Russian gas has in recent years comprised more than one third of total EU gas consumption. But some countries are more dependent on it than others: Germany relies on Russia for more than half of its gas; the Czech republic, Hungary and Slovakia are even more dependent. As a result of the Russian attack on Ukraine, not only did European governments set out to reduce dependence on Russian gas imports,[9] but Gazprom – at the Kremlin’s direction, and at odds with its commercial interest – sought to reduce exports.

While the Kremlin hopes to keep oil exports as high as possible, it sees withholding gas supplies from Europe as an instrument of economic warfare. Already in 2021, as the Russian troop build-up on Ukraine’s borders heightened political tensions with Europe, Gazprom stopped filling gas storage facilities in Europe and, while it kept delivering gas under long-term contracts, it stopped selling additional volumes on European spot markets. This supply squeeze, along with rising demand post-pandemic, led to a sharp increase in wholesale gas prices.

In February, after the Kremlin recognised the Donetsk and Luhansk “republics”, Germany blocked completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, a nearly-finished Gazprom project aimed at sending gas to Germany by a non-Ukrainian route. Economic war was declared, alongside the shooting war; the German policy of building a strong trading relationship, first with the Soviet Union and then Russia, had come to an end.[10] (On the impact of the gas supply squeeze on European energy systems, see part 3 below.)

In response to this and to financial sanctions, Russia cut gas deliveries further. In March, Putin issued a decree that payment had to be made in rubles; flows to Poland, Bulgaria, Finland, the Netherlands and Denmark were cut when companies refused. Over the summer, sanctions and counter-sanctions cut flows via three of four main pipeline routes – via the Baltic, Poland, and Ukraine – while those via Turkey continued. Gazprom failed to meet contractual obligations, another nail in the coffin of business relationships built up over half a century.[11]

European gas prices have soared, much further and faster than oil prices. Gazprom, like the oil companies, will have earned substantial export revenues. But the crisis shaking the company epitomises the effect of economic warfare. In the 1990s, Gazprom carried Russia through the world’s deepest ever peacetime recession, supplying cheap gas to businesses and households while oil companies were privatised for a song and revenues stashed offshore. Today, it has fallen victim to the Kremlin’s decision to subordinate economic management to its military adventure. The industrial-scale theft from Gazprom by Putin and his close colleagues has been documented by anti-corruption campaigners[12]; a senior executive of Ukrainian family background has fled to Kyiv and denounced the war,[13] while several others have died in mysterious circumstances;[14] and in September, both branches of the Nord Stream pipeline – Gazprom’s flagship infrastructure project – were sabotaged by unknown perpetrators.[15]

Russia’s total gas exports to Europe, from 150-170 billion cubic metres per year (bcm/year) in recent years, will probably fall to 90 bcm this year and zero next year. The Kremlin has spoken about diverting flows to China, but the potential is comparatively modest (48 bcm/year of contracts now, which could be doubled at best) and the geography very unfavourable.[16] Russia may have lost two of its largest gas export markets, Germany and Ukraine, permanently.

Kleptocrats’ impunity
The relative impunity with which Russia’s kleptocrats are surviving the sanctions regime is largely due to the growth of offshore tax havens, as a result of the neoliberal offensive. Here I argue that kleptocracy (defined as the systematic theft of public resources by the elite) that has emerged in former Soviet states over the last three decades is not an aberration at the neoliberal stage of capitalism, but integral to it.[17]

After the second world war, when the most powerful capitalist nations set up international legal frameworks for further expansion, these included exchange controls and capital controls that subordinated the financial institutions of each country to its state, and regulated international relations through the US dollar as the reserve currency. But from the 1970s, the financial system became increasingly globalised, financial institutions increasingly operated across state borders, and offshore zones opened up, via which elites could avoid tax levied by individual nations.

The Soviet system had developed its industries autarchically, behind the protective wall of a non-convertible currency. By the time that wall came down in 1990-92, and sections of the Soviet elite started appropriating state-owned assets and turning themselves into capitalist owners, the offshore zones were highly developed, and able to receive tens of billions of dollars of flight capital from Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet states. The form of capitalism established in Russia in the 1990s – with world-beating levels of inequality, and an especially monstrous concentration of wealth in a small elite group, whose influence over the state often overrides regulation – persists today, although power and wealth has shifted from some of the original Yeltsin-era kleptocrats to a new generation closely linked to the security services.[18]

Capital flight is not incidental to the form that capitalism took in former Soviet countries, but central to it. The journalist Oliver Bullough, in Moneyland, cites the French economist Gabriel Zucman, who estimated that in 2014, 8% of the world’s financial wealth was in tax havens. But, while only 4% of US financial assets were offshore, for African countries the average was 30%, Russia – 52%, and Gulf countries – 57%. The very nature of the offshore zones makes it difficult to measure these assets, and in 2010 the range estimated by James Henry, another economist, was $21-32 trillion, about four times greater than Zucman’s total figure of $7.6 trillion.[19]

It has become the very function of some of the rich countries, the UK in particular, to provide the financial tools that facilitate the looting of the former Soviet bloc and the global south. From another journalistic investigation, Tom Burgis concluded that the UK is in a “long fade from imperial power” to becoming a “global network of financial secrecy connected to the City of London and servicing new, private empires”; the UK’s bankrupt political class “take money and inspiration from the Ur of Kleptopia, post-Soviet Moscow”.[20] Russia has been integrated into the world economy both as an exporter of raw materials and a supplier of financial wealth into the offshore zones. The Putin regime is not some sort of opposite to neoliberal capital and its state authorities, but their Frankenstein’s monster, now out of control.

Impact on the Russian economy, and conclusions
Oleg Ustenko, chief economic adviser to Ukrainian president Zelensky, in August denounced western sanctions as a “phantom” that covered less than 5% of Russia’s pre-war crude oil exports; rising prices, he added, had “far more” to do with energy companies’ profiteering than sanctions. He pointed out that in July some measures had been relaxed: EU sanctions were amended to allow buyers to make “strictly necessary” payments to Russian oil companies, and a plan to block Russian access to shipping insurance delayed.[21]

This is the sanctions’ political character: the western powers are prepared to damage the Russian economy, and the well-being of the Russian population, but are tempered by their need to protect their own structures of power and wealth, and to manage their relationship with their own populations. While the sanctions have been as ineffective in blocking export revenues as Ustenko claimed, they are taking their toll on the Russian economy in other ways.

Sanctions on oil, gas and other exports have helped to push prices up, and to increase revenues to the Kremlin, but sanction on imports have already done substantial damage to Russian industry. While much Russian economic and trade data has been made secret since February, production statistics that are still available show disastrous reductions in industries that rely on imported technology and components: output of cars was down in June, year on year, by 62%. The production of other consumer goods, including fridges and washing machines, was down by more than one third in the first half of this year.[22] It is agreed among observers that the lack of high-tech imports will do the most damage over the long term, both to oil and gas production (see above) and other key industries.

Economists expect Russia’s GDP to shrink by 5-6% this year, but are divided over the longer-term outlook, the impact of Russia’s positive trade balance, and of measures by the Central Bank to strengthen the ruble. The discussion is itself highly politicised. One of the most comprehensive surveys of sanctions, by researchers at Yale University, draws an obviously exaggerated conclusion that “there is no path out of economic oblivion for Russia, as long as the allied countries remain unified in maintaining and increasing sanctions”. Other analysts point out that the Russian economy recovered from the disastrous slumps of 1992-94 and 2010-11; “oblivion” is relative.[23] What seems almost inevitable is that the poorest Russian households will suffer a further substantial deterioration in living standards – while, at the same time, men from Russia’s poorest households, and its ethnic minorities, stand a far greater chance of being conscripted to its demoralised army.

2. The causes of war
The western powers’ limited economic war against Russia is effect, not cause. Their Russia policy has aimed at integrating Russia economically, and making it a junior partner – not an enemy – politically. They have been forced to change by Russia’s imperial assault on Ukraine in February, and by Ukrainian popular resistance to it. In order to understand what happens next, and how this relates to the western powers’ historic failure to deal with climate change, it makes sense to review the history of these relationships.

An approach grounded in Marxism is proposed here, that takes into account both state and political forces, and the economic relationships underlying them. Those in the western “left” who hold that “NATO expansion” is the chief cause of the military conflict (up to and including Russia’s threat to use nuclear weapons), and that Ukraine is fighting a “proxy war” for the US, are both wrong and politically wretched. They act in effect as apologists for the Kremlin’s murderous actions. They ignore the obligation on all who seek to develop a Marxist analysis to uncover concretely how state and political forces are anchored in economic relationships. So an editorial about the war in Monthly Review, a premier English-language Marxist journal, focuses on “the central role that the US and NATO have played […] from the start”; denies that Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014 (!); and, along with an associated 6800-word article by the journal’s editor, says not one single word about the economic relationship between Russia and international capital.[24] Not one.

Here I offer an alternative explanation that takes into account economic and political factors. I then illustrate it with the specific example of the disputes over the gas trade.

Before and after 2014[25]
In 1989-91 the Soviet system collapsed, and so too did the two-power system of international regulation that had persisted since 1945. The Soviet Union’s autarchic, state-controlled model had run its course; labour unrest and social movements helped to finish it off. The western powers’ long-time military adversary was in chaos, but even then, neoliberal hegemony expanded into the post-Soviet space not only, or even mainly, by means of NATO. The most devastating changes were economic. Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet republics were plunged into the greatest peacetime slump anywhere, ever; swathes of industry were junked; social welfare systems collapsed; working people suffered unemployment and poverty. Western capital did not always seize property, or try to. Russia’s oil, gas, minerals and metals industries were mostly transferred into the hands of domestic business groups founded by canny former bureaucrats. So were Ukrainian steel, coal and chemicals. The drive from the west was to break up state property and trash every obstacle to the working of markets.

The most significant round of NATO expansion belongs to this first post-Soviet period. In 1999, Hungary, Poland and Czechia joined, and plans for accession were agreed with Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. They all joined in 2004. Since then four small Balkan nations have joined NATO (Albania and Croatia in 2009, Montenegro in 2017 and North Macedonia in 2020); as for Ukraine, while NATO countries long supplied it with relatively small quantities of defensive weapons, no accession plan was begun. Some Washington-centric “leftists” portray the US as the only driver of this process; in reality, eastern European states that had repeated historical experience of being invaded by Russia, and none of being invaded by the US, were themselves actors.

Putin’s accession to the presidency in 2000 marked a turning point. The Russian state was rescued from the chaos of the 1990s. The business groups were disciplined and forced to pay tax. Riches were taken from the Yeltsin-era oligarchs and put under the control of the former security services officers (siloviki); the assets of the largest privately-owned oil company, Yukos, were confiscated and handed to state-controlled Rosneft. As oil prices rose, to peak in 2009, Russian capitalism boomed as never before or since. Significant steps were taken to merge Russian capital with western markets, including financial sector development and the sale of minority shareholdings in materials exporters to foreign owners.

With Russia’s second war on Chechnya (1999-2002), Putin – enthusiastically supported by NATO – staked his claim as a gendarme for capital in Russia’s sphere of influence. The NATO powers were less happy with his first military adventure outside Russia’s borders, the invasion of Georgia in 2008, but turned a blind eye. Government attention moved elsewhere: a few weeks later, the financial crash unfolded in the US.

The post-2008 economic downturn formed the backdrop to the Maidan uprising that overthrew Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych in 2014. Improvements made in the 2000s to Ukrainian living standards had been wiped out. No single cause brought people out on to the streets, but resentment at the corruption of Yanukovych and the eastern Ukrainian bourgeoisie (owners of mines, steelworks and manufacturing capacity) that he represented was a factor. So was the push by other elements in Ukraine’s ruling elite for closer links with Europe and political distance from Russia. The description by Monthly Review and others of these events – in which millions of people participated and during which the police force collapsed – as a “coup” is as irrational as it is politically slanted.

The Kremlin’s decision to intervene militarily in Ukraine in 2014, and to annex Crimea, was provoked firstly by fear that the chaotic movement that swept away Yanukovich could be replicated in Russia. Putin had already faced the first large-scale protest movement of his presidency against ballot-rigging in the elections of 2011-12.

Frustration at the Ukrainian ruling elite’s closer links with Europe was also a factor. NATO’s limits were tested.

Even after 2014, the western powers amended, but did not abandon, their approach. While the US and its allies were determined to place limits on Russia’s military ambitions, it remained a gendarme in the former Soviet space. The western powers imposed sanctions that undid years of work by Russian companies to integrate more closely with the world financial system; Russian economists’ hopes of diversifying from dependence on hydrocarbons were dashed. But Russia’s functions as a supplier of oil, gas and metals to the world market, and of flight capital to offshore zones, was largely untouched.

The narrative of “NATO expansion” does not fit with the most basic facts. During Putin’s next military adventure, in Syria in 2015-16, “red lines” laid down by the US administration were clearly crossed by Russia and its Syrian ally. NATO’s failure to respond was humiliating. Russia spent several more years in the economic doldrums; Putin’s hopes that the new Ukrainian president, Zelensky, would prove more pliable in negotiations over the Donbas than his predecessor, were not realised; only then did Putin move to a more extreme form of near-fascist militarism and order the 24 February invasion.

Only after that, and only after Putin’s hopes of rapidly taking Kyiv were undone by Ukrainian resistance, did the western powers abandon their previous policy of strictly limiting arms supplies for Ukraine. As the Ukrainian writer Oleksiy Radynski argues: “An informal agreement between two imperialist powers [Russia and Germany] has been thrown into disarray by one factor that remained out of reach of these imperial designs: Ukraine’s popular resistance.”[26]

The gas trade
The gas trade, long central to Russia’s economic relationships with both Ukraine and Europe, is now falling victim to the economic war. Here I review its history, to see what light can be shed on the causes of conflict, both military and economic. (This was a principal area of my research during 15 years at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, up to last year.[27])

Ukraine entered the post-Soviet period as (i) the transit route for gas from Russia’s giant Siberian fields to European customers, and (ii) a major consumer of gas, Gazprom’s second largest export market after Germany. From 1992, payment by Ukraine for gas consumed, and by Russia for gas transit through Ukraine to Europe, formerly settled by intra-Soviet accounting transfers, overnight became payable in dollars. The Russia-Ukraine “gas wars” began, centred on unpaid bills for gas consumed. In the 2000s, as both economies recovered, the value of gas sales to Ukraine for Gazprom, and of transit fees for Ukraine, increased significantly. At first, Russia sought to control both transit and the Ukrainian market – but by the 2010s had abandoned both those aims.

First: what does this story tell us about Russian political and economic strategy towards Ukraine? In the 2000s, as the Ukrainian political pendulum swung back and forth between pro-European and pro-Russian politicians, Gazprom focused on securing control over the Ukrainian transit system. Ultimately, the Ukrainian parliament blocked all proposals for joint ownership. Gazprom reacted by driving a tough bargain on the price and contractual terms for Russian gas exports to Ukraine; this led in January 2009 to the most serious “gas war” yet, when flows not only to Ukraine but to Gazprom’s European customers were cut off.

After that dispute, the Russian approach changed. Attempts to involve Russian-controlled companies in the Ukrainian domestic market and in transiting gas were abandoned. Instead of seeking commercial concessions, Russia sought political ones. In 2010, Russia swapped cheaper gas for an extension of Ukraine’s lease to Russia of its naval base in Crimea. In 2013, the Kremlin offered a substantial discount on gas sales as part of a generous trade package, conditional on Ukraine abandoning its talks on an association agreement with the EU; Yanukovych’s support for that package was among the sparks that set off the Maidan revolt. In 2016, in response to Russia’s military activity in eastern Ukraine, the national gas company Naftogaz Ukrainy ceased direct purchases of Russian gas all together.

In the 2000s Russia had held out hopes of profiting from its powerful position in the Ukrainian gas sector; in the 2010s it sacrificed those hopes in pursuit of territorial gain.

What about Russian strategy towards European governments and companies? After the January 2009 dispute, Gazprom prioritised construction of pipelines to bring gas to Europe by non-Ukrainian routes. It aimed to rid itself of dependence on transit through Ukraine at all costs: the decision to go ahead with Nord Stream 1, directly from the Baltic Sea to Germany, was taken in 2010 despite the onset of the worst recession since the 1930s. Most of the powerful European energy companies that bought Russian gas saw Ukraine as mostly to blame for the cut-off in January 2009, and approved, or joined in, this project.

Throughout the 2010s, there were tensions between Russia and Europe over gas: this was not about Ukraine, though, but about the EU’s market rules, which cut across the traditional oil-linked long-term contracts that Gazprom and its big customers preferred. In other words, it was about the terms on which Russia, as a raw materials exporter, would supply world markets – a relationship both sides sought to continue.

