Oakland teachers’ strike: Balance sheet, lessons, and what next?

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Editor’s note: The Oakland teachers’ strike was arguably a watershed in resistance to neoliberal education reforms.  In one regard Oakland teachers’ demands echo those in this year’s teacher strike wave,  a growing social movement led by teachers, with massive support of parents and community, to save public schools from reforms pushed by both Democrats and Republicans.

Yet Press briefings by the Oakland Education Association (OEA) and a remarkable website created by a community supporter, show an extraordinary shift: an  explicit yet seamless fusion of  attention to social oppression, race and gender, with labor’s mission to defend the dignity of work and workers. “It’s really, really exciting – a movement that is connecting the dots” observed Pauline Lipman, whose research on the racial significance of neoliberal school reform in Chicago helped inform the Chicago Teachers Union 2012 program, the widely-adopted template for teacher union demands, “The schools Chicago students deserve.”

In this article, Jack Gerson, retired Oakland teacher and former executive board and bargaining team member, analyzes what occurred and why in the Oakland strike.

On Friday March 1, 2019 the bargaining teams of the Oakland school district (OUSD) and the Oakland teachers union (OEA) reached a tentative agreement that received a mixed reception by OEA members. Yesterday (March 3), after several hours of heated debate, OEA members voted to ratify the agreement, 1141 to 832, or 58% for, 42% against. That’s an unusually big “no” vote on a contract recommended by a union leadership which had just organized a spirited strike that shut down Oakland schools for seven school days. At cluster meetings and at OEA’s Representative Council (delegate assembly) on Saturday (March 2), bitter accusations were made by teachers who thought the agreement was far less than the union could win by continuing to strike.

Why this division? Despite the union leadership hailing the agreement as “historic”, it is far from that. There were several complaints:

OEA had demanded no school closures (earlier this year, OUSD announced plans to close 15 schools and consolidate nine others).  The OEA leadership said this was a critical demand. But in the tentative agreement, they settled for a 5 month “pause” in school closures. That’s not worth much: the pause will end at the beginning of August, in time for OUSD to close schools before next school year starts. It will be much harder to fight those school closures in the summer, with teachers and students on vacation, than it is right now during the strike. And if the schools are closed, we can expect the available school properties to be disposed of: some to charter schools, some to real estate speculators who will drive housing costs still higher — more teachers leaving Oakland, more homelessness. Many teachers spoke out against the “pause.”

School nurses said that their overwhelming need was for OUSD to lower their workload and hire more nurses. But the tentative agreement provided no change in nurses’ workload – just cash bonuses which the nurses had repeatedly told the union’s bargaining team they didn’t want to settle. Several nurses told the Saturday meetings that “We were thrown under the bus.”

OEA had demanded a reduction of maximum counselor workload to 250 students (From the current 600). But they agreed to 550 next year and 500 the following year. Every little bit helps, but this will only help a little bit.

OEA had demanded a reduction of class size maximums by 4 per class in high needs schools (about half of Oakland schools) and by 2 elsewhere. But in the tentative agreement, they settled for 2 in high-needs schools and 1 elsewhere, phased in over three years — better than nothing, but far less than what’s needed, as many teachers said.

OEA had demanded a 12% pay increase over three years: 3% retroactive to the start of the 2017-8 school year, another 4% retroactive to the start of the 2018-9 school year, and another 5% for the 2019-20 school year. But they agreed to 11% over four plus years, starting January 1, 2019. And since the last 2.5% increase won’t take effect until the last day of year 4, it’s essentially an increase for the following year – so this is 11% over five years, or 2.2% per year, well below the cost of living increases. The original demands were meager enough: Oakland teachers are the lowest paid in Alameda County, an area where housing costs and overall cost of living are among the highest in the country. The proposed increases in the tentative agreement will be less than inflation, which will do nothing to help young teachers to make ends meet, and so the exodus of teachers out of Oakland will continue.

OEA had made solidarity with other school worker unions a main theme. Indeed, on Friday OEA called for a picket with community members and SEIU Local 1021 (representing OUSD classified workers) to block the school board from meeting and adopting a budget which would cut over 140 jobs, mainly of SEIU members. But at about 2pm, OEA President Keith Brown told the pickets “We have a TA! We Won!” and urged them to disperse. The optics of this are very bad and were not lost on SEIU members. One wrote on Facebook: “As a SEIU member who has been picketing in the rain or shine for the past seven strike days, I feel betrayed. I feel used…  I thought our collective goal Friday was to shut down the Board Meeting.”

Fortunately, several hundred OEA members ignored the leadership’s request and stayed to picket with SEIU and community until after 6pm, when the school board meeting was cancelled. It’s critical to not let the school board play divide and conquer, pretending that they have to cut SEIU workers and student support programs to pay for the OEA contract. The attempt to disperse the pickets on Friday played into the school board’s hands. That needs to be corrected. It’s important that OEA leadership make clear that it unambiguously stands with all OUSD workers and stands fully in solidarity and support with them. Those cuts need not happen: much of the money is already there, and more can be found by cutting down on OUSD’s outrageous shoveling of revenue to private contracts and to redundant and overpaid top administrators.

On Monday, March 4,  hundreds of students and several teachers called in sick to protest at an emergency school board meeting called during school hours to try to minimize student and school worker presence. Despite impassioned speeches from scores of students and several teachers and other school workers, and over the protest of virtually all of those present, the school board voted to make $22 million in cuts: to school libraries; to restorative justice programs; to the Asian Pacific Islander support program; to the foster youth program; and to lay off well over 100 classified school workers.

On balance: It’s important to acknowledge that Keith Brown and his team were able to lead a spirited strike supported and carried out by over 90% of OEA members. In contrast, OEA’s punishing 27-day strike in 1996 was beset by divisions within the union and within the community, as some charged that it deprived black students of essential schooling. None of that this time – the union was unified throughout the strike, and it had substantial support from students, parents, and community.

And it’s not helpful to characterize the contract as “a sellout”, nor to say that the bargaining team or the officers are “sellouts.” I believe them when they say that they’re convinced that this was the best deal that could be had at this time. I believe them, but I don’t agree with them. Why not?

First, I think that the leadership was heavily influenced by their state parent, the California Teacher Association (CTA). CTA is overly legalistic and cautious, and it is closely tied to the state Democratic Party. Under CTA’s influence, the leadership team was far less transparent during the strike than it should have been. Decisions were made by a small group consisting largely of OEA’s officers and CTA staffers, with some union executive board members telling me that even the executive board was out of the loop. One lesson is more transparency is needed, and especially needed is an elected strike committee to work directly with the officers, the executive board and, as often as possible, Rep Council and picket captains.

Second, and related, I think that there was a reluctance to aggressively confront corporate targets physically with militant actions. To overcome the intransigence of the corporate-funded and controlled school board, it’s necessary to convince corporate Oakland that the union is prepared to see that there’s no business as usual.  Hesitancy to do that was evident in the reluctance of the OEA leadership to vigorously pursue a proposal to rally and picket at the Port of Oakland, which could and should have occurred several days ago and would have had the support of dockworkers (ILWU Local 34 had already voted its support). Instead, CTA staff and OEA officers expressed fears that the union would be legally liable if it picketed at the Port (it wouldn’t: the park and roads at the port are public property, picketing there is legal and that right has been exercised numerous times, including more than once by OEA). Finally, last Thursday (February 28), Rep Council voted overwhelmingly to picket at the Port on March 5 (tomorrow). It’s no accident that OUSD improved its offer and rushed to settle when they did: one big reason was to preempt the port action. Had OEA not settled on Friday, and especially if it followed the Port action with militant rallies and sit-ins aimed at the big real estate and financial interests in downtown Oakland, I think that the corporate masters would have told state and city politicians to cough up some money, and told their school board puppets to settle up.

The union leadership repeatedly credited OEA’s militant and spirited picket lines and mass rallies with what they proclaim as an historic win. But then they turned around and said that the meager tentative agreement is “the best that can be won at this time” because, they claimed, support was beginning to ebb. I saw little evidence of that: Thousands of teachers turned out to picket, march and rally on rainy days all week. I think that there’s another reason: The union leadership is for the most part close to liberal Democrats like state superintendent of schools Tony Thurmond, who stepped in late this week to mediate the dispute and broker the deal. Thurmond and other Democrats represent corporate interests and the state, both of which wanted an end to this disruptive strike. I am sure that they pressed the OEA leadership directly as well as indirectly (through their influence with community activists and with CTA, OEA’s statewide parent union).