Finally, what about western governments’ and companies’ strategies towards Russia? Surely, if western threats were the dominant factor stoking military conflict, the major oil companies would at least bear that in mind. But both before and after 2014 they invested billions in projects in Russian upstream projects; Ukraine, seen as having less favourable terms of entry, was to all intents and purposes ignored. The biggest ownership deal ever between western and Russian oil companies, BP’s swap of its shareholding in TNK-BP for 20% of Rosneft, went through in 2013. Rosneft, and its politically powerful chairman Igor Sechin, were sanctioned by the US in 2014 after Russia’s annexation of Crimea; BP’s cooperation with Rosneft continued and deepened.

The 2014 US sanctions did threaten the Nord Stream 2 project, that aimed to complete the diversification of gas transit away from Ukraine. Germany, though, wanted the pipeline to be completed. After lengthy negotiations, in July 2021 – with the Russian troop build-up on Ukraine’s borders well underway – Germany and the US concluded a deal under which the sanctions on the pipeline were dropped, in exchange for German commitments of investment in Ukraine.[28] This action by two NATO powers was predicated on the assumption that efforts to profit from Russia’s resources – by means of business relationships with Russian companies, rather than offensive military action – would continue. This attitude changed only on 22 February, after the Kremlin had recognised the two separatist “republics” in the Donbas, and the German government blocked completion of the pipeline.

Following the damage to the pipeline by sabotage in September, it seems doubtful it will ever be resurrected. Some of Putin’s apologists in the western “left” hurried to blame the US for the damage, despite having no evidence one way or the other. What is certain, though, is that their claims that the sabotage cut across Gazprom’s commercial interests are baseless. Gazprom’s entire European sales business, built up painstakingly over half a century, had already been wrecked, over the summer – by the Kremlin, when it ordered gas shipments to be reduced, in its attempt to weaken European military and political support for Ukraine.

3. Deconstructing the “energy crisis”
The war, and the breakdown of the western-Russia economic relationship, have squeezed the supply of fossil fuels, and some foodstuffs and other raw materials. Prices, especially in the wholesale gas market, have soared. This has both stimulated a gigantic profiteering spree, and also disrupted capital’s plans for post-Covid recovery. European energy policies, in which cheap Russian gas plays a central part, are ruined. Capital is responding in the way it knows best: expanding still further the fossil-fuelled technological systems on which it relies, and pushing out the frontiers of exploitation globally. US and European political leaders have undermined their own climate-related greenhouse gas emission reduction targets – once again – to encourage new investment in fossil fuel production. The crisis in which capital finds itself is real enough – but narratives of “energy crisis” and “energy security” must be questioned. The labour movement and social movements need to find ways of uniting around policies that both challenge the new assault on living standards and hasten the transition away from fossil fuels.

A proposed interpretive framework
To work out socialist responses to this crisis, it is important, first, to question categories such as “energy security”. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is presented, by the European Commission, the UK government and other state bodies, as a threat to “energy security” – that is, “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price”, according to the International Energy Agency.[29] But to whom must these energy sources be available? And how is “affordable” determined?

The market values identically a cubic metre of gas burned to heat a pensioner’s home; another cubic metre wasted, by sending heat into the air above that pensioner’s home, because it is not properly insulated; and a third cubic metre used in a petrochemicals plant, to produce plastic packaging, to reduce the costs of transporting luxury goods to a rich consumer. “Energy security” policy often favours the cubic metres wasted or used on luxuries, because construction companies that build poorly insulated homes, and petrochemicals, transport and luxury goods businesses, all have vocal lobbying power, whereas the pensioner only has a voice insofar as civil society can amplify it. “Energy security” assumes that energy demand is inflexible, and leaves untouched the mountain of economic relationships built over decades, on the assumption that fossil fuels will always be plentiful and cheap.

“Energy security” assumes a pact between capital and the state, in which the state is subordinate. In the early and mid 20th century, as social relations dominated by capital consolidated and expanded worldwide, a tension persisted between capital’s control of fuels and electricity and efforts in many countries by the state to provide these – at least to industry, if not to the population – as state-funded, or at least closely regulated, services. From the 1980s, the state’s role was weakened: international markets for fuels were commodified; neoliberal governments tried, albeit with only patchy success, to commodify electricity. In the 1990s, at the very moment that climate science pointed to the need for more state direction, the imperatives of neoliberalism demanded less.[30] According to its dogma, “energy security” was to be assured by markets and corporations.

Ultimately, the same crisis of capital that in Russia produced the Putin government also produced in Europe an “energy system” dominated by fossil fuel-producing companies on one hand and industrial consumers of gas and electricity on the other. Today, “energy security” is in the first place a defence of their interests. Against this, the labour movement and civil society need to develop an approach that defends working people from the assault on their living standards; advances the principle of fuel and electricity provision as services, not commodities; and at the same time paves the way for the transition away from fossil fuels.

European capital’s response
European wholesale gas prices started to rise in 2021 (see above). This year, they have been driven to 8-10 times the levels of 2020 by the shortage of Russian gas, and the expectation that next year there will be none at all. The squeeze on Russian supply of oil – and on Russian and Ukrainian supplies of other commodities, including wheat, vegetable oil and some metals – has driven other prices up. Many economists expect that countries emerging from recession, post-pandemic, will be pushed back into it.

The war’s effect on gas markets has been most extreme, first, because it comes after 30 years of liberalisation, that tends to increase market volatility; second, because of the high level of dependence of European, and especially German, industry and urban infrastructure on these imports; and, third, because the Kremlin is deliberately cutting flows.

European governments are divided on how to deal with the price impact. Some are imposing windfall taxes on fossil fuel companies and considering blanket or selective price caps. Most have introduced subsidies to retail consumers – in many cases because of elites’ fears that these consumers will be unable or unwilling to pay. The European Commission has proposed a mandatory 15% reduction in gas and electricity use over the winter. From the standpoint of the labour movement and civil society, what matters is that retail prices can be regulated by the state, if necessary in combination with nationalisation of companies, at any level: the “energy crisis” is not an uncontrollable Kremlin-created monster whose consequences have to be borne by working people.

European industry faces a combination of high prices and possible physical shortages of gas. Germany has nationalised Uniper, Germany’s largest gas importer; other suppliers of gas and electricity have asked for state support, as have producers of steel, aluminium, fertilisers and petrochemicals. Governments are hoping to replace gas with coal and nuclear power for electricity generation, and plans to phase out coal-fired power stations have been abandoned in Germany, the Netherlands, Greece and the Czech republic.

Alongside these short-term measures – and under the influence of lobbying by fossil fuel producers – European governments have invested heavily in new infrastructure to import gas and other fossil fuels from non-Russian sources. An investigation by the Financial Times found that European governments, while declaiming their belief in the transition away from fossil fuels, have since February adopted plans for more than €50 billion in fossil fuel projects. This is four times more than the €12 billion earmarked for fossil fuels in the RePowerEU strategy, which covers the period up to 2027. Since February, the EU has approved €27 billion in state aid for energy intensive industries and power sector companies, more than EU climate finance to countries in the global south for the whole of 2020.[31]

Much of this investment is directed to increasing Europe’s capacity to import liquefied natural gas (LNG), i.e. gas that can be brought in without pipelines. Energy researchers regard this as a knee-jerk over-reaction that will lock in excessive fossil fuel use; investing in energy conservation would be more effective. Since May, European politicians have announced deals with the US and Qatar, two of the largest LNG exporters. There has also been a European diplomatic offensive in Africa, where Reuters research showed that oil and gas producers are considering up to $100 billion of investment, mostly in offshore gas production. This would gear African countries to producing fossil fuels for export, instead of developing their own post-fossil-fuel energy systems.[32]

The success of the fossil fuel companies’ lobbying can be seen in the continuing support by European politicians for hydrogen as an energy carrier. Due to the difficulty of extracting hydrogen from gas without excessive carbon emissions, and the huge energy cost of producing it from renewables, it can only play a minor part in post-fossil-fuel energy systems. And yet gas companies, who see potential for their infrastructure to be turned over to hydrogen, have won substantial political support for this ultimate illusory techno-fix.[33]

Conclusions and strategies for the labour movement and social movements

These two apparently separate crises – war and failure to deal with climate change – have their roots in the larger crisis of capital. It must be worth discussing how their roots are entangled, if we are to give meaning to our hopes of social change that goes beyond capital. I suggest starting with the 1980s, when global recessions gave way to a new surge of capital expansion, often described as globalisation. At the Rio summit in 1992, all the world’s strongest powers accepted the conclusions of climate science, that fossil fuel use was the main driver of potentially dangerous global warming, and so had to be reduced – and yet through the 1990s and the 2000s, they presided over an unprecedented expansion of fossil fuel use to turbo-charge expansion of every type of industrial production. Only the recession of 2009-10 temporarily slowed that expansion.

Simultaneously, Russia was emerging from the breakup of the Soviet Union as an exporter of raw materials, oil and gas. When Putin succeeded Yeltsin in 2000, the western powers welcomed the restoration of a strong state in place of the chaos of the 1990s. Russia’s oil-fuelled boom of 2003-09 followed. Globally, oil demand soared and rising Russian supply was welcome; amidst this new round of economic expansion, climate policy was relegated to insignificance. The western powers looked on, first approvingly and then apprehensively, as the Kremlin adopted the role of capital’s gendarme in its sphere of influence; there followed the interventions in Ukraine in 2014 and Syria in 2015-16; Putin was on the road to this year’s disastrous invasion.

That the western powers allowed, or enabled, the Kremlin to take this course is seen by some analysts as the failure of the system of law-governed international relations, set up after the second world war and re-set in the wake of the Soviet collapse. I offer an alternative view, that that system was always beholden to capital, the dynamics of which favoured the Putin regime evolving as it has. The question is not whether that system failed, but whether it could ever have succeeded. The task of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, set at Rio in 1992, was in some ways the most urgent that the international political system had set itself. But this aim was forcefully pushed aside in the new surges of capital accumulation in the 1990s and 2000s. To ever-expanding capital, Russia was a source of new fossil fuels to power this juggernaut.

This was the ground on which the trading relationships, and political compromises, stood. These later formed the basis for Russian aggression against Ukraine. Capitalism and its political apparatus, that have produced the human and ecological disaster of global heating, simultaneously oversaw the emergence of Putin’s militaristic dictatorship. Putin is not an opposite to this system, but its creation.

Bearing these conclusions in mind, I offer for discussion some principles on which actions by the labour movement and civil society could be based.

First, civil society changes things. The resistance of the Ukrainian population was a necessary factor in the defeat of the Russian advance on Kyiv in March and the Ukrainian recovery of territory in the east and south in September and October. The Russian population’s attitude matters too: no-one there wants to join the army. In the labour movement and civil society in the rest of Europe, we need to build solidarity with Ukrainian resistance, welcome refugees from the war, and so on, alongside facing the consequences of the “energy crisis” and inflation.

Second, we should seek ways of linking the immediate issues faced by working people in European countries – unpayable gas and electricity bills on one hand, possible layoffs from work on the other – with longer-term policies that look towards the transition away from fossil fuels and the development of energy supply systems that serve people, not capital. The labour movement has throughout its history advocated the supply of fuels and electricity, along with other municipal services, as services, as rights, not as commodities. The case for forms of public and common ownership is compelling. We need to make these issues central to the struggles of the 2020s.

Third, we need to find ways to actualise the link between the immediate cost-of-living issues and the longer term issue of climate change. An obvious example is the call for the mass retrofitting of homes with insulation and electric heat pumps. Millions of European households are trapped in a system dominated economically by corporations, and technologically by fossil fuels: they pay exorbitant bills for gas and electricity that those systems compel them to use.

Energy systems researchers have shown that conservation measures could slash gas demand by nearly one-third of the EU’s total consumption within a few years. In parallel, an environmentalist alliance has advocated reducing EU consumption by 100 bcm/year – two thirds of the volumes imported from Russia in recent years – via energy efficiency measures, heat pumps and electrification in buildings, and more renewable electricity.[34] Such proposals need to be taken beyond the confines of research reports and discussed widely in civil society.

Looking to the longer term, insulation and heat pumps are small technological steps towards post-fossil-fuel energy systems; so are public transport networks geared to minimising road traffic. These technologies will only realise their potential – and help to avert dangerous global warming – when combined with social transformation that free us from capital’s domination and enable us all to live better, more purposeful lives.

These are just indications of the way I believe labour movements and civil society can face the crisis through which we are living. Others will be able to develop these lines of thought much further. Most important is the direction taken by working people as they act, collectively, to defend social life in the face of the multi-faceted crisis that the long-outmoded capital system is now inflicting on humanity. Showing how such actions can come together, to move towards the necessary radical systemic change – beyond capital, to a truly human future – must surely be the goal of any analysis directed towards the practice of the labour movement and social movements.

□ This article was commissioned by Emanzipation journal, which will publish a German translation. The English text also appears on the author’s blog. Reproduced here by permission of Simon Pirani and with thanks to Emanzipation.

Notes

[1] For example: S. Pirani, “Supporting the Ukrainian resistance. Six questions” (People & Nature, 19 April 2022). https://peopleandnature.wordpress.com/site-contents/supporting-the-ukrainian-resistance-six-questions/

[2] “Split reality”, The Economist, 27 August 2022

[3] Transparency International, Up to the task? The state of play in countries committed to freezing and seizing Russian dirty money, May 2022 https://www.transparency.org/en/publications/up-to-the-task-freezing-seizing-russia-dirty-money

[4] European Council, “EU sanctions against Russia explained”. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/sanctions-against-russia-explained/#sanctions

[5] “Briefing: global energy flows”, The Economist, 24 September 2022; “Western sanctions have had ‘limited impact’ on Russia”, FT 11 Aug; “EU embargo to hit Russian oil output, says IEA”, Financial Times, 14 September 2022

[6] Centre for Research of Energy and Clean Air, Fossil fuel exports from Russia in the first six months of the invasion of Ukraine, energyandcleanair.org August 2022

[7] “Fuel for thought: G7 price cap” by Robert Perkins, S&P Global Commodity Insights

[8] “Neft’ zasakhalilas’”, Kommersant, 7 July 2022; “Exxon prigrozal podat’ v sud”, Kommersant, 30 August 2022; “Rosneft says normal operations at Sakhalin 1 could help”, Reuters, 30 August 2022

[9] The RePowerEU policy, adopted by the European Commission in May, calls for Europe to be “independent of Russian fossil fuels well before 2030”, implying a reduction to zero of gas imports. https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/repowereu-affordable-secure-and-sustainable-energy-europe_en

[10] See S. Pirani, “Putin has sacrificed Russia’s economy for this war on Ukraine’s people”, Truthout, 21 March 2022. https://truthout.org/articles/putin-has-sacrificed-russias-economy-for-this-war-on-ukraines-people/

[11] See Oxford Institute for Energy Studies Quarterly Gas Review, August 2022; and J. Sharples, Falling Like Dominoes: the impact of Nord Stream on Russian gas flows to Europe (Oxford Energy Insight, August 2022)

[12] See Go-Getters: how the Chekists privatised national wealth, Proekt, 16 June 2022 https://www.proekt.media/en/investigation-en/gazprom-aleksey-miller-en/

[13] Igor Volobuyev, former Gazprombank vice president, fled to Ukraine. https://www.reuters.com/world/im-not-afraid-says-ex-gazprombank-executive-who-defected-ukraine-2022-04-28/

[14] Senior managers of Gazprom and related companies who have died in unexplained circumstances this year are: Leonid Shulman, head of transport, Gazprominvest; Vladislav Avayev, ex vice president, Gazprombank (apparent suicide); Alexander Tyulyakov, a corporate security executive (apparent suicide on 25 February); Yuri Voronov, founder of Astra Shipping, whose main business was Arctic contracts with Gaprom (apparent suicide). A senior manager of Novatek, Sergei Protosenya, also died in an apparent suicide. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-businessmen-who-have-died-unexplained-circumstances-2022-09-01/

[15] See for example: Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), Sabotage of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines, 29 September 2022 https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2022-09-29/sabotage-nord-stream-1-and-nord-stream-2-pipelines

[16] “Briefing: global energy flows”, The Economist, 24 September 2022

[17] See also Mary Kaldor, “Putin is the product of a corrupt economic system”, OpenDemocracy 1 March 2022. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/russia-ukraine-war-invasion-putin-corrupt-economic-system-now-reform/. The Oxford dictionary defines kleptocracy as “a form of government in which the leaders use their power to steal money and resources from the country that they rule”. 

[18] Journalists’ accounts of this shift include: M. Zygar, All the Kremlin’s Men: inside the court of Vladimir Putin (PublicAffairs, 2016), and Catherine Belton, Putin’s People: how the KGB took back Russia and then took on the west (Collins, 2020)

[19] Oliver Bullough, Moneyland: why thieves and crooks now rule the world and how to take it back (Profile Books, 2019), pages 48-49. One of the examples in Bullough’s brilliantly researched book is Ukraine under Viktor Yanukovich. Tom Burgis, Kleptopia: how dirty money is conquering the world (Collins, 2020) focuses on Kazakhstan. Both write about Russia. The argument in this section owes much to my reading of both books

[20] Burgis, Kleptopia, page 337

[21] Oleg Ustenko, “The west’s phantom energy sanctions fuel Russia’s war machine”, Financial Times, 7 August 2022; “West eases efforts to restrict Russian oil trading”, Financial Times, 31 July 2022

[22] O promyshlennom proizvodstve v I polugodii 2022 goda, https://rosstat.gov.ru/storage/mediabank/123_27-07-2022.html

[23] See J.A. Sonnenfeld et al, “Business Retreats and Sanctions are Crippling the Russian Economy”, August 2022 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4167193. Comments in response were published by Macro Advisory in Moscow https://macro-advisory.com/ See also, e.g.: Vladimir Milov, “Yes it hurts: measuring the effect of sanctions” https://www.globsec.org/news/yes-it-hurts-measuring-the-effects-of-western-sanctions-against-russia/ and Russia’s huge trade surplus is not a sign of economic strength, Bruegel, 8 September 2022 https://www.bruegel.org/blog-post/russias-huge-trade-surplus-not-sign-economic-strength

[24] “Notes from the Editors”, Monthly Review, May 2022 https://monthlyreview.org/2022/05/01/mr-074-01-2022-05_0/; and J. B. Foster, “‘Notes on Exterminism’ for the 21st century Ecology and Peace Movements”, Monthly Review, May 2022 https://monthlyreview.org/2022/05/01/notes-on-exterminism-for-the-twenty-first-century-ecology-and-peace-movements/

[25] This section summarises an argument made more fully in S. Pirani, “Ukraine: the sources of danger of a wider war”, People & Nature, March 2022 https://peopleandnature.wordpress.com/2022/03/21/ukraine-the-sources-of-danger-of-a-wider-war/

[26] Oleksiy Radynski, “Russian Fossil Fascism is Europe’s Fault”, Soniakh, October 2022 https://soniakh.com/index.php/2022/10/04/russian-fossil-fascism-is-europes-fault/

[27] S. Pirani, Ukraine’s energy policy and prospects for the gas sector (Oxford Energy Insight, December 2021), pages 2-6, summarises some points and refers to other earlier publications. https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/ukraines-energy-policy-and-prospects-for-the-gas-sector/

[28] Joint Statement of the US and Germany, July 2021 https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/joint-statement-usa-and-germany/2472084

[29] The UK’s policy response, published in April, was entitled “British Energy Security Strategy”. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/british-energy-security-strategy/ The EU’s RePowerEU proposals state in the first paragraph that the invasion has “disrupted the world’s energy system”, causing hardship via high prices and “heightened energy security concerns”. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_3131. IEA definition at https://www.iea.org/topics/energy-security

[30] See also S. Pirani, Burning Up: a global history of fossil fuel consumption (Pluto Press, 2018) and S. Pirani, “How energy was commodified and how it could be decommodified” https://peopleandnature.wordpress.com/site-contents/how-energy-was-commodified-and-how-it-could-be-decommodified/

[31] “Europe’s new dirty energy”, Financial Times, 6 September 2022

[32] See S. Pirani, Europe is trying to solve its energy crisis with fossil fuel projects in Africa, Truthout, 20 August 2022. https://truthout.org/articles/europe-is-trying-to-solve-its-energy-crisis-with-fossil-fuel-projects-in-africa/

[33] See e.g. S. Pirani, “The hydrogen hoax”, The Ecologist, https://theecologist.org/2020/dec/18/hydrogen-hoax, and J. Rosenow, Is heating homes with hydrogen all but a pipe dream?, Joule no. 6, October 2022, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joule.2022.08.015

[34] EU can stop Russian gas imports by 2025, Ember, 23 March 2022 https://ember-climate.org/insights/research/eu-can-stop-russian-gas-imports-by-2025/Investments in energy efficiency, Agora Energiewende, 24 March 2022 https://www.agora-energiewende.de/en/press/news-archive/investments-in-energy-efficiency-and-renewables-to-deliver-energy-sovereignty-for-europe-by-2027-1/. S. Pirani, “Goodbye Russian gas, hello rapid decarbonisation”, Open Democracy, 20 May 2022. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/russia-sanctions-oil-gas-decarbonisation/.

Bartolomé de Las Casas: Defender of the Indians—and, By the Way, of Ukraine

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Over 400 years ago, long before Woodrow Wilson or Vladimir Lenin, the Christian humanist Bartolomé de Las Casas, known as the “Defender of the Indians,” developed a theory of the right of nations to self-determination that can be applied to many other countries today, including Ukraine.

Russia’s war on Ukraine, its former colony, has raised again the issue of “the right of nations to self-determination.” We commonly associate the phrase with two men and two documents of the early twentieth century: Vladimir Lenin’s book The Right of Nations to Self-Determination (1914) and Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points Speech” (1918).

Lenin’s book was intended to provide a program for the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party and a guide for a post-revolutionary Russian state. Lenin concludes his book with this paragraph:

Complete equality of rights for all nations; the right of nations to self-determination; the unity of the workers of all nations—such is the national program that Marxism, the experience of the whole world, and the experience of Russia, teach the workers.[1]

Wilson’s speech on the fourteen points was meant to counter Lenin’s position,[2] to lay the basis for ending World War I and negotiating a peace at Versailles that would weaken the European empires and open the way for a new sort of imperialism, an American imperialism without political control of colonies, an informal, economic empire. Wilson called for an independent Poland to be reconstituted from the German, Austrian-Hungarian, and Russian empires, and other alterations in the map of Europe. Regarding the European colonies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, he wrote that there should be,

A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.[3]

President Woodrow Wilson delivers his “Fourteen Points” speech to Congress.

Wilson’s was talking about adjusting rival claims of the European empires, not liberation for the colonial peoples. Wilson suggests giving equal weight to the colonial Great Powers’ and diplomats’ notions of the colonies’ interests, but no one, including Wilson and the American government at that time was prepared to listen to the colonial peoples themselves and certainly not to grant them self-determination and national sovereignty. Wilson wanted an “open door”—into other nations’ empires.[4]

Lenin’s attempt after the Russian Revolution to create a federation of genuinely independent socialist states failed as Joseph Stalin led a counterrevolution and created a new Soviet empire. Wilson and the United States contributed to undermining European imperialism and gradually establishing a new informal American imperialism[5], though it took another World War to get there.

After World War the right of nations to self-determination was enshrined in Articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations charter, though frequently the principle was violated in practice by the United States as well as by other great powers.

Yet today, few are aware that more than 400 years before all of this the Spanish Dominican friar Bartolomé de Las Casa, in his book In Defense of the Indians, elaborated on the basis of Christian humanism a theory of the right of nations to self-determination as compelling as Lenin’s.

Las Casas’ book In Defense of the Indians, written between 1548 and 1550, was his contribution to the Valladolid Debates where his opponent was the theologian Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda. The debates were organized by Spanish King Charles V to determine how his empire should deal with its new American colonies and how it should treat the indigenous people of the Americas. At issue were the most fundamental questions: Were the indigenous people human beings? Did they have souls? Were they some lesser form of human beings? Were they “natural slaves”? Did they possess any rights? Did their nations have any rights? In the course of his argument, Las Casas argued for the humanity of the Indians and defended their right to self-determination (more about that below).

Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas

Las Casas: From Conqueror and Slave Owner to Priest Defender of the Indians

The debate is quite well known, of course, to students of Latin American history and has also been the subject of popular novels and film, but still warrants further discussion and dissemination.[6] There is no doubt that much of our interest in Las Casas that inspires novels and films is stirred by his extraordinary biography, his conversion from conqueror of Indians to their defender and his indefatigable work for fifty years defending both Indians and Africans in the Americas.

Bartolomé de las Casas was born in 1484 in Seville, to a French immigrant merchant family that had helped to found the city. One biographer believes his family were conversos, that is, Jews who had converted to Catholicism. As a child, in 1493 he happened to witness Christopher Columbus’ return from his first voyage to the Americas to Seville with seven Indians and parrots that were put on display. Queen Isabella ordered the Indians to be returned to their native land.

Bartolomé’s father, Pedro de las Casas, joined Columbus on his second voyage and brought home to Seville as a present for his son Bartolomé an Indian. In 1502 Pedro took Bartolomé with him on the expedition of Nicolás de Ovando to conquer and colonize Española (in English he island of Hispaniola, today made up of the Dominican Republic and Haiti). Bartolomé conducted slave raids on the Taino people (who were virtually annihilated by the Spaniards) and was rewarded with land and became the owner of a hacienda as well as slaves. In 1506 he returned to the University of Salamanca, where he had previously studied, and then traveled to Rome where he was ordained, becoming a priest in 1507.

When in 1510 Dominican friars led by Pedro de Córdoba arrived in Santo Domingo, they were horrified at the Spaniards’ treatment of the Indians, the massacres, the brutality of slavery, and the intense exploitation of the natives and they denounced it. Las Casas rejected the Dominicans’ criticism and defended the encomienda system by which Spaniards distributed laborers to the conquerors. In 1513, Las Casas joined the expeditions of Diego Velázquez de Cuéllar and Pánfilo de Narváez to conquer Cuba, acting as chaplain. He witnessed horrifying murders and torturers of the indigenous people. Once again, he received a reward, this time of gold and slaves. For a year he lived as both colonist and priest.

Then in 1514, while studying the Book of Ecclesiasticus or Sirach (which is part of the Catholic Bible but not part of either the Jewish or Protestant Bibles) he came across a passage that called his beliefs into question. It read:

If one sacrifices from what has been wrongfully obtained, the offering is blemished; the gifts of the lawless are not acceptable. … Like one who kills a son before his father’s eyes is the man who offers sacrifice from the property of the poor. The bread of the needy is the life of the poor; whoever deprives them of it is a man of blood.[7]

Reading this passage—and no doubt meditating on the horrors that he had both participated in and witnessed—Las Casas suddenly decided to break with his past. He gave up his haciendas, his encomienda, his slaves. He began to encourage others Spaniards to do the same, but of course they refused and they resented him.

Las Casas then traveled to Spain to take his case to King Ferdinand, and he succeeded in having one meeting with him, but then the monarch died in 1516. Many of the other higher-ups in the Spanish state and Church, such the Bishop of Burgos, Juan Rodríguez de Fonseca, who controlled the Crown’s business in the Americas, were themselves encomenderos who profited from the labor of the indigenous and they rejected Las Casas’ appeals to protect the Indians. Fearing that the entire population of the Indies, the Caribbean islands, might be annihilated, Las Casas wrote his Memorial de Remedios para las Indias (Memorandum on Remedies for the Indies) to be presented to the regents who now rules, calling for a moratorium on all Indian labor to protect the indigenous people and allow the recuperation of their populations.

At the time, no one understood the etiology of the diseases that were carrying off the majority of the indigenous people; the germ theory of disease and the causes of contagious pandemics, such as small pox, were unknown. Las Casas could see that Indians were dying more rapidly than Africans, though he did not know that was because the Africans had greater immunity to the diseases being carried by the European conquerors. So Las Casas initially proposed that Indians encomienda laborers be replaced by African slaves who seemed more hardy. Las Casas soon came to regret this position when he saw that the Spanish treated the Africans as badly as they had the indigenous people and he became an advocate for both Indians and Africans in the Americas.

Convinced by Las Casas’ argument that the Indians needed to be protected, one of the regents, Cardinal Ximenes Cisneros, put the Carmelite monks in charge of the Indies. Las Cases himself was given the official title and position of “Protector of the Indians.” When the Carmelites arrived in the Indies and faced the hostility of the Spanish encomenderos, they declined to implement Las Casas’ reforms. Las Casas for his own protection had to take refuge in a Dominican monastery.

Theodore de Bry’s illustrations to Las Casas’ Brief Account of the Conquest of the Indies.

During the next fifty years, as the Spanish came to rule all of Mexico, Central America, and the greater part of South Americas, subjecting the indigenous to the same sorts of horrors as those they had carried out in the Caribbean, Las Casas continued to indict the Spanish conquerors and colonists. His A Brief Account of the Destruction of the Indies, written in 1542 but not published until 1552, he described the horrors of the Spaniards’ massacres and enslavement of the indigenous peoples.  The book was translated into various languages and published with horrifying illustrations in many editions by Protestants who wanted to demonstrate the evils of the Catholic Church, what is called “the black legend.”

Under pressure from Las Casas, in 1542 King Charles V promulgated the New Laws to protect the Indians from exploitation. While this was a victory for Las Casas, there was initially great resistance and it took a long time before the Spanish colonists began to comply, and even then, the Indians remained subject peoples. Unable to live in the colonies because of the threats on his life, Las Casas was forced to return to Spain where he continued to fight to protect the indigenous people though his writing and his many appeals to the authorities. We turn now to the famous Valladolid debates on the people of the Indies.

The Valladolid Debate and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination

Theologian Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda.

King Carlos V, concerned about conditions in the Spanish American colonies decided to organize a debate between the two principal intellectuals on opposite sides of the question. Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, speaking for one full day, laid out his argument. He claimed that the indigenous people of the Americas were barbarians: ignorant, unlettered, and unreasoning, incapable of learning anything except the simplest tasks. The Spaniards, he argued, being superior in intelligence and morality, had he right to make war on them and conquer them. They Indians were, he said, incapable of governing themselves. He argued that they were sunk in depravity, worshipping idols and engaging in human sacrifice. He quoted the Bible and other authorities to argue that in ancient times such people had been justly exterminated or enslaved. Natural law, he averred, dictated that the Spaniards, superior in intelligence and morality, should govern them.

In response, Las Casas spoke for five days, reading the entire 253 folio pages, over 60 chapters, today making up 350 printed book pages. Las Casas either refuted Sepúlveda’s arguments, such as the claim that the indigenous Americans were ignorant and incapable of governing themselves, by providing evidence of their intelligence and self-government, or he argued, as in the case of idolatry and human sacrifice, that these practices had to be seen as demonstrating their religious inclination, their attempts to worship God. Las Casas denied the Spaniards’ right to ever invade, occupy, conquer, and subject the indigenous. He argued that the Spaniards’ wars against the Indians were unjust and therefore enslavement of the Indians was illegal and wrong, since only the captives of a just war could be enslaved. The Spaniards claimed to be superior, more civilized, but Las Casas wrote, “… in the absolutely inhuman things they have done to those nations, [the Spaniards] have surpassed all other barbarians.”[8]

Las Casas argues In Defense of the Indians, the text of his argument in the Valladolid debate, that the Indians have governments with kings, dignitaries, and laws. To get a sense both of the foundation of Las Casas’ arguments and the contempt in which he holds Sepúlveda it is worth quoting one passage in full:

Now if we shall have shown that among our Indians of the western and southern shores (granting that we call them barbarians and that they are barbarians) there are important kingdoms, large numbers of people who live settled lives in a society, great cities, kings, judges, laws, persons who engage in commerce, buying, selling, lending, and the other contracts of the law of nations, will it not stand proved that the Reverend Doctor Sepúlveda has spoken wrongly and viciously against peoples like these, either out of malice or ignorance of Aristotle’s teaching, and therefore, has falsely and perhaps irreparably slandered them before the entire world? From the fact that the Indians are barbarians it does not necessarily follow that they are incapable of government and have to be ruled by others, except to be taught about the Catholic faith and to be admitted to the sacraments. They are not ignorant, inhuman, or bestial. Rather, long before they heard the word Spaniard they had properly organized states, wisely ordered by excellent laws, religion and custom.[9]

Las Casas asks Sepúlveda to remember that when Rome tried to conquer Spain the Spaniards were considered barbarians, and he asks, “did you [Spaniards] also have the right to defend your freedom and indeed your very life by war?”

Las Casas makes his point on the right of nations to self-determination most strongly in this passage:

Since, therefore, every nation by the eternal law has a ruler or prince, it is wrong for one nation to attack another under pretext of being superior in wisdom or to overthrow other kingdoms. For it acts contrary to the eternal law, as we read in Proverbs: ‘Do not displace the ancient landmark [i.e., borders], set up by your ancestors.” [Proverbs 22, 28.] This is not an act of wisdom, but of great injustice and a lying excuse for plundering others. Hence every nation, no matter how barbaric, has the right to defend itself against a more civilized one that wants to conquer it and take away its freedom. And, moreover, it can lawfully punish with death the more civilized as a savage and cruel aggressor against the law of nature. And this war is certainly more just than the other one, that, under pretext of wisdom, is waged against them.[10]

Las Casas also argues that the Spanish have no right to impose Christianity by force. These statements are remarkable because clearly Las Casas is justifying, defending, and allying himself with the Indians who resist, rebel, and wage war against the Spaniards.

He concludes the chapter dealing with these questions with this.