It’s important to move forward now: to do what wasn’t done during the strike – a complete end to the school closures; a full moratorium on charter school growth; restore all the cut programs and all the jobs that were cut; take the spirit that dominated the strike and rekindle it into a militant movement that confronts corporate Oakland – at the Port, in the City Center, at all the seats of corporate power. Confront them, and demand that the priorities be set straight: Adequate funding for quality public education and for essential social services, not for privatization and corporate profit.

[Editor’s note: Kitty Kelly Epstein responds to Jack Gerson’s analysis here.]

Venezuela on the Brink

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The troops gathering on the borders between Venezuela and Brazil and Colombia are no less threatening to Venezuela because they claim to be protecting a ‘humanitarian convoy’. And Richard Branson’s concert simply provides another cover to conceal the real purposes behind this so-called aid. Donald Trump, and his neoconservative aides John Bolton and Mike Pompeo, have no concern for the welfare of Venezuela’s people – any more than their predecessors did in Libya, Rwanda and countless other examples of fraudulent mercy missions that were concerned only with a search for power and control. How credible can this operation to ‘rescue’ Venezuela be when it coincides with a demand to spend six billion dollars on a wall to deter impoverished immigrants from travelling north in search of work?

The crisis in Venezuela is real – despite Nicolás Maduro’s hypocritical insistence that everyone in Venezuela has food and medicine to meet their needs. But the purpose of this military operation is not to address the crisis – beyond a few photo ops of lorries full of supplies. It is to use the crisis to regain control of the country’s huge mineral resources. Venezuela, we should remember, has the world’s largest untapped oil reserves, not to mention untold mineral, gas, water, diamond and other undeveloped resources. Venezuela’s oil was taken back into state ownership by Hugo Chávez in 2005, seven years after he was elected to the presidency in 1998. Something like half a million barrels a day were and still are sold to the United States by the Venezuelan state oil corporation PDVSA via US subsidiary Citgo. Trump’s sanctions are now withholding that revenue.

The potential wealth that lies beneath Venezuela’s surface is the prize that Trump and his special friends in the multinational energy sector are seeking. The weaknesses of the Venezuelan state offered an opportunity to recover that profitable investment – and the promise of Juan Guaidó is that he will deliver it. The central plank of Hugo Chávez’s Bolivarian revolution was to reclaim oil revenues for the state and spend them for the benefit of the majority. That enraged the bureaucracy of a Venezuelan state that had shared those profits among themselves while the lion’s share returned to the home base of the multinational corporations who extracted, refined and sold it. Washington’s hostility to Chávez began when Chávez ended that comfortable 40-year arrangement.

There are other purposes behind Trump’s intervention. One is political – to finally crush the spirit that brought progressive governments to power in Latin America during the ‘pink tide’ of the early 21st century, and thus to reinforce the reactionary wave that has taken power in Chile , Argentina, Colombia and particularly in Brazil with the advent of the neo-fascist Bolsonaro.

The other objective, barely mentioned in the current reporting, is imperialist rivalry. Once, in the nostalgic dream conjured up Trump’s ‘Make America Great Again’ rhetoric, Latin America was the US’s ‘backyard’, its wealth feeding the economic growth of the US at the expense of the populations of the southern republics. Today, the US is not the only vulture hovering over those resources. Over the last 20 years, China has become a major investor and provider of loans to Latin America and especially the pink tide governments. Its total investment in Venezuela is worth $60 billion; the loans, principally for the construction of public housing, are repaid in oil. Chinese multinationals are also investing in extractive industries, oil and mining under extremely favourable conditions. Russia, too, has seen Venezuela as a staging post in its expansion plans in the region. It is not only heavily investing there; it is also providing arms to Venezuela through a recent Military Assistance Agreement. Imperialism is the enemy of the Venezuelan people – but it speaks a number of languages. In addition to its other troubles, Venezuela is now also an arena for inter-imperialist competition. What all the powers involved have in common is a strategy for the exploitation of Venezuela’s resources and those of Latin America more generally; none of them have any humanitarian aims.

Appearance and reality

In the confrontation between two presidential claimants, Guaidó and Maduro, neither represents the interests of the mass of Venezuelans.

Juan Guaidó was a virtually unknown Venezuelan politician until 23 January this year. He is the President (or Speaker) of the National Assembly – a post which, by mutual agreement, rotates between the various right-wing parties that together hold a majority in the Assembly. It is not a directly elected post – though that is never mentioned in reports about him. He is also a member of Voluntad Popular (People’s Will), the furthest right of the parties of the opposition coalition ill-named the Forum of Democratic Unity (MUD) – its members are unable to agree on anything beyond their opposition to Maduro.  Curiously, Voluntad Popular claims to belong to the Socialist International, which led some in the Labour Party to describe it as ‘a sister organisation’. In reality, it is not a social democratic organisation, but a reactionary grouping that backed the violent street barricades that erupted onto the streets of Venezuela between 2014 and 2018, leaving a toll of destruction and death. It is also the party with the closest links to Washington. Its founder and leader Leopoldo López has been in detention for the last four years, but his wife was a frequent visitor to both Obama’s and Trump’s White House, as well as touring right-wing European parties. One consequence of Guaidó’s sudden prominence will be to add weight to Voluntad Popular’s claim to head an opposition in which it has been a minority force until now.

The current National Assembly was elected in December 2015 with 63% of the popular vote. The result was wholly unexpected by the Maduro regime. It was all the more significant because the result did not reflect a rightward shift, but the abstention of two million chavista supporters. It was a protest against the gathering crisis and, as is now clear, a prelude to the devastating current situation. At that time there were already shortages of basic goods, a crisis in the health service and  declining production, as well as huge price rises. Maduro had won the presidential election in April 2013 after Chávez’s death, but with a majority of less than 1% over his right-wing opponent, Henrique Capriles. While the loyalty to Chávez was undeniable among the majority of the population, Maduro’s relentless exploitation of his predecessor’s popularity (he ran and reran Chávez’s speeches throughout the campaign and claimed the dead president sat on his shoulders) did not enable him to repeat Chávez’s 60% majority in the ballot. The Assembly vote came just two years later and marked a further decline in his support. The explanation lay not only in the deepening economic crisis, about which he did nothing at all, but also in the character of his regime, which was becoming increasingly centralised, authoritarian and corrupt, and in which the military were playing an increasing role. The state political organisation – the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) – acted as an instrument of power, distributing rewards, jobs and favours in exchange for loyalty on the one hand, and acting to control and contain local discontents on the other.

The roots of the Maduro state, however, lay in the Chávez period. In 2006, having won his second presidential election by an increased majority, Chávez announced on his weekly television programme the creation of a new party – the PSUV. It would be, he promised, a mass socialist party, democratic in its structures and accountable to its membership. Nearly six million joined in a matter of weeks. Yet what emerged was not a party fulfilling the promise enshrined in the 1999 Bolivarian Constitution of Venezuela, which asserted that the new Bolivarian Republic would be a participatory republic in which the people would be the subjects of the process (‘democracia participativa y protagonista’). Within weeks it became clear that it was a party modelled on Cuba’s Communist Party, which was anything but democratic or participatory. It was a highly centralised, top-down structure, in which the role of the grass roots was simply to acclaim and carry out decisions taken by the leadership.

Chávez’s last document was his Economic Plan for 2013-19 (the‘Plan de la Patria’). In his preface Chávez acknowledged that he had failed to transform the notoriously corrupt Venezuelan state or advance his much proclaimed ‘socialism of the 21st century’. His governments had not undermined the bourgeoisie nor broken its mechanism of power – the state. It was now time, he argued, to ‘pulverise the bourgeoisie’ (his words) and carry out a ‘golpe de timón’ (a ‘turning of the tiller’ of Venezuelan politics in a new direction). In fact, what had happened was that far from state and public institutions becoming subject to control from below, and the system of clientelism and patronage being replaced by accountable institutions, the creation of the PSUV had had the opposite effect. The mass organisations were brought under centralised control and absorbed into the state. The massive state budget and the high oil revenues coming into the country up to 2012 while oil prices remained high produced a new bureaucracy, which claimed socialist credentials and used revolutionary rhetoric, while in reality enriching itself, embezzling state funds, and building a state apparatus to protect its own interests. Many chavista leaders, a majority of whom came from working-class and lower middle-class backgrounds, became very rich very quickly. Chávez’s death and Maduro’s election gave them control of the chavista state. The many dedicated, committed socialists who gave their time and energy to carrying the chavista  ‘process’ forward were increasingly marginalised and silenced.