On the other hand, no free person, and much less a free people, is bound to submit to anyone, whether a king or nation, no matter how much better the latter may be and no matter how advantageous he may think it will be to himself…. No free nation, therefore, can be compelled to submit itself to a wiser one, even if such submission could lead to [its] greater advantage.[11]

We have, of course, many fundamental disagreements with Las Casas.  He lived and wrote more than two hundred years before the Enlightenment and the French Revolution and more than three hundred years before the Russian Revolution. He had no modern ideas of equality, justice, or democracy, living as he did in an age when in Europe the Christian religion formed the fundamental ground for all accepted thought. While he was sympathetic to the indigenous pagans who had never known Christianity, he believed that the Muslim infidels who knew but had rejected Christianity had to be opposed. Las Casas was not among those radical Christians like his contemporary, the German theologian Thomas Müntzer (1489-1525), who opposed both the Catholic Church and Martin Luther the leader of the Protestant Reformation, as well as the German nobility, a man who led a peasant revolution advocating a kind of Christian Communism.

Still, Las Casas completely rejected the idea that the Spaniards were superior to the Indians, arguing that all human beings are intelligent and capable of self-rule. In fact, he said that the Spaniards were the most barbarous because of the terrible and inhumane way they treated Indians. He argued that, as Jesus said, the Spaniards should love their neighbors, even if their neighbors were barbarians[12]. Though Las Casas believed that far from being barbarians the Indians were superior to the Spaniards.Las Casas accepted the existence of the Spanish monarchy and nobility and the Catholic hierarchy, and accepted patriarchy. He wanted to reform the Spanish state and its empire, reform them fundamentally, but not destroy them. Nevertheless, this Spanish reformer simply on the basis of the fundamental Christian principle that “all mankind is one”—created by one God and all capable of salvation—proved able to develop not only a defense of the Indians but a theory of national self-determination that one could apply to other nations as well.

Las Casas’ Theory of the Right to Self-Determination Applied to Ukraine

There are many interesting and disturbing parallels between Spanish imperialism five hundred years ago and Russian imperialism today. Both Spain and Russia both claimed to be states chosen by God to lead the way to a more moral world under their rule. Ferdinand and Isabella, who expelled the Jews and Muslims from Spain, financed Columbus’ voyage to the East Indies, in which he stumbled on the Americas, the initiators of the conquest of the New World, were known as the Catholic Monarchs, the Defenders of the Faith. Similarly Vladimir Putin, backed by Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church, argues for the superior morality of Russia in its war against Ukraine. Putin also argues that the Ukrainians are Nazis, that is barbarians, and must therefore be conquered and subjugated. Spain and Russia were both prepared to destroy others’ civilizations and kills thousands to create colonies, or in Russia’s case recreate a Ukrainian colony, and to enslave a population.

Today, however, as one witnesses the Russian war on Ukraine, with its widespread destruction of homes schools, and hospitals, of fields and factories, and its war crimes, including torture and murder of civilian men, women, and children, it is clear that, like the Spanish, the Russian president and his coterie are the real barbarians. Today we write in defense of the Ukrainians as he once did in defense of the Indians, as allies who support their right to arm and to defend themselves and their nation and to preserve their sovereignty.

As Las Casas says, “No free person, and much less a free people, is bound to submit to anyone, whether a king or nation, no matter how much better the latter may be and no matter how advantageous he may think it will be to himself.” Lenin–for different reasons and with distinct goals–would have agreed.

Notes

[1] Vladimir Lenin, The Right of Nations to Self-Determination, “Conclusion.”

[2] Perry Anderson, “American Foreign Policy and Its Thinkers” Special Issue of New Left Review, Sept./Oct., 1983 (#83), p. 10.

[3] Woodrow Wilson, “Fourteen Points.”

[4] Anderson, “American Foreign,” p. 10.

[5] The United States still had colonies: Philippines, Puerto Rico, and a kind of protectorate over Cuba, and some other smaller ones, but it was not acquiring more, preferring to us diplomacy, economic power, and when necessary, military intervention in foreign states on one pretext or another. It occupied Haiti and Nicaragua for many years, but it did not take formal political control of them.

[6] Prof. Lewis Hanke made the study of Las Casas the focal point of his research and writing for decades. His books that deal with Las Cases include: The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America (1949); Aristotle and the American Indians: A Study in Race Prejudice in the Modern World (1959); All Mankind Is One: A Study of the Disputation Between Bartolome De Las Casas and Juan Ginés De Sepúlveda in 1550 on the Religious and Intellectual Capacity of the American Indians (1974). Many other Latin Americanists have of course also written on Las Casas and he has been the subject of fiction and film as well. José Luis Olaizola, a Spanish writer of historical fiction, published Bartolomé de Las Casas, crónica de un sueño in 1991 (Planeta). Jean-Claude Carrière’s Jean-Claude Carrière, La Controverse de Valladolid (Paris: Le Pré aux Clercs, 1992), which was also made into a film for with the same title by director Jean-Daniel Verhaeghe and available for free on Vimeo at: https://vimeo.com/512013420 . There is also an Austrian Film, “Bartolome de las Casas” (1992), and Mexican film “Fray Bartolome de las Casas,” (1993) as well as the Catholic Pivoltal Players film in 2020.

[7] Brading, David (1997). “Prophet and apostle: Bartolomé de las Casas and the spiritual conquest of America,” Cummins, J. S. (ed.). Christianity and Missions, 1450–1800. An Expanding World: The European Impact on World History, 1450–1800 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), 117-138.

[8] Bartolomé de Las Casas, In Defense of the Indians, translated and edited by Stafford Poole, C.M., foreword by Martin E. Marty (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University, 1999), p. 29

[9] Las Casas, In Defense, p. 42.

[10] Las Casas, In Defense, p. 47.

[11] Las Casas, In Defense, p. 48.

[12] Las Casas, In Defense, p. 39.

What is the significance of the Saudi oil decision?

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As usual, given the kingdom’s dominant weight in the global oil market, the Saudi role was decisive in the decision taken a week ago by OPEC+, i.e. the expanded OPEC that includes a number of non-OPEC oil-exporting countries, most notably Russia. This decision, which called for the reduction of oil production in order to maintain the level of prices, caused a major international uproar, especially in the United States, not because of its actual impact on the oil market as much as for its significance regarding the US-Saudi relationship. This is because OPEC production during the months preceding the meeting was already below the previously set ceiling due to the inability of many countries to increase their production for technical reasons, while other countries, including the United Arab Emirates, want to increase their production after having invested in strengthening their extractive capabilities.

In fact, the biggest consideration in determining oil prices is not OPEC or OPEC+, but rather the fluctuations in supply and demand in the global market. From this angle, OPEC+, by its last decision, contributes to the reduction of global oil consumption by helping to push the global economy towards the recession that threatens it due to a number of factors. Among these are the effects of the great global crisis generated by the Covid-19 pandemic, in particular the contraction of the Chinese economy due to Beijing’s insistence on practicing a policy of zero Covid through lockdowns, a policy whose cost to the Chinese economy has become prohibitive and to which there is no way out in the foreseeable future except by abandoning it. The problem is that the virus is constantly mutating, while the continuous lockdowns prevent the creation of mass immunity in response.

Of course, the Chinese problem is compounded by the crisis resulting from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, whose economic consequences are worsening, not only at the expense of Russia, but at the expense of the European economies in particular. The Russian economy has benefited from the rise in fuel prices, especially gas, resulting from the escalating European boycott, which has partially compensated for the losses it incurred as a result of the war and other sanctions imposed on it, while Europe is the region primarily affected by that rise in prices. The Russian invasion put Europe in an embarrassing position, as it did not want to appear to be financing the Russian war machine, even though it was aware that Russia would still find customers to buy its fuels by virtue of the nature of the market for those materials.

The OPEC+ decision serves the Russian interest in that it is in line with Russia’s having to reduce its fuel production for several reasons, including the gradual blockage of European markets and the technical problems caused by the sanctions. But what about the interest of the Saudi Kingdom, which has the upper hand in the decision to reduce output, since it means reducing its production in the first place, given that it has the largest production margin? Evidence indicates that its decision, for which Mohammed bin Salman is fully responsible, contradicts its true interest for several reasons. The decision will exacerbate the tendency of the global economy to stagnate, and thus its outcome in the medium term will be a greater reduction in demand than would have occurred otherwise, by exacerbating consumers’ fear of the economic crisis.

Moreover, this behavior of the kingdom contradicts the behavior that it used for several decades, after it nationalized its oil industry half a century ago, namely, complicity with the United States, its protector. The latter relied on the kingdom to run the global oil market in line with its interests, a practice that culminated in the oil price war that the kingdom launched against Iran and Russia in 2014. This played an important role in intensifying pressure on Tehran, leading it to sign the nuclear agreement in the following year, and in increasing the weight of Western sanctions on Russia, imposed on it following its annexation of Crimea and its military intervention in eastern Ukraine.

With the OPEC+ announcement, the kingdom is taking a decision that serves the Russian interest par excellence. Indeed, it appears as if it stemmed from an explicit desire to support the Russian position in the Ukraine war. This has two consequences. The first is that the Saudi decision reinforces the European feeling that the dependence on hydrocarbons is a source of multifaceted harm, including great environmental damage and political harm, since these fuels have become more than ever a political weapon in hands in which Europe no longer has any confidence. This will accelerate European endeavors to dispense with hydrocarbons through the development of alternative energy sources, both renewable and nuclear. Europe’s tendency to eliminate hydrocarbons had begun to grow under the pressure of the environmental issue, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine has given it a strong impetus, which the Saudi decision will only help accelerating.

In the United States, the Saudi decision was interpreted as a stab in the back and a siding with Russia in the war in Ukraine. US President Joe Biden himself expressed his disappointment with Riyadh’s decision, and is facing pressure within his party from those who call for punishing the kingdom by withdrawing US military protection, including the withdrawal of the Patriot air defense system supervised by the United States inside the kingdom. What increases the impact of the Saudi decision is that the US president had retracted his declared campaign position on the Saudi crown prince, and visited the kingdom and met him a short while ago, placing the strategic interest created by the Ukraine war over the moral stance regarding the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi.

A conviction has become firmly established among Democrats that Mohammed bin Salman, by his decision to put pressure on oil prices to rise, thus exacerbating the general rise in prices, actually wanted to enhance the chances of the Republicans in next month’s congressional elections. The Republicans are indeed focusing their campaign on high prices, which they attribute to Biden’s economic policy, and they have described the Saudi decision as a sign of the US president’s failure in foreign policy, a broad headline under which they put the Afghan retreat and the inability to deter Vladimir Putin from invading Ukraine. It is no secret to anyone that the current Saudi regime prefers the Republicans and strongly hopes that their friend Donald Trump will return to the White House in two years.

 

This article originally appeared in Arabic on Al Quds. Translation by automatic means, with editing.

Interview on the War in Ukraine with Noam Chomsky

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Noam Chomsky has been a leading voice on the U.S. left for more than half a century and one of the world’s most-cited scholars and public intellectuals. He has published more than 150 books on linguistics, U.S. foreign policy and current affairs, and the media, the most recent of which are The Precipice: Neoliberalism, the Pandemic and the Urgent Need for Social Change (with C.J. Polychroniou; Haymarket, 2021), The Secrets of Words (with Andrea Moro; MIT Press, 2022), and The Withdrawal: Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and the Fragility of U.S. Power (with Vijay Prashad; The New Press, 2022). He agreed to respond to some questions on the war in Ukraine posed by Stephen R. Shalom, a member of the New Politics editorial board and editor of Perilous Power: The Middle East and U.S. Foreign Policy, a series of dialogues between Noam Chomsky and Gilbert Achcar (Paradigm, 2009). Shalom sent Chomsky a set of questions by email to which he responded. Shalom then added a brief reply at the end and Chomsky contributed a brief rejoinder.

Questions

  1. SRS: There are some (like Code Pink or DSA’s International Committee) who argue that the peace movement should oppose weapons deliveries to Ukraine by the U.S. government because the provision of weapons undermines diplomacy. Others say that Ukraine needs to be able to defend itself in order to negotiate an acceptable end to the war (such as the terms that Ukrainian president Zelensky put forward at the war’s beginning) and maintain that denying Ukraine weapons amounts to forcing it to capitulate. What is your view?

NC: Personally, I don’t accept either of the positions you formulate. Ukraine should receive weapons for self-defense — though this seems to me to have little to do with negotiating an acceptable end to the war, including Zelensky’s proposals. I should add on the side that I’m quite surprised at how few seem to agree with providing military aid: a mere 40% in the US-Europe.

But my response is misleading. Too much is omitted. First, there is an enormous disparity between the two positions. The latter (“others”) almost totally dominate public discourse. The former are barely heard. We are speaking of a debate between an elephant and a flea. Second, there is a good bit more to be said about these positions.

The flea calls for “ceasefire and total withdrawal of Russian troops” from Ukraine, and argues that a turn towards diplomacy offers a better hope for ending the horrors of Putin’s criminal aggression than continuing the flow of weapons, which escalates the war. To the very limited extent that its stand even receives notice within public discourse in the US, the reaction is dismissal if not obloquy.

The position of the elephant, in contrast, is almost universally accepted, and without critical analysis. For these reasons, it merits close attention.

This position is based on several assumptions. It appears to be assuming that prolonging the war will improve Ukraine’s negotiating position. Maybe. The US stance goes far beyond: US officials and many commentators hold that with western military aid, Ukraine can win the war, driving Russian forces out of all of Ukraine. That stance brings forth a critical assumption: If facing defeat, Mad Vlad — a monster who will do anything to extend his power – will quietly pack his bags and slink away to oblivion.

Perhaps, but there is clearly another possibility, suggested obliquely by US-UK military analysts, including the British official quoted in the Washington Post article cited below. In his words, “We assumed they would invade a country the way we would have invaded a country.” When the US-UK invade a country, they go for the jugular, destroying communications, transportation, energy systems, anything needed to keep the country going. To the surprise of the US-UK planners, Putin didn’t do that. The press reports that “In Kyiv and much of the western part of the country, prewar life has largely returned for civilians. People eat in restaurants, drink in bars, dance and enjoy lazy summer days in parks.”

There’s little doubt that Putin could adopt the US-UK style of war, even well short of using tactical nuclear weapons. The Ukrainian military understands that very well. Ukrainian commander in chief Gen. Valery Zaluzhny writes that Russian cruise missiles “could strike across the country with `impunity’,” adding that “limited nuclear war cannot be ruled out.”

As we all know, the escalation ladder from limited to terminal nuclear war is all too easy to climb.

Western military analysts offer reasons why “Putin’s Bombers Could Devastate Ukraine But He’s Holding Back.” Whatever the reasons, the fact remains.

Returning to the elephant, it is therefore calling for a remarkable gamble: let’s gamble that Putin will quietly accept total defeat and personal destruction rather than moving on to emulate the US-UK style of war.

Maybe, but it’s quite a gamble with the fate of Ukrainians, and well beyond. It is, perhaps, surprising that all this passes with almost no comment.

Turning to what more is omitted, the official US stance is that the war must go on in order to severely weaken Russia, in fact, to weaken it so severely that it will not be able to undertake aggression again – that is, more severely than Germany was weakened at Versailles in 1919. Just what that entails, I’ll leave to the imagination, but we can be confident that adversaries don’t ignore it.

The policy was made explicit at the US-run Ramstein Air Base meeting in April, often reaffirmed since. But that is only the most recent illustration of a long history of US avoiding diplomacy. This is not the place to review it again (I’ve done so repeatedly, including many interviews in Truthout). The record reveals that the policies of effectively integrating Ukraine into the US-military command have been consistent for years. They were extended last September in an official White House statement calling for further integration of US-Ukrainian forces. The statement also formally designates Ukraine as a “NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partner.” Progress in this program has been such that US military journals have referred to Ukraine as a “de facto” member of NATO. Furthermore, the State Department has acknowledged that the US does not take Russian security concerns into consideration. In this and many other ways, the US has impeded the prospects for a diplomatic settlement – for principled reasons, as made clear at Ramstein and since.

There’s endless discussion of how we should fight the war, virtually nothing about how we might bring the horrors to an end – horrors that extend far beyond Ukraine. The radical imbalance is striking and instructive.

The rare calls for moving to a diplomatic settlement regularly elicit bitter condemnation, even when they come from revered warhawks like Kissinger: “Munich,” “Putin lover,” and worse. In this regard, the US differs from the mainstream of world opinion, not only in the Global South but even Europe, where “77 percent of Germans believe that the West should initiate negotiations to end the Ukraine war.”

It’s worthwhile to digress for a moment on US doctrinal isolation, a background for discussion of these matters that should not be overlooked. To take one of myriad examples, the current issue of the major establishment journal Foreign Affairs – moderate and independent by US standards — has an article on Ukraine and the world by two representatives of the more liberal wing of policy planning and discussion, Fiona Hill and Angela Stent. They find incomprehensible the unwillingness of the Global South – most of the world – to join the US in its obviously noble efforts. The South even sinks so low as to “argue that what Russia is doing in Ukraine is no different from what the United States did in Iraq or Vietnam” – which would indeed be a serious error, but for reasons the authors could not comprehend. The South doesn’t even share our distress “that Russia has violated the UN Charter and international law by unleashing an unprovoked attack on a neighbor’s territory,” an unimaginable crime. The only explanation the authors can think of for this remarkable lack of understanding of the world is Putin’s propaganda machinations.

It will be interesting to see if there is a word of critical comment.

  1. SRS: Some think the United States should use its leverage (weapons supplies, etc.) to pressure Ukraine into making particular concessions to Russia. What do you think of that idea?

NC: I haven’t heard of that proposal, but if raised, it should be dismissed. What right does the US have to do anything like that?

  1. SRS: You have said that in any negotiated conclusion to the Ukraine war, “Crimea is off the table.” What is your view of the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and why do you think Crimea is off the table? Is it a matter of right or of might?

NC: When was “right” an operative concept in world affairs?

I don’t pretend to be a military expert, but all of them seem to agree that for Ukraine to conquer Crimea would be at best a bloody slaughter, if even imaginable. If so, it’s off the table for now. On the “Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014,” it’s not as simple a matter as in the US propaganda version. There’s a substantial scholarly literature on the complex events of 2014, which I can’t try to review here; historian Richard Sakwa’s work, for example. On Crimea, I can only refer you to what I’ve written, which also discusses a bit of the background as reviewed by John Quigley, the U.S. State Department representative in the OSCE delegation that considered the problem of Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

  1. SRS: You have suggested the analogy between a U.S. military alliance with Ukraine and a Chinese military alliance with Mexico, the latter being simply unimaginable. But the left has certainly supported Cuba’s right to receive arms (other than nuclear missiles) from the Soviet Union. More generally, don’t we support the right of the victims of great power bullying to receive defensive weapons from rival great powers, even though the bullies are unhappy and the motives of the weapons providers are of course themselves far from altruistic?

NC: The abstract right of victims of great power violence to be supplied with defensive weapons – including Ukraine – does not arise, at least for me. The wisdom of doing so, however, constantly arises. How much of the left called for Russian supply of weapons to Iraq to defend itself from the devasting US-UK invasion? How much of the left called for Russia and China to provide advanced weapons to the NLF that would lead the US invaders to escalate their horrendous assault?

I find the analogy to Cuba rather odd. As scholarship recognizes, Cuba was a “virtual colony” of the US until Castro’s victory. In a few months, it was under attack from Florida bases. Kennedy invaded, and when that failed, launched a murderous terrorist war and imposed harsh sanctions that have crushed the economy, becoming more brutal over the years, opposed by the entire world (US-Israel excluded) though all adhere to the sanctions in fear of US retribution. I don’t see any useful analogy to Ukraine.

  1. SRS: While agreeing with you that NATO’s eastward expansion was provocative and unwarranted, I wonder whether you haven’t overstated the degree to which the United States could have in the preceding months prevented the Russian invasion? For example, you cite the recent Washington Post investigation of the period leading up to the Russian invasion as showing, according to a summary by George Beebe and Anatol Lieven, that Washington eschewed negotiation. But my reading of the Post report suggests a different conclusion. While confirming the U.S. government’s public position that it was unwilling to rule out the possibility of Ukraine eventually joining NATO (impossible in any case as long as Russia’s annexation of Crimea and presence in Donbas stand), the report also shows that Biden assured Putin that there was no immediate prospect of Ukraine joining NATO and that the U.S. was willing to discuss the issue of the placement of U.S. weapons systems in Europe (one of Putin’s “red lines”). In early January, deputy secretary of state Wendy Sherman “offered talks and trust-building measures in a number of security areas, including the deployment of troops and the placement of weapons on NATO’s eastern flank along the border with Russia.” Later in the month, secretary of state Antony Blinken offered to discuss security concerns with Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov and made no headway. The British defense minister met with his Russian counterpart with an offer to talk and was told Russia had no intention of invading Ukraine. And French president Macron got a commitment from Putin to meet with Biden, which Putin reneged on. So what do you make of these facts?

NC: The Beebe-Lieven article gives one example of how the US might have averted the invasion had it had any interest in doing so. That greatly understates “the degree to which the United States could have in the preceding months prevented the Russian invasion.” Above, I barely sampled the rich record of how the US moved systematically towards integration of Ukraine within the US military command, designating Ukraine as a “NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partner.”

True, there was no “immediate prospect” of Ukraine joining NATO, which is to say that there was a prospect. And, in fact, the US was working towards that end in the months before the invasion within the “Enhanced” program that it announced a year ago. As virtually all high-level US diplomats with any knowledge of the region have pointed out, “trying to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO was truly overreaching…recklessly ignoring what the Russians considered their own vital national interests” (W. Bush’s defense secretary Robert Gates, expressing a broad consensus in these circles).

“The Russians” include US favorites, like Clinton’s friend Boris Yeltsin. And the late Mikhail Gorbachev, who accused the West and NATO of destroying the structure of European security by expanding its alliance. “No head of the Kremlin can ignore such a thing,” he said, adding that the U.S. was unfortunately starting to establish a “mega empire,” words echoed by Putin and other Russian officials.

To pursue the Mexico analogy, suppose that an immensely more powerful China was integrating Mexico within its military command but assured the US that there was no “immediate prospect” of its joining its global military alliance though it was working towards that end. Would we regard that as a generous offer? And if China went on to express willingness to discuss its deployment of troops and weapons on the US border, would the US thank them for the conciliatory step? Or regard it as an insult.

I’ve discussed elsewhere what I make of the rest of the facts. Putin’s rejection of Macron’s initiatives was criminal, and also stupid, since he was offering Washington its fondest wish: driving Europe into its pocket and undermining the Gorbachev vision of a common European home that would be a far better outcome than the US-run Atlanticist system, a topic I’ve discussed at length elsewhere and that I think is extremely important.

  1. SRS: You have said that the United States has been unwilling to contemplate a diplomatic settlement of the conflict or to accept the neutralization of Ukraine, drawing an analogy to U.S. policy during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. But whatever the U.S. record in Afghanistan, in Ukraine U.S. officials have not ruled out diplomacy or neutralization – if that’s what Ukraine wants. When Zelensky floated the idea of neutralization in March, the U.S. comment was “This is ultimately a question for our Ukrainian partners to decide – to decide the terms of diplomacy, what they are willing to pursue, what they are not willing to pursue.” When asked in late April whether the United States would be open to accepting Ukraine as an unaligned neutral nation, Secretary Blinken declared (at 1:25:02):

“We … are not going to be more Ukrainian than the Ukrainians. These are decisions for them to make. Our purpose is to make sure that they have within their hands the ability to repel the Russian aggression and indeed to strengthen their hand at an eventual negotiating table. We’ve seen no sign to date that President Putin is serious about meaningful negotiations. If he is, and if the Ukrainians engage, we’ll support that.”

Now of course we don’t know what is being said in private or what will take place in the future, but my reading of the current evidence leaves me less convinced of the claim that Washington has been blocking negotiations.

NC: I wouldn’t be so quick to dismiss the Afghan record of the ‘80s, now well-documented. One reason is the close similarity to current policy that I discussed. We can therefore learn a lot from it. Beyond that, without checking, I suppose that while Washington was working hard to undermine diplomatic efforts to end the

Russian invasion so as to “weaken” Russia, it was also producing banal statements about how everything’s up to the Afghan people.

In the light of the well-documented record, it seems to me to require quite a leap of faith to take current US government pronouncements on diplomacy seriously. The record seems to me to show convincingly that the US has been impeding meaningful negotiations throughout, by now unequivocally by adopting the official war aims of continuing the war in order to severely weaken Russia.

These efforts to undermine diplomacy apparently continue. Hill and Stent report that “According to multiple former senior US ‘officials we spoke with, in April 2022, Russian and Ukrainian negotiators appeared to have tentatively agreed on the outlines of a negotiated interim settlement.” The terms of that settlement would have been for Russia to withdraw to the positions it held before launching the invasion on February 24. In exchange, Ukraine would “promise not to seek NATO membership and instead receive security guarantees from a number of countries.”

Hill-Stent blame the failure of these efforts on the Russians, but do not mention that British Prime Minister Boris Johnson at once flew to Kyiv with the message that Ukraine’s western backers would not support the diplomatic initiative, followed by US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, who reiterated the official US position that Washington’s goal in the war is to “weaken” Russia.

I don’t frankly see the relevance of Blinken’s comments. Yes, Ukrainians have to make their own decisions. And the US has to make its own decisions, with a great deal at stake of enormous global significance that I need not review.

  1. SRS: The Russian antiwar movement has vehemently condemned Putin’s war as imperialist aggression and is supporting desertion as well as sabotage acts. They fully agree with Ukrainian socialists and anarchists who regard their country’s fighting back as legitimate defense and have joined the local popular defense units (Territorial Defense). How do you assess these positions?

NC: The way I have always done in the past. That’s basically the position that we took in the ‘60s and since, tactical questions aside. Why should there be any change in this case?

Furthermore, quite rightly, the Russian antiwar movement is focusing its energy and efforts on Russian crimes, scarcely raising, if at all, the misdeeds of official enemies. It is, in short, adhering to the elementary moral principle that all should observe: focus attention and engagement on the factor that is our responsibility and that we can most effectively influence.

Much to its credit.

 

Response by Stephen R. Shalom

I’m not sure I get the elephant and flea argument. Surely, we don’t take positions based on whether they have a lot or a little support. When some on the left argued against voting for Biden in swing states in 2020, we both spoke out against this view even though the majority of opinion leaders also favored voting for Biden. In the same way, doesn’t the fact that major segments of the left oppose arms to Ukraine warrant response, even though most mainstream opinion supports providing weapons?

It is true that the left didn’t call for Russian supply of weapons to Iraq to defend itself from the devasting US-UK invasion. But is this the right analogy? Saddam Hussein’s could hardly be regarded as a legitimate government, lacking any democratic legitimacy and responsible for huge massacres, especially against the Kurds. Iraq’s population didn’t support his war. The more relevant analogy to Ukraine would seem to be those governments that were justly resisting great power aggression with undisputed popular support – like Vietnam, or Cuba, or Nicaragua. And in none of these sorts of cases did the left object to the USSR or China (or others) providing weapons to the victims of aggression.

To be sure, the left didn’t call for aid to the National Liberation Front that “would lead the US invaders to escalate their horrendous assault.” But the Soviet Union and China provided massive amounts of military aid to Vietnam, with no objection from the global left. Indeed, the scale of the weapons provided was often greater than that provided by the United States to Ukraine (Moscow’s aid included jet planes and anti-aircraft missiles along with Soviet crews; Beijing sent tanks, planes, and 150,000 anti-aircraft artillery soldiers).

Washington, of course, did escalate its horrendous assault, many times. The USSR and China refrained from supplying Vietnam with missiles that could strike the United States, and no one on the left called for that. But almost no one on the left supports delivery to Ukraine of missiles or planes that can strike Russia itself.

Regarding the Cuba example, Cuba, like Ukraine, was a dependency of a great power that established relations with the other great power. The power that considered the dependency to be within its sphere of influence was furious, but in the Cuban case the left position held that Havana had the right to establish relations with whomever it wanted and, when threatened, to receive defensive weapons from whomever it wanted. The left does not respect imperial spheres of influence. Why wouldn’t the same apply to Ukraine?

The claim that Boris Johnson scuttled a diplomatic solution seems to me to go beyond the evidence and to minimize Ukrainian agency.

Finally, we agree on praising the Russian antiwar movement, but what about the position of the Ukrainian socialists and anarchists who, while opposing their government’s neoliberal and xenophobic policies, have taken up arms against the Russian invaders.

 

Rejoinder from Noam Chomsky

On the flea-elephant, the question is not what position to take, but how to distribute energies. The elephant dominates public discourse. The various fleas are barely heard. If one chooses to focus on them, fine, but then let’s be clear what is at stake. The fleas mentioned here differ from the elephant primarily on tactics: expelling the Russian invaders by force or negotiations. The latter (flea) position is either ignored or vilified in the US, but is normal elsewhere: the Global South of course but even much of Europe, ¾ of Germans for example. Another sign of the sharp deviation of the US from most of the world.

The flea position is also standard on the left. On Vietnam, the main target of the US wars was always South Vietnam. The left called for a negotiated withdrawal of US forces. It did not call for continuing the war to severely weaken the US – the official US government policy on Ukraine.

The other analogies you suggest, when unraveled, seem to me to lead to similar conclusions. In our discussion, there is no issue over sending arms to Ukraine for defense, Ukrainian agency, supporting Ukrainian leftists who fight against the invaders, opposing spheres of influence, or the rest of what you mention, with one exception. It’s true that we don’t know for sure whether Boris Johnson (and Lloyd Austin) “scuttled a diplomatic solution” (nor did I say so), because such matters are barely even reported in the US. It is, however, a fair surmise that their visits repeated the official policy: continue the war to severely weaken Russia, and gamble that Putin won’t use his conventional weapons to devastate Ukraine in a US-UK style war, puzzling US-UK military analysts, as we’ve already discussed

There is no question of justifying Putin’s criminal invasion. There are questions about what should be our primary concern: what we can hope to influence, US policy. It is becoming harder and harder to justify US policies. Or to ignore the reluctant conclusion of John Quigley that “It’s reasonable to question whether the U.S. goal is less to force Russia out of Ukraine than to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian”

 

21st Century Revolution

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21st Century Revolution: through higher love, racial justice and democratic cooperation, Ted Glick, Bloomfield, NJ: Future Hope Publications, 2021, 114 pp. $10, https://tedglick.com/2021/09/12/21st-century-revolution/.

Ted Glick has been a champion of radical social change for over five decades, tirelessly working for peace, justice, independent politics, and climate survival. It this short book, he shares some of the conclusions he has drawn from this lifetime of activist experience.

Two of the book’s five chapters deal with spiritual matters, which may well put off many readers, but he makes a compelling case that these are concerns that the left ignores at its peril. He is well aware of the obscurantist and reactionary role that organized religion has often played in human affairs, but he argues that this is not the full story. While religion has frequently served to divert people from the need to fight injustice, it has sometimes helped to propel freedom struggles. He quotes the Protestant theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who was killed in a Nazi concentration camp after joining the anti-Hitler resistance: “It is not the beyond that we are concerned with, but with this world.” And “We are not to simply bandage the wounds of victims beneath the wheels of injustice, we are to drive a spoke into the wheel itself.”

Glick reminds us that hard-headed historical materialist Frederick Engels considered that Thomas Muntzer, the leader of the 16th century German peasant wars, was both a religious and a political revolutionary. The kingdom of God that Muntzer demanded be immediately established on Earth was to have no class differences, with all work and property shared in common. Likewise Karl Kautsky, a leading theoretician of social democracy, wrote of the “outspoken proletarian character” of early Christianity, aiming for “communist organization.” Kautsky, however, criticized early Christian support for an equal distribution of wealth, arguing that socialists had to instead push the concentration of wealth to the highest point and then turn it into a state monopoly – not exactly an inspiring vision, remarks Glick, or one likely to lead to the classless and democratic societies found among early Christian communities.

The Bolsheviks’ official position prohibited discrimination against anyone on the basis of religious beliefs and did not require party members to be atheists. But Lenin’s critique of religion went beyond condemning the reactionary role played by the clergy of the Orthodox Church. “Our morality,” he said, “is entirely subordinated to the interests of the proletariat’s class struggle.” Lenin’s dismissal of religion even extended to the non-theistic humanism promoted by revolution-supporter Maxim Gorky. Under Stalin and under Mao in China the ruling parties were actively atheist.

Again, Glick does not soft-pedal the way that organized religion has supported the unjust and oppressive status quo. But he describes how small groups (and sometimes even large ones) have found inspiration from religion to speak truth to power, sometimes doing so in response to socialist criticisms. In Belgium, Italy, and France, there were movements of many thousands within the Catholic Church from the 1920s to the 1950s that sided with oppressed working people.  The Cuban revolution, says Glick, had a more tolerant view of religion than did the Soviet Union or China, helping to inspire Liberation theology in Latin America and beyond. However, the fact that the Cuban Communist Party – the country’s only legal party – didn’t allow religious believers to join until 1991 seems much more problematic than Glick allows, and the government’s authoritarianism certainly contradicts our notions of democracy.

Forty years ago I met radical nuns in the Philippines who worked with the urban poor. When I asked them about birth control, they told me that while the Pope disapproved of it, they did not. Today we have a Pope who has been influenced by liberation theology. Nevertheless Glick acknowledges that the Catholic Church is still a thoroughly patriarchal institution.

Glick ends his first chapter concluding that the path forward for those who seek social change “must be wide enough to allow secular and spiritually-grounded revolutionaries to walk it together.” He notes that in his experience many groups have fallen apart because of the failure to establish collaborative, respectful, and democratic practice. This, more than the correct line, is critical if groups are going to last.

Glick’s second chapter is titled “Does God Exist? Does It Matter?” I approached this chapter with a great deal of skepticism, but, admirably, Glick too is skeptical of his own views, as they evolved over time. Although I was unpersuaded by many of his arguments over the course of the chapter, his conclusion – quoting Einstein – is compelling: “A positive aspiration and effort for an ethical-moral configuration of our common life is of overriding importance. Here no science can save us.”