When the right wing won the National Assembly elections in 2015, Maduro’s reaction was immediate. He declared a state of emergency and ruled through presidential decrees (‘leyes habilitantes’), bypassing the Assembly from then on. The right wing’s only demands were the removal of Maduro and the release of Leopoldo López – their only other policy was, in line with Maduro’s own ambitions, to increase oil production.

The state under Maduro

In his public appearances Maduro always appears surrounded by the military. It is an accurate reflection of the nature of the state he heads. The discourse he uses is full of references to revolution and socialism, and denunciations of imperialism. He still claims the mantle of Chávez, whose promise was to challenge neoliberalism, throw off the chains of dependency, and diversify the economy – using oil revenues to develop domestic industry as well as to create the foundations of a welfare state. His victory challenged a forty-year regime, based on corruption, which had commonly responded with violence to any challenge to its power.

In 2005, Chávez announced the implementation of ‘21st-century socialism’ in Venezuela. In the aftermath of an attempted coup in April 2002, which failed because of the mass mobilisation of poor and working-class Venezuelans in support of him, the Bolivarian revolution moved in a more radical direction, redistributing oil revenues through social programmes and nationalising some enterprises (their owners were paid compensation) but also supporting organs of power at the grassroots. The creation of the PSUV in 2006 claimed to continue and deepen that process, but the reality was that it represented the opposite of participatory democracy. It was a command structure – ideally suited as it proved to Maduro’s strategy. The new state bureaucracy constituted itself as a ruling class, whose political instrument was the PSUV, a top-down structure that distributed favours and fragments of power, and a great deal of money, in return for loyalty. The 2015 election result was a warning from the mass social base of chavismo; the response was to strengthen the mechanisms of control and repression, and to concentrate both political and economic power in the hands of the ruling elite.

This new layer – the ‘Boliburguesía’ as it came to be called – colluded with the Venezuelan capitalist class, while denouncing it in its public rhetoric. The stand-off with the Assembly after 2015 did not affect the currency speculation both groups were massively engaged in; it did not prevent the pillaging of PDVSA as the public sector descended into a spectacular decline. The street barricades continued, it is true; but so too did the meetings between Maduro and leading members of the capitalist class, including the wealthiest of them all, Lorenzo Mendoza of the Polar Corporation. As the oil price fell, and with it the country’s export income, rising inflation – soon to become hyperinflation – affected the majority. Dollars could buy anything – bolivars bought less and less. Goods disappeared from the shops for long periods. Food, building materials, car parts, the absent medicines and drugs reappeared on a black market. The profits were enormous and unaccountable. The main pharmacy chain in Venezuela Farmatodo, for example, was owned by a leading chavista; The shelves in its Venezuelan branches were empty. But as I discovered on a visit to Bogotá, their branches in Colombia had every form of medication freely available. That was just one of many examples.

Yet neither the National Assembly nor Maduro did anything to address the deepening crisis that Venezuelans were facing. No genuine price controls, no attempt to stem the haemorrhage of funds through the exchange system, no anti-corruption measures that were anything other than rhetoric. As the formal economy ceased to exist, corruption oiled the wheels of the black market economy. Loans to the state, whether from China or other external sources, disappeared without trace; public spending contracts generated huge ‘commissions’ – or bribes as we might call them – which could involve anything up to 40% of the total. One fund – Fonden – for housebuilding was financed by China, but published no accounts of its spending; there were some fifty others that operated in the same secret way. Odebrecht, the Brazilian engineering firm that spent $1.3 billion in bribes across the region before it was exposed, was one of the main infrastructure contractors in Venezuela as well as Cuba.

In 2016, the direction that Maduro was taking became startlingly clear, when he announced the Arco Minero project. The Arco Minero covers the Orinoco River Basin and surrounding area, and includes part of the Amazon Basin. It is roughly the size of Cuba, and covers 12% of Venezuela’s surface area. It is astonishingly rich in oil and minerals including gold, copper, antimony, diamonds, uranium. It is the main source of the country’s fresh water. It is also home to a number of indigenous communities whose rights are recognised and protected by the Bolivarian Constitution. Venezuela’s immense oil reserves are there, but the mineral resources have not been exploited. The mining that did go on there before now was small-scale and artisanal; working conditions were appalling and life was very cheap. Chávez had previously discussed a plan for the region’s development after the Canadian multinational Gold Reserve[1]was expelled from the region, but abandoned it. In his 2016 speech Maduro announced that 150 multinational companies (from various countries) had been invited to develop the region’s resources with a promise of long-term tax relief and the construction of infrastructure at the state’s expense. The Canadian corporation was invited back and its disputed demand for compensation agreed.

At the same time, it was announced that constitutional guarantees would be suspended and the region placed under military control. Chávez had rejected the plan precisely because of its constitutional implications and the environmental damage that would follow the renewal of mining, and particularly gold mining whose use of mercury had already poisoned so much of the Amazon basin. Maduro now returned to it. He announced at the same time the creation of Cominpeg, a company to be run by the military out of the Ministry of Defence – but independent of state control. It would be given control of Venezuela’s mineral resources and parts of PDVSA.  There were protests from many quarters, from leading chavistas and trade unionists on the one hand, and indigenous communities and environmental groups on the other. Maduro’s response was the state of emergency in the area and the tightening of military control. The expulsion of local communities began within weeks.

The significance of this decision was profound. In my view it signalled the reversal of the Bolivarian process. However flawed and unclear it might have been, Chávez’s strategy had remained committed to state control of resources and the socialisation of the profits from their exploitation. The Arco Minero project marked the abandonment of that strategy and the privatisation of the nation’s extractive industries. It represented the reversal of Chávez’s strategy, and a return to dependency on the global market. The political consequences removed any lingering doubt. Half of Maduro’s cabinet now came from the military, as did most of the state governors elected in 2017 after a postponed election. The new ruling class Maduro led now directly controlled many key resources and their growing wealth from graft and corruption merged political and economic power. Their instruments were patronage and corruption, the PSUV – and repression.

The deepening economic crisis was blamed on an ‘economic war’. Temporary schemes to hide the crisis included corruption commissions that did nothing, and the CLAPS (Local Committees for Supply and Production), a scheme to deliver basic food parcels to poor districts. These were administered through the PSUV; non-members received nothing, and even those who were eligible were often asked to pay, or found their parcels plundered, when and if they arrived at all. The food parcels simply entered the circuit of corruption. The creation of a ‘Carnet de la Patria’ (National Card) meant, in effect, a loyalty card to the regime. Without it, citizens could not collect any social benefits. Thus the million or so state employees, plus PSUV members and activists, could be relied upon to cheer Maduro to the rooftops at rallies and televised events. Repression, on the other hand, was represented by the cynically named Organisations of Popular Liberation (OLPs) who conducted ‘anti-drug trafficking operations’ in the poor areas. The death toll of young men rose dramatically – but the trafficking continued. In reality the state was running interventions favouring some traffickers over others. The OLPs have now been replaced with a more honestly named force, the FAES (Special Forces), who today are leading the controls at the borders.

I watched footage from the bridge between San Cristóbal and Cucuta in Colombia, where the US has marshalled the trucks carrying its ‘aid’. It is blockaded by armed Venezuelan troops. I couldn’t help but remember the information I had been given a year or two earlier about the number of Venezuelan army lorries passing across the same bridge day after day carrying contraband into Colombia.

Whose crisis is it?

Maduro has denied that there is a crisis in Venezuela in his television interviews for the BBC and Spain’s La Sexta channel. The crisis is real, the hunger is deepening and the lack of medicines has had consequences we can only imagine, though we know that infant mortality is rising and that malaria, a disease once eliminated, has returned to Venezuela. The government ceased to publish any data in 2013.[2]

What are the real dimensions of the crisis? Inflation is set to pass the one million percent mark this year. To translate that into real terms, it means that a monthly wage will buy a tray of eggs, or a packet of disposable nappies (if either can be found). According to the World Health Organisation 61% of the population went hungry in 2017 and Venezuelans suffered an average weight loss of 11 kilos. And that was in 2017. At the same time, industrial production and GDP declined by 45% for 2013-18. Their products were replaced (if at all) by imports, which meant yet another bonanza for importers who bought their dollars from the Central Bank at a low official rate of exchange and then charged for their goods in bolivars at a black market exchange rate a hundred or even a thousand times higher. At the same time, oil production was falling below two million barrels a day, largely due to corruption, mismanagement and lack of maintenance of facilities. The pickings were huge.