Chapter three addresses capitalist culture. Marx, Glick argues, had a blind spot regarding the importance of personal change for social change. We need to challenge capitalist culture in our own lives and organizations if we hope to build movements that can achieve a just world. Glick discusses hunter-gatherer societies and their non-acquisitiveness as something to be emulated, but this strikes me as overly romanticizing the primitive, as Glick himself afterwards somewhat concedes. But there is no disagreeing with him when he urges left organizations to stress diversity and cooperation and to create a culture that encourages honest discussions of real differences of opinion. He urges consensus seeking, but without requiring consensus at all times, which can prove undemocratic. One technique he recommends for promoting participation is using breakout groups with reporting back. I think more work needs to be done on developing these participatory methods, because in my experience report-backs rarely result in actionable decisions.

In chapter four, Glick looks at the U.S. class structure and what this means for our social change organizing. In place of a simplistic view that divides the country into two classes, he identifies seven general class groupings in U.S. society. Each one of these experiences a different life situation and has a different propensity to support a left movement. The suffering of the barely-surviving working class makes them more open to the left, and no left can fail to address their needs. The low-income working class on the other hand is the most numerous group and their support is essential for any successful radical change. The moderate to middle-income working class is often quite conservative and will require serious dialogue and even confrontation over issues of race, sex, and gender before they can be won over to the revolution. The professional and managerial middle class will include a minority who are progressives, but we have to be careful not to let their elitism undermine left efforts.

In the final chapter, Glick puts forward a strategy for a 21st century revolution, a strategy that he says already enjoys quite a lot of agreement on the left. We need a broad-based popular alliance, a movement of movements. These movements need to be empathetic, use comradely rhetoric, and devote more attention to inter-movement diplomacy. They need deep working-class roots. Redistribution and the climate need to be central demands. Organizing needs to be “dialogic,” that is, listening to people, not just leading them. He calls for a flexible and tactical approach toward election campaigns, sometimes running independent left campaigns, sometimes supporting progressive Democrats or fusion candidates. It is important, he says, to push for reform of undemocratic electoral laws. And he emphasizes the critical role of direct action.

Glick argues that the movement of movements must also be internationalist, but his discussion here is far too brief. What does internationalist mean? The left is currently very divided over whether internationalism means (a) opposing U.S. imperialism everywhere and supporting all enemies of U.S. imperialism, or (b) opposing all imperialisms anywhere and expressing solidarity with all victims of imperialism.

Ted Glick believes that we can achieve a better world, one without class oppression, racial injustice, or patriarchy, one inspired by spiritual values that have been part of our species for millennia. The path forward is not easy, but one statistic Glick cites provides reason for optimism: by one count there are some 1-2 million groups worldwide working toward environmental sustainability and social justice. This hopeful book urges us to use this potential to achieve a 21st century revolution.

 

The United States and China in Latin America: Rival Imperialisms

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The United States has long dominated Latin America, but today—in fact for the last twenty years—it is being challenged by China, which has invested billions and established political and some military relationships with many governments in the region. The U.S. took control of Latin America first through wars and later through economic investment, China has begun with economic investment, but as we know from history, defending such investments often requires war. One can foresee a sharpening of U.S.-Chinese inter-imperialist competition in Latin America today.

U.S. Imperialism in Latin America

Let’s begin with the United States’ bloody history in Latin America. The United States’ rise to domination in Latin America took about 100 years, involved two major wars and many military interventions, occupations, and coups d’état. Driven by the Southern states’ desire to expand slavery, the U.S. began to take territory from Mexico between 1836 and 1855, most important the U.S.-Mexico war of 1846-48, following which the United States took half of Mexico’s territory, which became the Southwestern United States (Texas, California, Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, Colorado). Some 100,000 Mexicans and many indigenous people were forced to become part of the United States; the Mexicans were not granted full rights and many native peoples were exterminated.

Then in the Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States acquired Puerto Rico and established a protectorate over Cuba. In 1903 the United States backed Panama’s secession from Colombia, and in 1904 the United States took over from France the construction of the Panama Canal that opened in 1914. The canal became strategically significant, allowing the U.S. to move its warships between the Atlantic to the Pacific. So, by the beginning of World War, I the United States dominated all of Central America and the Caribbean, though keeping the region under its control entailed the occupation of Haiti 1915 to 1934 and of Nicaragua 1912-1933. In 1933 U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt announced the “good neighbor policy” and ended the occupations and withdrew the Marines but he left U.S. backed dictators in their place. Still, whenever American interests were threatened, U.S. intervened, as in the case of the coup it organized in Guatemala in 1954.

At the end of World War II, the weakened British empire lost its economic hold on Latin America and the United States replaced it to become the principal banker and investor in the mines, oil fields, and plantations. The Cuban Revolution of 1959 finally ended U.S. control of the island, but in response the United States organized the failed the Bay of Pigs invasion. After that fiasco, President John F. Kennedy launched the Alliance for Progress, ostensibly to promote democracy and capitalism, but it gained no traction. President Lyndon B. Johnson sent the U.S. Marines to invade and occupy the Dominican Republic 1963 in order to remove the left nationalist president, Juan Bosch. At the same time, Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara inspired a wave of guerrilla movements throughout Latin America, but without a mass working class or peasant base, they were tragic failures. And the Latin American elite reacted by organizing military coups aided or organized by the United States in Brazil (1964), Bolivia (1971), Chile (1973), Uruguay (1973), and Argentina (1976).

Only at the end of the 1980s did the U.S. and Latin American elites permit democracy to return to Latin America, generally in the form of conservative political institutions and parties accompanied by neoliberal economic policies. So, the United States continued to dominate finance, industry, and trade until the twenty-first century. But then a series of rebellions, social movements and popular uprisings led to elections that brought to power the Pink Tide governments opposed to both U.S. domination and the neoliberal economic system. Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in 1999, Luiz Inácio da Silva (Lula) in Brazil in 2003, Nestor Kirchner in Argentina in 2003, and Evo Morales in 2006. Lula played a central role in the creation of BRICS, and alliance of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. BRICS created a development bank and other financial institutions as an alternative to the International Monetary Fund and the Word Bank. The Red Tide soon went out, but a new era was beginning.

The Rise of the Chinese Economy

Since the new millennium, everything has changed with the rise of China. While the United States is still the world largest economy with a GDP of 23.0 trillion USD, China is in second place with a GDP of still 17,734.1 trillion. The top four of the world’s 15 largest banks are Chinese. China today exports more goods and services than the United States: China $2,723,250.43 millions followed by U.S. with $2,123,410.00 millions. China’s growth in economic power has been accompanied by a growth in ambition as, like other great imperial powers such as the United States, the European Union, and Russia it seeks to expand its economy as well as its political and military influence. Unlike the United States and Europe which are driven by profit maximization. Chinese imperialism is driven by state political interests. China’s hybrid bureaucratic collectivist and capitalist economy, controlled by the Communist Party, has the advantage that the state directs the banks, corporations, and trading companies, making its international economic policies quite effective.

Chinese involvement in Latin America has been gradual. After Richard Nixon traveled to Beijing to embrace Mao Zedong in 1972, most Latin American governments follow U.S. foreign policy and recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Still there was little economic, political or military involvement until the World Trade Organization accepted China as a member in 2001. In the early 2000s, China established free trade agreements with Chile (2005), Peru (2009), and Costa Rica (2010). Other Latin American nations later followed suit. To establish ties with the PRC often meant having to break ties with Taiwan, as Costa Rica did in 2007, Panama in 2017, El Salvador in 2018 and Nicaragua in 2021. And trade with the PRC has boomed. In 2001, Latin America exported only 1.6% of all its exports to China; today that figure is 26%. According to the World Economic Forum, Chinese-Latin American trade grew 26-fold between 2000 and 2020, from $12 billion to $315 billion. Today China is Latin America’s largest trading partner, followed by the United States. Some countries like Chile, which sends about 39 percent of its exports to China, and Jamaica which is deeply indebted to China, have become economically dependent.

Chinese trading patterns in Latin America resemble those of the United States and Europe with Latin America in the 19th and 20th centuries. Latin American principally exports commodities such as pork, soybeans, sugar, timber, copper, bauxite, petroleum, oil, and other materials that China wants for its industries and to feed its people. And China sells Latin America higher-value manufactured goods, such as Huawei and Xiaomi smart phones, which Latin Americans desire. The disadvantage for Latin America is that imported Chinese manufactured goods often displace domestic products, so that there may be growth in extractive and agriculture sectors but a stagnation or even a decline in industry.

China’s relationship with Latin America goes far beyond trade. Chinese corporations, many of them state-owned enterprises, now have vast investment in Latin America. Logically, just as the British and Americans did in an earlier era, the Chinese tend to invest the processing of the extractive and agricultural products they are buying. For example, from 2000 and 2018, China invested $73 billion in in refineries and processing plants in Latin American countries that provide coal, copper, uranium, natural gas, and oil. Beijing also recently invested about $4.5 billion in lithium production in Mexico, and the “Lithium Triangle” of Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile, believed to have half the world’s store of this valuable mineral.

China engages in outward direct investment (ODI), that is, establishing subsidiaries of its corporations or acquiring companies in Latin America. Chinese ODI in Brazil amounts to $60 billion, in Peru, $27 billion, and in Chile $15 billion today. Total Chinese ODI in Latin America is $130 billion. Then too there are Chinese bank loans. The China Development Bank and the China Export-Import Bank had made 94 loans in the region amounting to $137 billion in 2020. Chinese loans have benefited some countries, but others, like Bolivia and Ecuador face created excessive debt. Chinese loans typically have adjustable interest rates, so now, with interest rates rising, Latin American nations are finding harder to make their payments.

The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has also come to Latin America. Originally launched in September 2013, the BRI was originally intended link Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa through the construction of infrastructure: roads, bridges, and then damns, power stations, electrical systems, and electronic communications. The BRI, which is the heart of the Chinese imperial economic system, creates a web for Chinese loans, investments, trade, and military assistance as well. China promotes the BRI as part of its South-South diplomatic initiative, supposedly to unite the Global South to contest the Global North of Europe, the United States. Twenty out of twenty-four Latin American and Caribbean countries had joined the BRI as of December 31, 2021.

Politics, Soft Power, and the Military

The Chinese President Xi Jinping has personally taken the lead in promoting Chinese relations with Latin America, having visited the region eleven times since he took office in 2013. Other Chinese leaders frequently visit Latin America either as diplomats to promote closer ties, to oversee the granting of loans, or to make new investments.

The Chinese government, in addition to economic projects, has also spent $10 billion per year to establish Confucius Institutes in Latin American and Caribbean countries that offer undergraduate and advanced degrees in Chinese language and culture and organize cultural exchanges. Mao Zedong introduced the reactionary Confucian philosophy into the Chinese Communist Party and later into the state after taking power in 1949; together with Stalinism and Maoism it forms party of the society’s authoritarian ideology. China also provides financing to other institutions and universities for research.

China has also established ties with the Latin American military. China has established a defense forum that promotes discussions with military leaders. China offers military exchanges and training programs in which officers or soldiers study in each other’s military academies, visit each other’s bases, and learn each other’s methods. Thus, China learns the strengths and weaknesses of Latin American countries and gain influence among Latin American military officers, just as the United States has done in the past. China has not established military bases in Latin America, which would alarm the United States, but it has created what it calls “strategic strong points” to provide naval access and supply. The Chinese have seven port operations by in Mexico, three in Panama, three in the Bahamas and one in Buenos Aires, Argentina, as well as being engaged in port construction projects in Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, and Jamaica.

China has sold millions of dollars’ worth of aircraft, ground vehicles, aid defense radar systems, assault rifles and other materiel to Bolivia and Ecuador. But some of its closest military ties are with the authoritarian leftist regime in Venezuela, which has been besieged and sanctioned by the United States. Venezuela has purchased $80 million in K-8 fighters and also bought military transport planes.

Conclusion: Latin America Will See Inter-Imperialist Conflict

The United States is not about to give up its supremacy in Latin America without a fight, whether economic, political, or military. The American government views the Caribbean and Central America in particular as part of its sphere of influence and considers its involvement in South America to be necessary to maintain its hold on the hemisphere.

While some progressives, and leftists believe that China is a benign power working to create a fairer world, there is little to justify this view. Consider the case of Tibet. After the Chinese Communists took power in 1949, the PRC annexed Tibet in 1950, but in a negotiation with Tibet’s Dalai Lama promised the Tibetans autonomy. Unhappy with Chinese rule, Tibetans rebelled in 1959, which led China to take direct control and impose the Chinese Communist one-party system, while a few years later the Cultural Revolution carried out the destruction of six thousand Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and caused the deaths of between 200,000 and one million people. Han Chinese military officials and bureaucrats took charge of the government while the PRC promoted Han immigration, carrying out the Sinicization of Tibet.

Then there is the case the Uighurs, some twelve million ethnically distinct people who speak a Turkic language and are mostly Muslims living in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). China has detained and holds over one million Uighurs, adults and their children, in “reeducation camps” where many perform forced labor, are subject to abuse, and some tortured. At the same time, as happened with Tibet, the policy of promoting mass migration of Chinese into Xinjiang has been changing the ethnic character of the region. Chinas has no toleration of ethnic and cultural difference or freedom of conscience, whether of Tibetan Buddhist or Uighur Muslims. Neither, of course, does it permit the establishment of rival political parties, independent labor unions, or any other form of independent social movement.

Finally, there is the role of China in the South China sea, one of the world’s most important shipping passes with vessels carrying trillions of dollars in goods that sail through each year. The South China Sea islands are claimed by many different nations: China, Taiwan, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and Singapore. There is competition not only over the islands and the trade route but also over oil in the sea. China has staked out its claims to the lion’s share of the South China Sea and has militarized three of the islands with anti-ship and anti-aircraft weapons increasing tensions in the region. China’s behavior in Asia reveals its character and suggests how it would behave if it had more power in the Western Hemisphere.

Of course, Latin America is far from China and close to the United States, still the world’s greatest military power. China is in no position to take military action in the Western Hemisphere. Yet the two greatest imperial powers of the day now struggle for dominance over the Latin American economy and one can expect that struggle to become more acute.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Two Sixties’ Radicals Recall Fighting Times in U.S. Labor

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A review of Fighting Times: Organizing on the Front Lines of the Class War (PM Press, 2022) by Jon Melrod and Troublemaker: Saying No to Power by Frank Emspak (available at Amazon books).

The University of Wisconsin at Madison was a hotbed of student radicalism in the 1960s. Unlike some other centers of campus opposition to the Vietnam War, left-wing activists there were among the first of their generation to organize around issues related to their own mistreatment as workers. In 1963, undergraduates employed in campus jobs formed a Wisconsin Student Employees Union to force the administration to raise their wages to the federal minimum (a 50 cent per hour increase). Seven years later, the UW Teaching Assistants Association organized the first TA strike in U.S. history, a 24-day walk-out that won union recognition. UW graduates shaped by that experience went on to play key roles in the labor movement, locally, state-wide, and in others states. Two members of this UW alumni network, Frank Emspak and Jon Melrod, have just published autobiographical accounts of their parallel transition from being Marxist students to blue-collar workers in unionized workplaces in the 1970s and 80s.

At the time, they and their closest comrades were not exactly the best of friends or workplace allies. As Emspak reports in his memoir, Troublemaker, he came from a distinguished old left labor family. His father Julius, was a key organizer and longtime national officer of the United Electric Workers (UE), a union built with the help of Communist Party (CP) members or sympathizers in the 1930s. Melrod made his personal post-graduate turn toward industry as part of a group affiliated with the Revolutionary Union (RU), a Bay Area formation that later morphed into the Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP). RCP cadre considered the CP to be a case study in Marxist-Leninist “revisionism” and were not fond of its labor work either. Both authors are trying to reach an audience of 21st century socialists who are, in some cases, young enough to be their grand-children. To most (but not all) in that new generational cohort, differences between the CP, the RCP, and other “alphabet soup” groups from the sectarian left of five decades ago will be of minimal interest. What will hopefully draw readers to Troublemaker and Fighting Times are their granular lessons about building left-led union reform caucuses, which can actually oust old guard officials and replace them with rank-and-file militants more committed to membership mobilization and strike activity.

A Catalytic Role

Today, that kind of internal struggle is more likely to occur in education, healthcare, or service sector labor organizations, rather than older industrial unions. Younger labor radicals who’ve become 1970s-style “colonizers” are more apt to choose workplaces or firms—like Starbucks or Amazon–without established unions so they can play a catalytic role in new organizing or first contract struggles. However, Melrod’s former union, the United Auto Workers (UAW) is currently in the midst of a first-ever direct election of its top officers, which has created a new political opening for UAW dissidents. And, with a recent national leadership change for the better in the Teamsters, Teamsters for a Democratic Union (TDU)—formed 46 years ago with much socialist help–is now well positioned to shape contract campaigning in the nation’s largest private sector bargaining unit, which covers 230,000 workers at United Parcel Service.

Melrod and Emspak both describe workplace organizing in an era when national bargaining on that scale was still the norm, rather than the exception, and unionized manufacturing had yet to be decimated by de-industrialization. Even when good-paying factory jobs were far more plentiful, however, management and its labor union partners had a shared interest in barring the door to former campus agitators like the authors. In Fighting Times, Melrod describes how he got hired at American Motors Corporation (AMC), then the nation’s fourth largest auto manufacturer, with a little help from job application falsification (which, when discovered, led to his first contested firing).

Emspak faced unique challenges landing a job at General Electric in Lynn, Massachusetts, then the largest industrial complex in New England. There was no concealing either his advanced degree (a PhD in labor history from UW) or a family tree, well known to the company, which helped oust the left-led UE from Lynn and other GE factory locations in the early 1950s. Not only was his father Julius a former GE worker, but so were five other members of two previous generations of his union building family. Even after the post-war legal and political assault on the UE, its more compliant replacement, the International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE) still had to contend with “a large group of workers who had a strong sense of what a real union could be” and welcomed the chance to unite with “a new generation of class-conscious troublemakers.” Emspak became one of the latter at GE only due to the fortuitous intervention of two under-cover UE sympathizers. One helper was a foreman who hired him without the knowledge of higher ups in the company, and a second, was a shop steward, who counseled Emspak not to sign an IUE membership card, alerting the union hall of his hiring, until he had completed his probationary period and could only be dismissed for just cause.

Once on the job, both authors faced the challenge of making friends and fending off enemies, of whom they had many in management and the union officialdom. Both had trusted political comrades they could count on, when faced with heavy red-baiting, often accompanied by physical threats. (On one occasion, Emspak was assaulted by hostile officials from other IUE locals when he attended a national union meeting and spoke out against GE proposals for a two-tier wage system,) Neither Melrod or Emspak would have been effective workplace organizers without joining social networks based on after work partying, sharing meals on the job, or, in the latter’s case, becoming a fellow gardener on a company-provided plot for machinists at a UE shop where he worked before joining the IUE at GE.

Shop Floor Leadership

Both memoirists stress the importance of publishing rank-and-file newsletters or revitalizing local union committees as a vehicle for addressing shop floor issues often ignored or downplayed by higher ranking union officials. Melrod’s opposition caucus in UAW Local 72 in Kenosha, Wisconsin published Fighting Times, which highlighted stories about job discrimination and harassment at AMC. As the paper “became known as a voice against racism … at election time, we could rely on many workers of color and women who viewed us as their stalwart defenders.” In IUE Local 201, the “left militant coalition” that Emspak helped to build was heavily represented “on the health and safety committee, the women’s committee and the new technology committee—groups that believed in and tried to implement membership-driven actions for health and safety and against sex bias and the challenges of new technology.” At AMC, as Melrod reports, wildcat strikes were often the weapon of choice against speed up and other abuses of management authority. At GE, the IUE contract included a rare open-ended grievance procedure, which made it possible for workers to strike, legally and during the life of the contract, over unresolved grievances, if the action was approved by the Local 201 executive board. Both Fighting Times and Troublemaker are filled with colorful and instructive accounts of direct action on the job, a tradition currently undergoing a revival in some non-union workplaces.

Helping to lead shop-floor struggles made both authors viable candidates for local union leadership positions. In Local 72, Melrod first became a steward, then chief steward, UAW convention delegate, and member of the local executive board and bargaining committee. Emspak was elected to the IUE’s national GE conference board and four times as a Local 201 executive board member, representing 1,000 workers at a satellite plant in a GE local with a total membership of 8,000. He mounted a strong local-wide campaign for assistant business manager, losing by a mere 38 votes out of 4,834 cast. In a second bid for the job, he and other militants were defeated after a plant-wide strike over accumulated grievances “lasted a month and achieved almost nothing.” By stonewalling the union and “making its progressive leadership look incompetent,” GE was able to install a “less confrontational group” at the 201 hall. During their union careers, the guidance that both authors received from their outside political organizations was not always helpful or supportive. When Melrod became less of a “polemicist”–and spent more time listening to and learning from his co-workers–fellow revolutionaries safely removed from the factory floor accused him of being a “Menshevik.” Emspak found himself at odds with the Communist Party, on several occasions, when he became part of a “worker-led campaign against a sub-standard national contract” with GE, organized in response to the “absence of leadership at the top of the union and no serious planning for a strike.”

As the opposition of IUE Local 201 members increased, even the local’s business manager, a member of the national negotiating committee, urged rejection of a 1979 tentative agreement. But, in the middle of this fight, the CP changed its position and supported the GE contract settlement it had previously deemed inadequate. When Emspak continued to campaign for a “No” vote, this had the helpful effect of demonstrating that his “loyalty was to the membership and not the international union or the CP.” Six years later, he reports, history repeated itself “when the Party endorsed union contracts with GE that Party members at GE had been leading the opposition against.” As Emspak recalls, “a top down decision was made, without input from many of us on the ground… At that point, there did not seem to be any benefit from being in the CP and most in the largest shop club in the industry simply left it.”

Law and Labor Education

Melrod and Emspak’s experience as rank-and-file activists helped shape their successful later careers in law and labor education respectively. As Melrod explains, even before deciding to go to law school, he had won seven National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) cases “forcing American Motors to reverse decisions punishing me for my organizing efforts.” One termination case dragged on for nearly three years before a federal circuit court of appeals ordered the company to re-instate him with full back pay and seniority rights. In other litigation, widely reported at the time, Melrod and two other rank-and-file newsletter editors were sued for $4 million in damages by AMC supervisors who claimed they had been defamed by Fighting Times. This company-backed effort to intimidate opposition caucus members also backfired. “The NLRB intervened after the civil trial, finding AMC guilty of violating our rights and ordering the company to pay over $300,000 in legal fees and lost wages.” As part of his later law practice, Melrod specialized in “refugee and asylum law, representing clients from all over the world fleeing political, sexual, religious, and ethnic persecution.

After he left GE and IUE Local 201 in 1987, Emspak transitioned first to state and federal jobs as a valued advisor to unions on the workplace impact of technological change. Then, he returned to his alma mater to teach shop stewards, local officers, and union staff members in labor education courses run by the University of Wisconsin School for Workers. During his career there, he founded Workers Independent News (WIN), which operated for sixteen years and, at its peak, produced pro-labor radio show content airing on 150 stations nationwide, which reached hundreds of thousands of listeners. In this new arena, Emspak found himself walking a familiar tightrope. During its existence, WIN raised several million dollars from twenty-two national unions, and additional donations from over one hundred local unions. But labor radio sponsors from the AFL-CIO and Change to Win affiliates were not always appreciative of “independent” reporting on their own strikes, contract campaigns, or internal politics. As WIN’s founder reports, “we faced pressure to restrict our coverage to conform to the interests and opinions of union leadership…press freedom did not seem to be of particular concern.” The WIN experience leaves the question of how to finance independent labor journalism unanswered—but, in Emspak’s view, “points to developing a funding model that is widespread and not dependent on institutional union support.”

As writers today, the authors of Troublemaker and Fighting Times have no WIN-type need for self-censorship (and no longer risk being sued for defamation by a factory foreman!). Both Emspak and Melrod have penned candid, illuminating accounts of their past union and political activism, which will be very useful to younger radicals who share their belief that only working class organizing can change the balance of power between capital and labor.

Ukraine and Its Language in the Political Imagination of the Russian Nation and Empire

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Nikolay Bogdanov-Bel’sky, “New Fairy Tale,” 1891.

On February 21, 2022, Vladimir Putin gave a long speech whose purpose was to justify the invasion of Ukraine, launched only three days later. According to the Russian president, the Ukrainian state is an illegitimate invention and the Ukrainians’ claim to a distinct identity is nothing more than the product of foreign manipulation. Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians constitute for him one and the same nation, while the policy promoting the Ukrainian language and culture would be a proof of the “genocide” against Russian speakers living on Ukrainian territory and thus justify the invasion of the country. The question of language therefore seems to play an important role in the outbreak of the Russian invasion and in the conflict between the two countries that preceded it. In order to understand Putin’s war against Ukraine and its people, one must take a close look at the place that Ukraine, its state, language, and culture occupy in the imperial and national imagination of Russians.

After the fall of the medieval state of Kievan Rus, dismantled by the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century, much of the land that makes up present-day Ukraine returned to Poland-Lithuania, and it was not until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that it came under Russian control. It was therefore the integration of these new territories that gave birth to the idea of a Russian nation uniting the three peoples, an idea now resurrected by Vladimir Putin. At the time, the objective of this project was to equip itself with a hegemonic group that would make it easier to exercise domination over the non-Orthodox and non-Slavic peoples. The control of Ukraine was therefore a cornerstone in the project of the Russian Empire but also and above all in the project of the  Russian Nation. The assertion of a distinct Ukrainian identity was thus perceived by the Tsarist elites as an existential threat to their state.

In 1863, publication and teaching in the Ukrainian language were completely banned. This policy led to a situation, probably unique in European history, of a decline in the literacy  rate of the population between the middle of the eighteenth century and the end of the nineteenth century. Inequality in access to education is one of the factors that reproduce social inequalities. In the nineteenth century, Ukrainian society was thus marked by an opposition between a “backward” countryside and the Russified cities, which at the same time served as the centers of imperial domination.

Under these conditions, how has the Ukrainian language been able to survive and develop despite everything? Indeed, the infrastructures necessary for the emergence of a common national identity, such as the development of cities and communications, generalized schooling, or the development of an efficient centralized administration, remained largely underdeveloped. The Tsarist authorities, with the almost unlimited resources of their vast empire, were reluctant to invest in the costly project of truly Russifying Ukraine, integrating it into the development of the Russian nation. Rather than embark on this policy, they resorted to crude repression against the Ukrainian language. However, it was already too late: at that time, Ukrainian poets and writers, who were fascinated by Romanticism and for them the defense of their mother tongue was an important political marker; they were already conceptualizing their ethnic group as a nation. In short, the predation of the Tsarist elites, state underdevelopment and belated and incoherent pressure prevented the assimilation of Ukrainians to Russia. In general, the desire of the political elites to preserve their multi-ethnic empire while at the same time building a Slavic nation-state is one of the reasons for the the Russian state’s inherent fragility. The resistance of Ukrainians against these projects was perceived as the worst betrayal.

In 1917, the empire broke up. But a national and class awakening soon developed. The Ukrainian peasants not only claimed their right to their language, but they also demand their subjectivity, that of being political actors in their own right, of being recognized. The arrival on the political scene of this “dark masses” annoyed the urban classes, including the socialists who saw themselves as the representatives of the interests of the working class in the industrial regions of southern and eastern Ukraine. As one of the party members explained, for them, the socialists, “Ukraine as such does not exist, because it does not exist for a worker of the city.” Another wrote that the “tragedy” lies in the fact that the Bolsheviks were trying to gain an advantage over the peasantry “with the help of the Russian or Russified working class, which despises the slightest trace of the Ukrainian language and culture.” The determination with which a large number of Ukrainians fought for their sovereignty with arms in hand, however, convinced the Bolsheviks that special arrangements must be made to ensure the control of this population. So in 1923, Moscow introduced a policy to promote non-Russian languages.

With Stalin, the return in force of assimilative policies was accompanied by state violence that took extreme forms, going as far as genocidal practices. The latter also struck Ukraine, with the famine of 1932-33 that was knowingly planned by Stalin (an event called Holodomor in Ukraine). The colonial division of labor between the city and the countryside reemerged and strengthening, guaranteeing to Russian Soviet and Russified citizens privileged social positions and access to income, skills, prestige and power in the peripheral republics. After the Stalinist era, one can see the promotion of a Soviet identity that is totally confused with Russianness. Although there is no law prohibiting it, speaking Ukrainian outside the private sphere is then perceived as an expression of hostility towards the system. Speaking Russian is, on the contrary, a way to demonstrate loyalty to the existing order and respect for the hierarchy between “brotherly peoples.” Russian then became the dominant language in all areas of public life: economy, administration, culture, press, education. Thus, more and more Ukrainians abandoned their tongue, which had become a marker of cultural inferiority that hindered social mobility.

Soviet modernization and urbanization were accompanied by the strengthening of the dominant imperial culture, which perpetuated significant structural inequalities between Russian speakers and Ukrainian speakers. The post-Soviet elite has neither the will nor the means to correct these structural deficiencies, so their opportunist policies largely aimed to preserve the status quo. The law that gave Ukrainian the status of an official language was adopted under the Soviet regime in 1989 and remained in force until 2012. After 1991, the advent of capitalism and the weakness of the state did not work in favor of the Ukrainian language. Suffering from its image of inferiority, deprived of any aid from the state, little known abroad, Ukraine’s media, cultural, and artistic production couldn’t compete with the growing Russian market. Moreover, from 2004 onwards, the various clans of oligarchs in competition for power artificially fed the socio-linguistic divide in order to be able to mobilize their respective electorates around questions of identity.

In 2012, the pro-Russian political forces passed a law that was supposed to ensure the protection of minority languages, but their campaign in reality aimed solely to “defend the Russian tongue.” When President Yanukovych was impeached in 2014, the parliament tried to repeal the law. Although this decision was never ratified, Russia took this opportunity to express concern about the discrimination against Russians by what it called the “fascist junta” in Ukraine, an argument that was used to justify Russian interference in Crimea and Donbas in order, according to Moscow, to “save our compatriots.”

In 2018, the parliament adopted the law that requires that Ukrainian be used in most aspects of public life and obliges state officials and those who work in the public sphere to know and use it in their communication with customers. The Ukrainian state is therefore currently playing a major role in the construction of a common identity for the inhabitants of the country. This may seem surprising from Western Europe, in countries where this process took place more than a century ago. The situation of Ukraine, having obtained its independence only thirty years ago and remaining under Russian political and cultural domination until 2014, cannot be compared to that of nations supported by state of their own since at least the nineteenth century.

Some individuals make the conscious choice to start speaking in Ukrainian in order to distance themselves from the Putin state, which claims absolute monopoly on the Russian language and culture, considering that the use of the Russian language and belonging to its “civilizational space” are one and the same thing. Indeed, since the early 2000s, Russia has embarked on the promotion of the conception of the “Russian world” by relying on the Russian speakers of neighboring countries, who have been given a special mission. This consisted of absolute loyalty to the Russian state, which presupposed unconditional support for all Kremlin decisions. If, in the 2000s, the “Russian world” was above all a tool of soft power and international influence, beginning in 2014 it became the engine of Russian irredentism whose objective is to erase Ukraine from the world map. Presenting himself as the defender of the Russian language and culture, Vladimir Putin denies nothing less than the right of Ukrainians to exist, frequently making statements that can be qualified as incitement to genocide.

In the face of the Russian invasion and the inhuman treatment of civilians by the occupying army, the inhabitants of the country now feel themselves to be first and foremost Ukrainians, including in areas of the country where Russian remains the dominant language. In these unfavorable conditions, some of those Ukrainians who are engaged in resistance to the occupier nevertheless continue to claim the use of Russian, thus defying Putin’s exclusive privilege of imposing his power over this language spoken by millions of people who do not recognize themselves in his political project. Using the imperial language by investing it with a decolonial content could become a solution for a bilingual Ukrainian society, although it is not easy to defend today, at a time when Ukrainians struggle for their physical existence.

This article originally appeared in Pages de Gauche, No. 185.

Brazil: End of the Nightmare?

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Bolsonaro and Lula.

The result of the first round of the Brazilian elections on 2nd October is mixed. Certainly, Lula, the candidate of the Workers’ Party, is in the lead, with 48.4% of the vote. But the hope of a victory in the first round has vanished and, above all, he is closely followed by Jair Bolsonaro, the neo-fascist candidate, with 43.2%–much more than the polls predicted. There will therefore be a second round on October 30, which, barring an unexpected reversal, should be won by Lula. However, Bolsonaro’s supporters appear to be in control of parliament as well as several regional governments. In short, the neo-fascist current will probably lose the presidency, but remains an extremely powerful political force.

Brazil’s dominant classes have never had a great fondness for democracy.   Inheritors of three centuries of European colonization and four centuries of slavery, they have shown, in the last hundred years, a strong propensity for an authoritarian state from 1930 to 1945 under the personal power of the caudillo Getulio Vargas; 1964-1985, a military dictatorship; in 2016, a pseudo-parliamentary coup against President-elect Dilma Rousseff; from 2018-2022: neo-fascist government of Jair Bolsonaro. The more or less democratic periods seem to be parenthesis between two authoritarian regimes.