The bourgeoisie gathered around Guaidó may claim to have an alternative to offer. But their only demand is for the state to return to their control. Under Chávez and under Maduro they have disinvested from production to invest in the currency speculation industry by becoming importers. Between 2003-13 imports by the public sector increased by 1033%. Imports in general rose in the same period from $14 billion to $80 billion – 70% of those imports were supposedly for industry, yet as we have seen, industrial production has declined catastrophically over these years. Yet in 2018 Minister of Industry Tareck El Aissam announced that one-third of the national budget would be allocated as credits to the private sector. The picture could not be clearer. In a recent article, John Pilger noted that ‘the restaurants in Caracas are full’. That is true and revealing. But who in Venezuela does he imagine eats in restaurants – and does he think they pay their bills on bolivars?

The leading revolutionary activist Roland Denis describes the Venezuelan state as ‘utterly corrupt and living on a revolutionary history transformed into an increasingly clumsy and false religious discourse’. If it has survived, this is for several key reasons. First the creation of an authoritarian state structure administered by a new ruling class that has merged economic, political and military power. That ruling class is committed to reintegrating into a global market as a provider of oil. Secondly, the residue of loyalty to Chávez is still strong and reinforced by a system of patronage. But for an increasing majority life is lived on the edge of the abyss. The third factor is the ineptitude and political weakness of the opposition, which has at no stage offered any policy addressing the economic crisis.  If it has emerged now, it is only as a surrogate for US interests in the region, which reflect those of the Latin American right and European capital.

The demonstrations called by Guaidó have attracted massive support. It should be clear, however, that that is not a reflection of political support for the right. The marches also attracted many among the working class and the poor who are very clear about the interests that Guaidó represents. They are not anti-chavista, but they are bitterly critical of Maduro and the bureaucratic-military class that rules Venezuela today.

When Maduro was elected to the presidency in August, it was with with the endorsement of a Constituent Assembly he had called earlier in the year. Unlike the 1999 Constituent Assembly, which wrote the new Constitution, and whose delegates were elected after widespread public debate, the 2018 Assembly was filled with unelected delegates placed by Maduro and the PSUV. It was an exercise in organised propaganda, not an example of popular democracy in any sense. In the presidential election in August, Maduro won 32% of the electorate – that is, 48% of those who voted. In his last election before his death, Chavez won 62% of voters; in just over five years since his election, millions of chavista voters had abandoned Maduro.  In the last two years, three million people (dismissed by one of the leaders of the state, Diosdado Cabello, as mere ‘followers of fashion’) have fled the country – and they are not by any means just the middle class. The presence of the Special Forces at the borders is suggestive. But more suggestive still is the fact that at no time has Maduro developed strategies to address hunger, or the mounting violence and lawlessness, or the health crisis, let alone the corruption of which he and his family are also beneficiaries. Last August, once re-elected, he announced that there would be a plan, a solution to the crisis. No plan has yet emerged nor policies that might lead to one. But the internal repression has intensified.

What is to be done?

Neither Guaidó nor Maduro have anything to offer the mass of Venezuelans. They are rival factions battling for the profits from oil and the huge benefits that come from corruption. Guaidó has no real social base; the demonstrations are not expressions of support but manifestations of desperation on the one hand, and of the other of rage at the betrayal of a revolution. It is a confusing situation. But the confusion has been intensified by a left outside Venezuela which has accepted and supported Maduro as he sold off the revolution to the highest bidder. Looked at from his point of view, the issue is the survival in power of himself and the profiteers around him. Looked at from the point of view of the Venezuelan working class, which is the only position from which socialists can address the current situation, there is nothing to choose between Guaidó and Maduro. And there seems to be an impasse given the armed forces’ support (until now) for him. The armed forces are defending their hold on political and economic power. With characteristic cynicism the right are offering amnesty for the military – that is, impunity for their economic crimes in exchange for abandoning state power to them. The dilemma for socialists is what the alternative is or should be.

The Bolivarian Revolution was carried to power by mass support of Venezuela’s poor and working class. Their mobilisation and grass roots activism both saved Chávez from the coup of 2002 and built the resistance to the subsequent attacks from the opposition. Their capacity for independent action was the only guarantee of the participatory democracy that Chávez had promised. The creation of the PSUV in 2006 changed that, absorbing those grass roots organisations into the state and disarming and demobilising them. Those organisations barely exist today; but the memory of the experience of mass involvement does still remain. In the medium term, the task must be to rebuild those organisations, and to build solidarity for any and every manifestation of popular, mass resistance that arises – like the recent strikes of nurses, teachers and state employees. To continue to argue for solidarity with a corrupt, authoritarian state that cynically claims revolutionary credentials is to undermine any possibility of a re-emergence of struggle from below.

Our solidarity should be with the Venezuelan people, exposing the lie of ‘humanitarian intervention’, calling for the immediate withdrawal of all troops from Venezuela’s borders. We should be clear where the responsibility for the crisis lies, both external and internal. Solidarity must defend the rights of the Venezuelan people to determine their own future, and contribute to rebuilding their capacity to exercise that right against all imperialisms, against the right across the region and beyond, and against a corrupt ruling class that has profited from their desperation. If there is any form of military intervention, the masses will respond in defence of that right, and the role of solidarity will be clear.

In the immediate term, the Committee for the Defence of the Constitution, which includes leading chavistas from the past, Trotskyists, indigenous and environmentalist movements among its number, has called for a referendum as allowed by the constitution, which would test the attitude of the majority to new elections. It is a limited and inadequate response, but there is no revolutionary upsurge on the horizon. A referendum will at least provide an opportunity for Venezuelans to show that neither Maduro nor Guaidó speak for them, and it will unmask the hypocrisy of both camps. What kind of socialism can it be that does nothing about the hunger and needs of its people and sends trained thugs to fire on them? Beyond empty calls for revolution now, it is hard to imagine any other immediate alternative. But the international left cannot allow itself to continue to provide an alibi for a corrupt ruling class, nor allow it to discredit the idea of a socialism whose most fundamental sense is the struggle to build a just future free of exploitation, corruption and fear.

***

[1] It may surprise people that Canada joined the Lima Group in supporting Trump, who has shown very little affection for Canada. The explanation is that Canada is a major player in the Latin American mining sector. See: Todd Gordon and Jeffery Webber, ‘Imperialism and resistance: Canadian mining companies in Latin America’, Third World Quarterly, 29:1 (2007), 63-87.

[2] In the absence of any available official data I have relied on the carefully researched economic analyses of Manuel Sutherland, a young Venezuelan Marxist. He has recently been fired from his job at the state’s Bolivarian University.

 

One Party in the Age of Two Lefts?

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One of the great challenges to redressing the split between Democratic Party avoiding and Democratic Party engaging socialists, is how to productively deal with a beguiling strategic predilection of the party avoiders. That predilection is to assail the Democrats as socialist spoilers; and while their arguments are not necessarily wrong, the ways they prove them divert many from facing the unity-encumbering dynamics of their left formation-building strategies. Read more ›

Should DSA Endorse Bernie Sanders? A Debate

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Well, it’s happened: Senator Bernie Sanders has declared his candidacy for the 2020 Presidential nomination of the Democratic Party. Seeing a historic opportunity, DSA’s National Political Committee has established an expedited endorsement process. Now DSA chapters all over the country are debating the question, exploring what such a decision would have on the growing socialist movement. Below are two contrasting views on the question: Should DSA Endorse Bernie Right Now? Read more ›

Hungary’s Winter of Discontent

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Ooh the harder they come
The harder they’ll fall, one and all 
– Jimmy Cliff, 1972

Widespread protests in Hungary, against the right-wing, authoritarian and nationalist government of Viktor Orbán, which began in December 2018, continue at the time of writing, though on a reduced scale. The trigger issue was the “slave law”, new legislation permitting employers to ask their workers for 400 hours overtime in a year (up from 250 hours), and moreover allowing this work to be paid up to three years in arrears. The overtime is not compulsory under the law, but workers fear victimisation by their bosses if they refuse.

More generally, the protests have challenged the encroaching control by Orbán and his Fidesz party over the judiciary, the news media and the universities.

Involved in the protests are the Hungarian Trade Union Confederation (MASZSZ) and opposition political parties – and therein lies a huge problem and contradiction. Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary), which came second in the general election of April 2018 taking 23 percent of the vote, is a party with a far-right, even fascist pedigree, though it is now projecting a more moderate image. The Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) is actually a liberal, pro-European Union party with a record of support for privatisation and free market policies.

In late January, workers at the Audi Hungaria motor factory in Győr held a very successful strike that halted production, not only at the Hungaria plant itself, but also at Audi’s plant in Ingolstadt, Bavaria, which assembles cars with engines made in Győr. Audi gave in to the union’s demand for an 18 percent wage rise, a big step towards the longer-term goal of closing the earnings gap with Audi workers in Slovakia and Poland, where wages are 29 and 39 percent higher than the pre-strike rate at Audi Hungaria. This is a wage dispute with the company, not directly part of the anti-government protests. Still, it signifies growing confidence and militancy on the part of the workers.

By some measures, Hungary’s economy is performing well. Annual growth in GDP is currently above 4 percent, while unemployment has fallen to 3.6 percent, from 11 percent in 2010. However, wages are low, which is one reason why many Hungarians have gone abroad to find better paid work. 600,000 Hungarians, or 9 percent of the working-age population, work outside the country. Orbán’s drive to increase working hours is an attempt to solve what is, from the point of view of capitalist employers, a labour shortage, without relaxing his anti-immigration policy.

Viktor Orbán’s “Illiberal Democracy”

Viktor Orbán first made his mark in 1989, at a ceremony for the reburial of Imre Nagy and other leaders, executed after the suppression of the Revolution of 1956. Orbán used the occasion to call for the withdrawal of Russian troops and for free elections. It was a brave speech – one that echoed the initial demands of 1956. Both demands were fulfilled within a year. Originally, his Fidesz was a liberal youth party, but over the years it shifted to the right. By the mid-1990s, he envisaged it as “a modern conservative party”, after the manner of Helmut Kohl’s Christian Democrats in Germany. Since then, Orbán and Fidesz have moved much further to the right.

Orbán’s ideology of “Illiberal Democracy” upholds the nation-state against multinational organisations such as the European Union on the one hand, and individual human rights on the other. It fiercely opposes immigration and multiculturalism. It stresses Hungary’s “Christian identity”, but this is an instrumental version of Christianity in the service of the nation-state, with scant regard for humility or compassion. The notion of “Christian identity” serves also to exclude Muslims as “other”. “Illiberal democracy” extols the traditional family, because the chief purpose of sexuality is to procreate future generations of Magyars. In 2017, Orbán invited the International Organization of the Family, which campaigns against LGBTQ rights, to hold its gathering in Budapest. In 2018, he banned gender studies in Hungary’s universities.

Hungary under Orbán remains a bourgeois democracy, in that opposition parties and trade unions operate freely. However, the government has systematically extended its control over the news media, and the country is saturated by its propaganda.

While Orbán closed his country to real refugees from Syria and elsewhere – he had fences built along the borders with Serbia and Croatia to keep them out – he has declared a welcome for racist “refugees” from more multicultural countries in Europe. In foreign policy, he has called for an “anti-immigration axis” within the European Union, including Italy and Poland alongside Hungary. (The use of the word “axis” has sinister resonances, particularly in Hungary, a country that allied with Nazi Germany in the Second World War).

“Illiberal democracy” includes at least an undertone of antisemitism. Orbán has praised Miklos Horthy, Regent of Hungary from 1920 to 1944, as a great statesman – despite Horthy’s involvement in the mass deportation of Jews to the Nazi death camps. In December 2018, the business magazine Figyelő published a cover showing Andras Heisler, president of the Hungarian Jewish Federation, amid a shower of banknotes. The magazine alleged that Heisler was involved in financial mismanagement. Whether the allegations are true or false, corruption is widespread in Orbán’s Hungary, and Heisler was singled out and depicted in an antisemitic manner.

After graduating from university in 1987, the young Viktor Orbán worked part-time for George Soros’s Open Society Foundation. In 1989, he went to Oxford University on a Soros scholarship – returning to Hungary for the end of the state-capitalist single-party state system that went by the name of socialism. Today, Soros has a starring role in Orbán’s ideology as the arch-enemy and hidden hand behind the protests. One government mouthpiece said: “These protests are being organised with George Soros’s money, so that they can turn Hungary into an immigrant country”.  In the words of one protester: “Personally I don’t care about George Soros… but I hate that some people believe that Soros is the only reason for our problems”.

In 2017, the statue of Marxist philosopher György Lukács (1890 – 1971) was removed from St Stephen’s Park in Budapest. This was followed by the closure of the Lukács Archives – in the face of widespread protests in Hungary and internationally. This is all part of the drive to impose ideological conformity on Hungary.

The wheel of history may be turning. Viktor Orbán, who once spoke out against a waning dictatorship, now finds his own grip on power shaken by protests from below.

Originally posted on the International Marxist-Humanist website.

Just Collapse!

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Sudan. The endless lines outside bakeries and gas stations suggest an almost willful naiveté about the dire economic and political situation. The Kafkaesque bureaucratic system requires an element of nepotism to vitalize it into animation. The lack of cash in banks, and the depreciation of the local currency force the people to convert and conserve money. The increased taxes on the average citizen and the tax cuts for those associated with the government produce distrust and disgust directed towards the state. The secret services arbitrarily arrest of persons who display even the slightest antipathy towards government doctrine and use gulag-like hidden torture prisons. All these phenomena, and others, have converged, and the implosion of this concoction manifests as a wave of zealous, righteous indignation that overwhelm every Sudanese person. There is a rumble in the atmosphere that can be felt all over the country. The echo of gun shots and tear gas booms ripple to the furthest corners of Sudan. From the naming and shaming of secret service officials on social media, to clashes between citizen and government, it’s a full-blown revolution!

Why? And why now? These conditions are by no means new to Sudan. The brutal tactics of the secret services were on gory display during previous protests, and the increased prices and scarcity of gasoline has been a reoccurring motif in northern Sudan since the split of 2011. The currency depreciation, though it is at its nadir, was already on a downward trajectory. There was always a vivid understanding of the corruption in Sudanese politics. I remember talking to a rickshaw driver last summer; naturally the final subject matter of the conversation was politics. My question, perhaps simplistic, was “why do the Sudanese people not revolt?” To which the rickshaw driver answered “to what end? To end up like Egypt or Syria? We know the situation is bad, but what happens when someone inherits a 30-year corruption debt, and what if the new president is as corrupt or worse?” There seemed to be a synergy of political awareness among those I talked to; the response was mostly similar to the rickshaw driver’s.

So, what changed? The frailty of the economy finally gave way, and it collapsed. Simply. It is no longer financially sustainable to work traditional professions in Sudan. During one of my patience-building exercises of queuing up for hours, sometimes days, in the gas lines of Khartoum, Mohammad, a child of nine years, came up to my window selling chewing gum. I was curious as to why he was still in the street at 11 pm, and where his parents were or siblings. Mohammad told me that, even though his father worked as bureaucrat and his mother was a teacher, he needed to sell all the chewing gum he had before he could return home and buy flour to make Kisra or Gurasa breads. It’s perhaps important to note that it was Mohammad’s summer holidays. In the not so distant past, a bottle of water used to cost one Sudanese pound; today it’s 12 pounds, with no increase in salaries. Beyond that, if you had money in the bank, you could not withdraw; opportunistic black-marketeers would stand outside banks and buy checks at 80% of their value.

The causes of the crisis are multiple, from the 1989 coup d’état to the 1997 embargo. Beyond the overt aetiology, I believe there are three complex happenings that may have aided in actualizing today’s reality in Sudan. First, the fragmentation of Sudanese society; second, mass migration of the middle class; and finally, the dependence on expatriates to stimulate the economy. Of course, this is not to remove any blame from the current government, or to in any way obviate accountability with determinism.

In Sudan, the fragmentation of society, ethnically and socioeconomically, insured the continued rule of the National Congress Party. The wars against South Sudan and west Sudan, and the propaganda programs helped in dividing Sudan to the point of splitting the country. These tactics also privileged a certain narrative that promoted the interest of the northern Arabic ethnic group in Khartoum. Today in Sudan, wealth and power is not spread equally; instead it is concentrated in a single ethnicity. The longer the current government remains in power the smaller the circle of privilege becomes. In recent years even the northern Arabs have felt the brunt of economic decline.