The four years of Bolsonaro’s presidency have been a huge disaster for the Brazilian people. Elected with the support of the bourgeois press, business circles, landowners, banks, and neo-Pentecostal churches, he took advantage of the fact that Lula, the only opponent capable of beating him, had been put in prison, under false accusations. The former captain was unable to fulfil his dream of re-establishing a military dictatorship and shooting “thirty thousand communists.” But he has sabotaged every health policy in the face of Covid, resulting in more than 600 thousand deaths; he has ravaged Brazil’s fragile public services (health, education, etc.); he has reduced tens of millions of Brazilian women to poverty; he has actively supported the destruction of the Amazon by the kings of soybeans and cattle; he has promoted neo-fascist, homophobic, misogynist, and climate-sceptic ideas; he supported the paramilitary militias (responsible for the assassination of Marielle Franco); and he has not ceased to try to set up an authoritarian regime.

Will the October 2022 elections put an end to this nightmare? Lula is likely to win in the second round on October 30. But Bolsonaro, following the example of his political model, Donald Trump, has already announced that he will not recognize an unfavorable result: “If I lose, it is because the vote has been falsified.” A part of the Army, strongly represented in his government, seems to support him: will it go so far as to take the initiative of a military coup against the elected president, i.e. Lula? This hypothesis cannot be ruled out, even if it does not seem the most likely: the Brazilian Army is not used to moving without the green light from the Pentagon and the State Department. But right now, Biden has no interest in supporting a tropical Trump at the helm of Brazil. Bolsonaro tried to mobilize his supporters—police, militiamen, retired generals, neo-Pentecostal pastors, etc.—to create a crisis situation comparable to that caused by Trump around the Capitol after his electoral defeat. Will he have the same success as his North American idol?

Despite the highly questionable choice of a reactionary bourgeois politician (Geraldo Alckmin) as his running mate for vice-president, it is clear that Lula—Luis Inacio da Silva, former metalworker, trade union leader of the great strikes of 1979, and founder  of the Workers’ Party—is currently embodying the hope of the Brazilian people to put an end to the neo-fascist episode of the last four years. He is supported by a broad coalition of forces, which includes not only most of the organizations of the left and the social movement—trade unions, the landless movement, the homeless movement—but also the broad sectors of the industrial bourgeoisie, which unlike the land owners, who remain loyal to Bolsonaro, came to the conclusion that the ex-captain was not a good option for business. It must be acknowledged that the electoral battle was not preceded by a rise in popular mobilization as in Colombia.

The Party of Socialism and Freedom (PSOL), the main force of the radical and/or anti-capitalist left in Brazil—where there are several currents associated, in one form or another, with the Fourth International—decided, after a long internal debate, to support Lula from the first round. A small dissident current, led by the economist Plinio de Aruda Sampaio Jr, who disagreed with this choice, left the party, but the main left currents of the PSOL—such as the Movement of the Socialist Left (MES), whose spokeswoman, Luciana Genro, was the presidential candidate of the PSOL in 2014—have, despite their desire for a PSOL’s own candidacy in the first round, accepted the majority decision and actively participated in the campaign in support of Lula.

Most PSOL activists have no illusions about what the government led by Lula and the Workers Party (PT) would be: probably an even more unbalanced version of the social-liberal policies of class conciliation of previous experiences under the aegis of the PT. Admittedly, these experiments have allowed some social advances, but it is not certain that this will be the case this time. This will depend, of course, on the ability of the radical left and, above all, of the social movements, of the exploited and the oppressed to move, autonomously and independently. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the vote for Lula is an unavoidable necessity to free the Brazilian people from the sinister nightmare that the regime of Jair Bolsonaro has signified.

Once elected, Lula will face many difficulties: fierce opposition from sectors of the Army, the kings of cattle and soybeans, neo-Pentecostal churches, fanatical (often armed) supporters of Bolsonaro.  He risks having before him  a hostile Congress, dominated by reactionary forces; the present Chamber is governed by the so-called “4 Bs: beef, banks, Bibles, bullets”, i.e. landowners, finance capital, evangelical sects and paramilitary militias. One of the decisive battles of the future will be the rescue of the Amazon, which is being destroyed by agro-capitalism.

In addition, Lula will be, like Dilma Rousseff, under the permanent threat of a “parliamentary coup.” This results from a disastrous choice for the vice-presidency: Geraldo Alckmin, former governor of Sâo Paulo, the former right-wing opponent beaten by Dilma Rousseff in 2014. Lula probably chose him to give pledges to the bourgeoisie and disarm the right-wing opposition. But he has thus given a decisive weapon to the ruling classes. If Lula takes any action that does not please the Brazilian oligarchs, who controls the majority of the parliament, he will be the subject of impeachment proceedings, as was the case with Dilma in 2016. In this sad precedent, she was punished under  ridiculous pretexts, and replaced by the vice-president, Temer, a reactionary of the so-called bourgeois “center”.  The same could happen to Lula: impeachment and substitution by Alckmin. The Colombian Gustavo Petro was more skilful, choosing as running mate Francia Marquez, an Afro-Colombian woman, feminist and environmentalist.

That said, the imperative of the moment, in October 2022, is, without a doubt, the vote for Lula.  As Trotsky explained so well almost a century ago,  the broadest unity of all the forces of the workers’ movement is the necessary condition for defeating fascism.

 

Putin’s Annexation of More Ukrainian Territory is Part of Pattern of Ethnocide and Genocide. Stand with Ukraine.

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Bodies exhumed in Ukraine show signs of torture before execution.

Russian dictator Vladimir Putin in a formal ceremony in St. George’s Hall in the Kremlin yesterday signed papers to formally annex and incorporate into Russia large portions of Ukraine amounting to 20 percent of that country’s territory. That territory and those people thus officially cease to be Ukrainian.

At Putin’s orders, Russia conducted hastily organized sham referendums in these provinces where hundreds of thousands had fled and where tens of thousands of others lived under occupation, some in ruins. Still other Ukrainians in this region—some reports say as many as a million, including thousands of children—have been rounded up by Russian soldiers and FSB police agents and sent to Russia. Clearly, as the world could see, under these extreme conditions the people of those regions could not freely decide their own fate.

Yet Putin stood in the hall and made a preposterous speech claiming these territories for Russia “forever.”

“The people made their choice,” he said. “And that choice won’t be betrayed. I want the authorities in Kyiv and their real overlords in the West to hear me: the residents of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson are becoming our citizens. Forever.”

As United Nations Secretary General António Guterres said, however, “Any annexation of a state’s territory by another state resulting from the threat or use of force is a violation of the Principles of the U.N. Charter and international law. Any decision to proceed with the annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine would have no legal value and deserves to be condemned.”

These phony referendums and Putin’s theatrical performance in the Kremlin surrounded by Russian officials and the puppets he had put in power in the conquered territories constitute the latest episode in an on-going war of ethnocide and genocide against the Ukrainian people. They form part of a hundreds-of-years-long, off and on process of attempts to Russify Ukraine and to erase the Ukrainian people’s identity. Ironically it takes place as the Ukrainian people have come together as one people as never before and have succeeded in frustrating Putin’s military objectives. Putin speech, taking place as he ordered the conscription of hundreds of thousands to fight in Ukraine, was accompanied by the flight abroad of 200,000 Russian men and protests in the streets throughout the country with thousands arrested.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has, I argue here, had from the beginning a genocidal character, as defined by the United Nations, which I cite in full so that readers can see that all of these elements are present, as I will show.

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

  1. Killing members of the group;
  2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
  3. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
  4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
  5. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

All but the fourth of these practices have occurred in Ukraine.

The U.N.’s definition, does not align with our popular conception of genocide most indelibly imprinted in our minds by the Jewish holocaust. Yet the official definition does grasp that genocide has an intention and a trajectory and that through a process these elements fuse into a horrifying reality.

How do we on the left, we socialists, look at this worst of all imaginable crimes, the attempt to culturally erase or physically annihilate an entire people? And where do we stand?

Imperialism and Genocide

The current campaign of ethnocide, of cultural erasure, is driven by Russian imperialism. Imperialism is one of the frequent causes of ethnocide or genocide. The expansion of a state with the goal of conquering and subjugating another people or nation—whether the state was ancient, medieval, or modern, that is, pre-capitalist, capitalist, bureaucratic collectivist (i.e. Stalinist)—has often come to involve genocide.

We might take the case of Spain beginning at the end of the fifteenth century as the paradigm. With its ideology of pureza de sangre (pure blood) and its role as defender and propagator of the Catholic faith, Hapsburg Spain began to expand. In pursuit of empire, the Spanish fought the Muslims and the Protestants in Europe and the pagans of the Americas with the intent of extirpating their religious beliefs.

In 1492, the same year Columbus sailed for Spain and stumbled across the Americas, the Spanish either drove the infidels—Jews and Muslims—out of the Iberian Peninsula or in ethnocidal campaigns forced their conversion at the point of a sword. Arriving in the New World, the Spanish conquistadores vanquished the indigenous empires, the Aztecs and Incas, and many less powerful states and tribes, and imposed their racial dominance, their religion, and their language, as well, of course, as seizing the indigenous peoples’ wealth and lands. In the course of the conquest, in some cases, they practically exterminated entire ethnic groups, such as early on the Tainos of the Caribbean among many others. Under Spanish rule other groups lost their distinctive ethnic character, their religion and language, and were transformed culturally.

The Spanish, of course, were not alone. At the time, the English, Dutch, French and other European ruling classes held similar notions of their ethnic, religious, and cultural superiority, as did the rulers of the great territorial empires of the Ottoman Empire and Russia. Though, of course, in each case it was their blood that was pure, their religion—Protestant, Eastern Orthodox, or Muslim—that was the true faith, and their civilization that should rule. Long before the arrival of modern capitalism, for example, the Tsarist Russian empire and absorbed Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Poland in the West and Siberia and nearly all of Central Asia in the South and East—in the name of Russian superiority embodied in the Orthodox faith and proven by conquest. While the British North American colonies and then the United States annihilated some indigenous people and forced others off their traditional lands and onto reservations.

In the late nineteen century, the concept of civilizational superiority became justified by the pseudo-scientific racism of social Darwinism, the notion that the Europeans were the most evolved, had the highest intelligence, and superior morality. The French, for example, told the world and the tens of millions of Africans, Asians, and Pacific island peoples in their colonies that their empire had a mission civilisatrice, a civilizing mission, just as the British, with the largest empire “on which the sun never set” took up, in Rudyard Kipling’s words, “the white man’s burden” of bringing peace and plenty to “the silent sullen peoples.” In Eastern Europe at that time, Tsarist Russia imposed its language and culture on Ukraine, but against a rising Ukrainian national sentiment that became a revolutionary force by World War I.

In reality, by the end of the nineteenth century not ideals but interests had become predominant; the territorial empires (Ottoman and Russian), the older capitalist, commercial and industrial empires (England, Holland, and France), and the newer ones (the United States, Germany, and Japan) all contended for control of the world’s land masses and seas, for natural resources and labor, leading to two world wars. Throughout this evolution of imperialism, the ideology of ethnic and cultural superiority continued to justify mass murder and genocidal campaigns either in the colonies or in the wars in Europe itself. Under King Leopold of Belgium, who postured as a great humanitarian, some ten million Congolese were killed in the pursuit of land and rubber. The Dutch and the British carried out genocidal wars against the San people (called the Bushmen) in the Cape of Good Hope colony. In Europe, Stalin’s Soviet Union, neither capitalist or socialist, collaborating with Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Germany, also engaged in genocide in Ukraine. Hitler ordered the “final solution” that through starvation, firing squads, and gas chambers killed six million European Jews.

In the post-World War II period, as the anti-colonial movement grew among the subject peoples of Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean, the United States and Europe continued to engage in imperialist interventions in the name of their superior civilizations based on capitalism, democracy, and human rights, while the Soviet Union did so in the name of Communism, progress, and international solidarity. The French fought wars to keep their colonies in Vietnam and Algeria. The U.S. took up the war in Vietnam that killed two million Southeast Asians and precipitated the greatest contemporary genocide in neighboring Cambodia, killing between 1.5 and 2 million people. The Soviet Union invaded and occupied Afghanistan. China took Tibet. The United States’ “war on terror,” including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan also killed hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children, one estimate is 890,000.

Putin’s Arguments for Imperialism, Ethnocide and Genocide

So, aware of this history, when today we hear Vladimir Putin’s atavistic notions about the role of Russia among the Slavic people and more generally in Europe and Asia, we recognize at once that we are dealing with an imperialist ideology, though his arguments resemble those of sixteenth century Spain more than modern imperialist concepts. Putin laments the collapse of the Soviet Union and the breakup of its empire in Eastern Europe. “As for the Russian people, [the fall of the Soviet Union] became a genuine tragedy. Tens of millions of our fellow citizens and countrymen found themselves beyond the fringes of Russian territory. The epidemic of collapse has spilled over to Russia itself,” he said.

In reality, Putin’s imperial ideology is a throwback to Tsarist Russia. Putin—influenced by rightwing intellectuals like Lev Gumilev and Alexander Dugin—believes (or claims he believes) in the thousand-year-old Russia. He sees the Russia of the old Tsarist empire, infused by a cosmic force of “passionate power” (Gumilev), inspired by the Russian Orthodox Church, the archetypal Slavic nation, speaking Russian, and leading the other Slavic peoples and the neighboring Asians in the creation of a Eurasian power than can stop and challenge and defeat the West. Such an ethno-nationalist, civilizational ideology has been used by Putin to justify conquest, mass murder, and ethnocide.

Putin believes then, that the Russian empire must be recreated and those “fellow citizens and countrymen [who] found themselves beyond the fringes of Russian territory,” must be rescued and reincorporated into Russia. Most important of those are the Ukrainians, a nation as large as France with a population of more than forty million people with its own history, language, and culture whose very existence Putin has denied. In 2019, Putin told filmmaker Oliver Stone, “I believe that Russians and Ukrainians are one people … one nation, in fact,” Putin said. “When these lands that are now the core of Ukraine joined Russia … nobody thought of themselves as anything but Russians.”

Putin rejects the idea of a Ukrainian people and nation, arguing that Ukraine is an artificial creation. “Modern Ukraine was entirely and fully created by Russia, more specifically the Bolshevik, Communist Russia,” Putin said in 2021. “This process began practically immediately after the 1917 revolution, and moreover Lenin and his associates did it in the sloppiest way in relation to Russia — by dividing, tearing from her pieces of her own historical territory.” He has also written an article arguing this position. His position thus denies the Ukrainian people any agency, any ability to decide their own identity. Clearly this position becomes a justification for war against the Ukrainians to force them to become part of Russia. It is an argument for ethnocide and even genocide.

If one is to commit mas murder or genocide, the aggressors also find it necessary to deny the humanity of those they plan to kill or eliminate altogether. To motivate their people and their soldiers, they must argue that those who will be killed are less than human, either because of their race, their religion, or their political views. As he launched his war against Ukraine in February 2022, Putin declared, “To this end, we will seek to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine and put to justice those that committed numerous bloody crimes against peaceful people, including Russian nationals,” Putin said. Calling the Ukrainians Nazis dehumanizes them, especially given the history of Adolf Hitler’s war on the Soviet Union, launched in 1941, that killed 27 million, not only Russians but many other Soviet ethnic groups and particularly Ukrainians. Ironically, while there are some Nazis in Ukraine—as there are today nearly everywhere—Putin’s military forces include not only the neo-Nazi mercenaries of the notorious Wagner militia but also a regular Russian Army battalion under the self-proclaimed neo-Nazi commander Alexeï Milchakov.

The War as Evidence of Ethnocide and Genocide

The Russian war on Ukraine has from the beginning–even if it has not happened everywhere–exemplified what is sometimes called “total war,” that is, it is a war on both the military and civilians involving artillery fire or aerial bombing of cities, destruction of offices and industrial plants and mines as well as agricultural fields and facilities, mass murder of both soldiers and civilians (adults and children), in the course of which  thousands of soldiers and civilians have been killed, torture and rape, all of which is intended to create terror among the population. As a result, 7.4 million Ukrainian fled to other nations in Europe, though perhaps as many as three million have now returned. Another seven million Ukrainians have been displaced from their homes to some other place in their country. Among the displaced who have left and those who remain are about 3 million children. Total war in Ukraine has also destroyed the economy and left millions unemployed. While all of these atrocities have been common in modern wars and do not in themselves constitute either ethnocide or genocide, they may lay the basis for it.

The concerns about ethnocide and genocide are increased by the finding of hundreds of bodies in mass graves. An Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine established by the United Nations’ Human Rights Council found that Russian soldiers had committed war crimes, including many cases of torture, executions, rape (including of children), bombing of civilian areas sometimes leading to separation of families from their children. The commission is also looking into the adoption of Ukrainian children by Russian families.

How does one prove genocide, since as the U.N. convention reads, “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” I think it is a question of examining, as we have here, all of the elements surrounding the case in question.

While war always leads to atrocities, in this case the combination of Putin’s ideology, his claims of the non-existence of Ukraine or Ukrainians, his total war on the Ukrainian people, and the record of war crimes makes it clear that we are witnessing both ethnocide and genocide. All of this call us as socialists, and should call others, to stand with Ukraine, to support its war for self-determination and its right to acquire arms, and at the same time lead us to support the anti-war movement and war resisters in Russia.

 

 

 

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