With the effects of economic decline being felt by most, highly skilled workers and professionals find themselves in a precarious situation, in which the inevitable collapse will lead to unemployment, regression, and pay cuts. Today, university professors earn less than $200 a month, where 15 years prior it was $1,000 plus. These deteriorations forced the middle class and the privileged to quickly migrate for better opportunities. This mass exodus marked the obliteration of the middle class, which had two effects on the socioeconomics structure of Sudan. Firstly, in place of the former middle class came the unqualified and unprofessional, who were not capable of performing the work of their predecessors. Thus, when the wife of the minister of health fell ill, the minister arranged for her to be treated abroad. Secondly, the gap between poor and rich became vast, and any person outside the umbrella of governmental privilege faced insurmountable obstacles, from arbitrary taxation to racketeering.

The expatriated professional middle class were successfully employed and managed to integrate into other societies, even creating small cohorts in major cities, i.e. London, Doha. With their financial ability, they would spend summers and other holidays in Sudan, more often than not, even send money to relatives and friends in Sudan. With the lack of production opportunities and skilled capabilities, there is nothing to stabilize the currency. The money spent by expatriates in Sudan, and sent to family and friends, is a major stimulus to the economy. The government relies on this stimulus so much that expatriates have their own bureaucratic system (the Organization of Expatriates Affairs, Khartoum), among other exclusive privileges. Due to the excessive corruption in the country, money from potential economic enterprises or foreign aid from other countries was devoured by government officials.

This dependency on expatriate cash flow proved to be destructive. Unlike the Philippines or Egypt or any other countries that have relied partially on expatriate contributions, Sudanese expatriates were not enticed with financial incentive schemes. On the contrary, expatriates are exposed to ‘special’ taxes, a targeted tax plan that exploits that bracket of Sudanese society. In addition to the special taxes, sending money to Sudan costs half the sent amount through conventional channels; the black-market values the dollar at 70 Sudanese pounds if you’re paying by check, and 80 if paying by cash. However, the official price, that is not even used by the government, is 40. All in all, the currency has three values, or more: cash price, check price, and transfer price. In recent years, the expatriates, having integrated into other societies and created a homey atmosphere there, and because of corruption, have become more and more reluctant to splurge in Sudan. Consequently, this has led to further economic disarray.

Today’s protest slogan in Sudan is “Tsgut Bss!” This translates as “Just collapse!” It seems to me that the political awareness shown by the rickshaw has been overwhelmed by dire economic realities, where the cost of one piece of bread today is the same as a sandwich, a soda and a cigarette not ten years ago. I would imagine if I asked the rickshaw driver the same question today, he would reply with “Tsgut Bss!” I occasionally find myself thinking about Mohammad, from the gas station; does he sell chewing gum every holiday, or even throughout the year? Or where would he be if we did not have a failed government? Or what if one day he needed more than flour? Or what if something sinister happened to the child in the dead of night – would his family even know what happened? All things outside his control.

 

The Decline and Fall of Neoliberal Hegemony

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In his scathing, Sturm und Drang takedown of the 1851 French dictatorial coup, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoléon, Marx remarks that history repeats twice: “the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.” Thus when Luther pit himself against the Catholic establishment, he put on, according to Marx, “the mask of the Apostle Paul.” Likewise, the French Revolution of 1789-1814 “draped itself alternately in the guise of the Roman Republic and the Roman Empire.” And to Marx’s chagrin, the latter guise, in particular, enjoyed a revival under Louis Napoléon Bonaparte, who drew on it relentlessly to rationalize his retconning of the Napoléonic legacy.

Marx, in his essay, focuses understandably on the evocations of the past that had acquired political significance in France. But while France continues, even to this day, to be partially gripped by nostalgia for the revolutionary heroism requisite to the establishment of an ostensibly neo-Roman Republic, in the years from 1979-2007 the Anglo-American world, skewing toward unfettered free markets, came to embrace its own brand of historical nostalgia: that of the English Enlightenment. Against the evils of the growing welfare state, what became known as neoliberalism governance was initially invoked as a return to a laissez-faire order dominant throughout the 19th century. To this day apologists like Samuel Gregg argue that the night watchmen state of the 19th century Anglo-American world left markets alone to bring about an unmatched order of global prosperity and development. This ideal order was challenged by re-distributive efforts through the mid 20th century, and only began to gain traction again in the 1970s and ’80s when intellectuals like Friedrich Hayek and politicians like Margaret Thatcher surged to popularity and power.  By the 1990s, with the establishment of international legal regimes via institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), neoliberalism seemed unstoppable. Indeed, figures like Francis Fukuyama famously declared the “end of history,” arguing that neoliberalism’s triumph was so complete there could be no genuine competing ideologies.

Of course all good things must come to an end. Since the “Great Recession” of 2007-08, neoliberalism’s popularity has been waning across the globe. Right wing populists-what we have elsewhere called post-modern conservatives-are emerging across the globe to challenge its internationalism, fetishism of the market economy, and tendency to engender mass migration and cultural change.  Many neoliberals have expressed surprise at these developments. They were confident that the Hayekian gambit they staked the international order on-that the mass of people would accept massive inequality and social transformation in return for a gradually improving standard of living-now seems like a bust.  Some might attribute this development chiefly to the impact of the Great Recession, which destroyed millions of lives across the globe. And indeed, we do not intend to undervalue the Recessions impact as a catalyst. But it is essential to understand that the failings of neoliberalism run much deeper.  It was characterized by an array of internal contradictions that, indeed, have the air of farce.

To show why, we will begin by demonstrating the superficiality of neoliberal ideology, even relative to the Enlightenment forebears they invoked but rarely appreciated. This is an aspect of a broader project to demonstrate why neoliberal doctrines were riven by intellectual failings and practical challenges from the get go, which were often masked by their transient success as a system of hegemonic global governance. Looking at where neoliberal authors were blind to problems figures like Smith understood can demonstrate why it is faltering as a capitalist project even on its own terms.

Neoliberalism and Classical Political Economy

“Whenever the legislature attempts to regulate the differences between masters and their workmen its counsellors are always the masters.  When the regulation, therefore, is in favour of the workmen, it is always just and equitable; but it is sometimes otherwise when in favour of the masters.”

            Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations

While the ideas of Hayek and Milton Friedman indeed bear a superficial resemblance to those of Enlightenment thinkers such as Adam Smith, their efforts to cast themselves as their successors are, in a crucial sense, disingenuous. In this short article we will focus on describing the difference between the work of Adam Smith and Friedman. This is because few authors better highlight the distinction between the comparative rigor of classical political economy, even when endorsing nascent capitalist dynamics, against the more stridently ideological accounts of the neoliberals.

In the Wealth of Nations, Smith, while supportive of the liberalization of laws impeding trade, insists on the importance of the role of government in complimenting the function of the market. Smith, a beneficiary of the rich intellectual climate of eighteenth-century Scotland—itself in large part a product of the Scottish government’s levying of taxes to finance schools, including for the poor—argued that governments should pay for the construction of, among other things, schools, bridges, and roads. He also makes the point throughout the text what has been described as the “invisible hand”—the capacity of individuals to enhance the welfare of the collective through the pursuit of their own ends—can only manifest within a society in which the authority of the private sector is held in check, due to the fact that its interests are “always in some respects different from, and even opposite to, that of the public.”

In the hands of Friedman, Smith’s ideas undergo a considerable metamorphosis. For while Smith stresses the need for intelligent private sector regulation, Friedman, by contrast, espouses something closer to a free market absolutism—one limited only by his call for a negative income tax to ameliorate extremes of poverty and his acknowledgement of the occasional need for public sector monopoly, as in military defense (though even this Friedman blames on socialists, in the form of “the threat from the Kremlin”). Barring these exceptions, in Friedman’s view, seemingly all forms of government-provided social security and regulation—from social housing to state licensure—can be either privatized or abolished. In an effort to reinforce his claim that the private sector is far more efficient than the public one across virtually all sectors, Friedman also attempts to disprove what he views as the foundational myth of the American welfare state by alleging the Federal Reserve severely mismanaged the money supply during the Great Depression. This argument, however, is highly selective and revisionist: while Friedman blames the Great Depression on the Federal Reserve’s allowing of the money supply to fall by one-third from 1929-1932, he fails to examine the significant role played by the Roosevelt administration’s 1934 Gold Reserve Act in expanding the American money supply.

Friedman’s commentary on the New Deal is by no means the only part of Capitalism and Freedom that is deeply flawed. In the seventh chapter of the book, “Capitalism and Discrimination,” Friedman argues that the free market is a socially equalizing force due to its indiscriminate nature, and that minorities wrongfully “attribute to capitalism the residual restrictions they experience rather than to recognize that the free market has been the major factor enabling these restrictions to be as small as they are” (an utterly hilarious notion, given that Friedman here appears to be pitting his book against the actual political experience of all social minorities). There is something to be said for this argument—one not so dissimilar to Marx’s claim that the “the bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations.” But by making the sweeping assertion that “the preserves of discrimination in any society are the areas that are most monopolistic in character, whereas discrimination against groups of particular color or religion is least in those areas where there is the greatest freedom of competition” Friedman 1) classifies all governments as de facto more discriminatory than the private sector, and 2) treats the question of “freedom of competition” ahistorically. The problems with this are manifold. As for point 1) it is clear that, in many cases, governments have been able to successfully counteract private-sector discrimination, as is witnessed, in an American context, by the large number of African-Americans who found employment with the American government due to its relatively aggressive enforcement of fair employment practices after the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Regarding point 2), it should be remembered that the principle of “freedom of competition” is often used to uphold policies which are explicitly discriminatory in nature (just consider the ‘right’ of slave-owners to hold slaves as property prior to the Emancipation Proclamation!).

Another problem of Friedman’s analysis is the way that he, like many neoliberals, condemns government intervention—yet is nevertheless willing to take credit for all of the positive gains it’s accrued. This is in sharp contrast to Smith’s position in The Wealth of Nations. Smith was far more sensitive to the way in which government often played a fundamental role in securing the rights and property of capital, often through dramatic and unwarranted intervention.  As the quote at the start of this section indicates, he felt this was a disaster. It meant that capital was able to use government to secure its interests, often at the expense of their workers and the population as a whole. This is part and parcel of why Smith believed the state may have a crucial role to play in assisting workers to ensure they had opportunities for flourishing outside of work, and also is foundational to his arguments for breaking up monopolizing tendencies where they arise. Contrast this with the comparative silence of figures like Friedman when government efforts succeed in ameliorating the conditions of the worst well-off, with the often shrill reaction which occurs when redistributive efforts harm the interests of capital even marginally.

For instance, Friedman argues that there is “drastically less inequality” in “Western capitalist societies like the Scandinavian countries, France, Britain, and the United States” than “in a status society like India or a backward country like Egypt” (and, Friedman speculates in lieu of data, maybe even in Russia). Yet so far is this is true, it would only be the case, historically, due to the combination of developed capitalist industry and redistributive measures imposed by the government (keep in mind that when Friedman wrote Capitalist and Freedom, the highest marginal tax rate in the United States was 87%). Similarly, Friedman notes that while John Stuart Mill remarked in 1848 that “mechanical inventions [have not yet] lightened the day’s toil of any human being,” the “chief characteristic” of “progress and development over the past century is that it has freed the masses from backbreaking toil and has made available to them products and services that were formerly the monopoly of the upper classes, without in any corresponding way expanding the products and services available to the wealthy.” But it never occurs to Friedman, even fleetingly, that the capacity of the populace at large to enjoy the wealth created by more advanced capitalist production may owe to the adoption throughout the developed world of more extensive redistributive measures. Adam Smith, let alone Karl Marx, would certainly not have been so blind.

Conclusion: Neoliberalism, Post-Modern Conservatism, and the Contradictions of Praxis

There are many more contradictions that could be dissected with Capitalism and Freedom—just one of several canonical neoliberal tomes. But in sum, we can say that Capitalism and Freedom contributed to the reinforcement of two significant economic fallacies which have been devastating in practice. The first of these is that lowering taxes would not lead to significantly heightened inequality; a point Friedman makes repeatedly throughout the text. The second is that the pathway to development lies in a program of full-scale deregulation. The latter notion, in particular, came to influence the ‘free trade’ frenzy of the eighties and nineties, as nations both rich and poor eagerly ceded portions of their sovereignty to wed themselves to transnational trade agreements, on the basis of the belief that they only stood to benefit.

On the proving ground of reality, however, both these assumptions proved problematic. On one hand, it’s clear that the lowering of tax rates in the Western capitalist nations described by Friedman—as well other factors, such as anti-inflationary monetary policy and a lowered birth rate—has indeed contributed to a significant rise in inequality, with nations such as the United States and the United Kingdom now backsliding into Dickensian disparities between rich and poor (and facing correspondent political destabilization). On the other hand, the irony of international free trade is that the countries that have most succeeded in enriching themselves—such as Japan and China—have maintained varyingly stringent regimes of capital controls to prevent national income from falling considerably below GDP (or in other words, to prevent foreign takeover leading to the excessive payment of rents abroad). By contrast, regions such as Africa—which lacked the sovereignty to impose said controls—now must contend with a full-blown neocolonialism; one in which as much as 40-50 per cent of all manufacturing capital is foreign-owned.

No surprise, then, that the public of the Western capitalist nations at large—no longer able to bask in the credit bubble that sustained their living standard prior to 2008-09—are suffering from deep neoliberal fatigue. While the turn towards post-modern conservatism as an alternative is deeply disturbing, it is not entirely surprising. As observed by Slavoj Žižek, the left must recognize that, beneath the banality of its xenophobia, lies, and vulgarity, post-modern conservatism can initially propose policies which seem attractive to individuals who have suffered under neoliberalism and its contradictions.  Trump, for instance, frequently criticizes the liberal economic programs supported by so-called ‘elites.’ Leftists must understand this if they are to fully grasp the initial appeal of post-modern conservative doctrine.  Where we need to be critical is observing that, even where they propose superficially attractive policies, many of these figures have little intention to implement progressive measure.  In practice, Trump’s domestic policies, such as ending Obamacare and lowering tax rates, disproportionately favour fiscal dumping, and thus the jet set class he regularly rails at. Only on the question of foreign trade—beholden as it is to a system of regulations that nations like China have deftly exploited to prevent foreign annexation—has Trump, likely sensing the diminishing gains associated with it, elected to upset the Republican status quo (fixating on the gamesmanship of other countries also helps Trump, as Thomas Piketty has observed, distract from his plutocratically-directed domestic policies). Post-modern conservatives are a false solution to real problems, and can only be counted on to deliver a politics of dishonesty and division. Only a genuine progressive alternative can provide true solutions to the contradictions engendered by neoliberal doctrine and policy.

The liberal economic policy dreamt up by the English Enlightenment ended in tragedy—a dramatic heightening of industrial productivity coupled with the impoverishment of the populace at large. This conflict was only subdued with the foundation of the welfare state. More recently, the existence of the social state helped prevent the ’07-’08 recession from becoming a re-run of the Great Depression, as regular state payments and stimulus packages aided in offsetting the impacts of a pervasive confidence failure. Neoliberal hegemony, then, ends in farce: as a diminished force within an economic establishment that’s only managed to save itself through bathing itself in the chilly waters of socialization.

Cedric Johnson and the Other Sixties’ Nostalgia

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There is something politically familiar in Cedric Johnson’s two essays in Catalyst (Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2017) and New Politics (No. 66, Winter 2019). Because his political conclusions are very general, even vague, ones that build “on broad solidarity around commonly felt needs and interest” … by ”building alliances not on identity as such, but on shared values and demonstrated commitments” (Catalyst 2017: 84) it is difficult to put one’s finger on just what the precise political and social conclusions of his essays are. Yet, despite the rejection of sixties’ nostalgia, the elegance of the language, and the contemporary originality of his arguments and supporting evidence there is the ring in Johnson’s two essays of a familiar sixties’ politics that sought to be the alternative first to militancy in the movement and later to Black Power “back in the day.”

This was a politics that downplayed the significance of race as a dividing line in working class life and American society in general without denying the reality of racism in the aftermath of the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964. Simultaneously, it substituted the trade union bureaucracy for the working class in the practice of “building alliances” in its version of “coalition politics.” It was associated above all with A. Philip Randolph and Bayard Rustin, two of the best-known African Americans in this country’s civil rights, labor, and socialist movements. These important figures are mentioned not only in Johnson’s Catalyst essay, but by Touré Reed as well in his New Politics contribution—though only in the post-Civil Rights Act phase of their political careers. Indeed, I have recently run across this reference to Rustin and the sixties a number of times in the on-going debate over the relevance and weight of race and class in left political analysis and practice. I will return to this below.

Much of what Johnson says about the failures of Black Power and the cross-class nature of Black America then and now is true and has been analyzed by others, such as Manning Marable (Black American Politics, Verso, 1985) among many. Johnson’s argument are, of course, more up to date. I will not attempt to present a different analysis of “black exceptionalism,” as he calls it, but rather an analysis of Johnson’s implied political direction. What I will call “the other” sixties nostalgia. But first, a look at the reality of “hyperincarceration” on which much of his argument is based.

Locking up by class and race

The criminal “justice” system has always been a class project under capitalism with its central foundation of exclusive private property and the need to protect it. This is as true in countries that historically have had no significant racial minorities as in those that did. Indeed, in the case of the United States, if the criminal “justice” system did not lock-up offending or misbehaving white people, it would be of little use to capital. At the same time, of course, it is very selective of which white people are most likely to be arrested, tried and incarcerated. Misbehaving bankers who ruin the lives of millions by breaking or bending the law are more likely to get a bonus than a sentence, while white working-class offenders who rob or harm individuals or small businesses get the slammer. Case closed? It might be if the working class of the United States was not so racially diverse, structurally unequal, locked out of whatever channels of upward mobility there once were, and forced to compete with itself for jobs, housing, education, and much else even more intensely than in the pre-neoliberal era. Just who, then, gets incarcerated in the US?

First, it is important to distinguish between prison and jail.[1] Those in jail account for about a quarter of all those incarcerated at about 740,000 in 2016. The incarceration rate (inmates per 100,000 US residents) in jail for blacks was three-and-a-half times that for “non-Hispanic” whites, while that of (non-white) Latinos was 50% greater. This is already a sure sign of unequal treatment given that non-Hispanic whites compose 60% of the US population, blacks 13% and Latinos 18% with the rest mostly other people of color and a small number not identified by race. But jail is not the heart of today’s carceral state. Over half (55%) the jail population turns over every week and the average stay is 25 days. At the heart of hyperincarceration are the federal and state prisons where those sentenced do “hard time”, with the average stay in a state prison running 2.5 years. It is here too that in 32 states the death penalty applies.

The table below shows the prison population for 2016. What we see is a wildly disproportionate representation of blacks, Latinos, and other people of color composing together almost 70% of the prison population. Behind this disproportion lies the highly discriminatory practice of sentencing. Here blacks are almost six times and Latinos three times more likely to be sentenced to “hard time” in prison than whites. These disproportions have been increased somewhat by the introduction in the last twenty years of algorithms for the targeting of police operations such as PredPol and sentencing such as LSI-R which are widely used across the US. These probability-based algorithms not only incorporate the (mostly unconscious) biases of their designers and programmers, but worse still create mathematical feedback loops that increase the targeting of black neighborhoods and, hence underplay the frequency of similar crimes in white neighborhoods. The same biased feedback loops operate in sentencing algorithms. So, while Non-Hispanic whites were 34% of prison inmates in 2006, they were down to 30% a decade later. Note here that no one involved in the digitalization of criminal “justice” was required to be a raving racist, believer in white supremacy, to have voted for Donald Trump, or even necessarily to be white. The racial bias had been built into the system long ago, “blind” administration, and now technology were sufficient to perpetuate and even intensify the racial bias.

Population of Federal and State Prisons by Race and Ethnicity, 2016

Race                                        Population                  %                    

Total                                       1,459,533                    100%

Non-Hispanic White            440,200                       30%

Black                                         487,300                       33%

Latino                                       339,600                       23%

Other*                                       192,433                       16%

* Mostly Native Americans, Pacific Islanders, Asians, and a small number of those not designated by race.

Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics (2018) Prisoners in 2016.

That these figures are in part the result of the War on Drugs, zero tolerance policies as well as “broken-windows” law enforcement is true enough. That black middle-class professionals and politicians played a contradictory and even reactionary role in demanding or developing these policies, as Johnson argues, is undeniable—although it is most certainly a subordinate role in terms of federal and state policy and practice. Indeed, whether in the old ghetto or today’s leafy black neighborhoods, the black middle class and petty bourgeoisie have always played a contradictory role in the long struggle for black freedom. None of this refutes the existence of both underlying structures of racial inequality or the practice of racism in the criminal ”justice” system as countless studies have shown. It is also the case, as Johnson points out, that black working-class people in today’s black “exclusive class zone” (Catalyst 2017: 83) have demanded the police protection they are routinely denied. Given the outsized presence of the police in stop and frisk, drug sweeps, the deployment of militarized SWAT teams, and other operations in poor black neighborhoods, this itself is quite a comment on the racially selective class nature of policing today. Stopping, frisking, harassing, arresting and incarcerating disproportionate numbers of black males is not the same thing as providing protection to the majority of black residents.

The escalation of incarceration is not simply a matter of controlling the “surplus population,” as Johnson argues. It is, as I stated above, a class project, but one with racist assumptions and practices. Those who are sentenced to prison are not primarily from the “surplus population.” In fact, nearly two-thirds of the prison population were employed prior to incarceration. 49% of all prisoners were employed full-time and another 16% in part-time work before entering prison, while another 8% were students, retired, or permanently disabled according to a study by the National Center for Education Statistics. To be sure many of these jobs would have been poorly paid, and some who held them had probably moved in and out of the labor force, but only 19% of prisoners in 2014 were unemployed at the time of incarceration. Johnson’s inclusion of low-paid workers in the “surplus population” or reserve army of labor dismisses its functions in capital accumulation and becomes too broad a group to have much meaning.

The functions of the “surplus population” or reserve army of labor is to depress wages by increasing competition, as Johnson points out, but also to provide a pool of available workers to fill the entry slots in new or growing industries in accordance with the needs of capital accumulation. Today, this would include industries such as healthcare, hospitality, food service, warehousing, etc. To fulfill these tasks those in the reserve army must be either unemployed, between jobs, or “not in the labor force”, including women doing family care. Some students and retired people can fill in part time jobs as well. If employed workers are counted as part of the reserve army, however, the 28% of those employed who earn below the poverty line or possibly the 30% of the workforce that draws on some form of government aid in order to get by (percentages that would be significantly larger if only working class employees were counted) are included along with the millions of unemployed and those “not in the labor force” or marginally attached to it, the concept would be a useless analytical tool.

The conclusion that race and racism are major factors in determining who does “hard time” in prison, just as they strongly influence who gets the worst jobs and who faces racial harassment and even violence on-the-job no matter what it pays is simply unavoidable. Every year some 90,000 cases are filed with the EEOC the majority of which deal with race and mostly come from employed workers. This does not include court cases, grievances filed over racial harassment or discrimination, or the countless numbers of those in employment who suffer in silence. Johnson is right that Jim Crow is not an apt name for the subjective, structural, institutional, material, and political forms and underpinnings of racism as they have evolved since the civil rights era and deepened with the advent of neoliberalism. But race, unscientific category that it is, remains a major basis, cutting across class, for sorting out of who gets what in American society. To reject this reality is not to adopt a class perspective, but on the contrary to reject the working class of this country in all its actually existing inequality, diversity, and increased competition.

The “other” sixties nostalgia or choosing the wrong Randolph and Rustin

As noted above, Johnson and a growing number of others who favor what they believe is a class orientation and reject “identity politics” have referred to the political direction proposed by Bayard Rustin and A. Philip Randolph in the mid-1960s—what I call the “other” sixties nostalgia. Both are important figures in US history and their politics deserve reviewing. The problem here is that their politics changed in important ways at a crucial point in the development of the long black freedom struggle and neither their previous views on black self-organization nor the cross-class direction they proposed in the wake of the passage of the Civil Rights Act receive the attention they require by those who cite their post-1964 coalition politics. In light of the debate on race and class today we need to look at their views on both black self-organization and coalition politics as they evolved.

Randolph was a self-proclaimed socialist and a longstanding advocate and practitioner of black self-organization that frequently excluded whites and put forth demands relating specifically to blacks, as well as a believer in working class solidarity and advancement. The Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and Maids was an entirely black union, though one supposes if there had been any white porters or maids (a very unlikely possibility at that time) they could have joined the union. When Randolph organized the first March on Washington movement in 1941 (with Rustin’s aid) to demand black jobs in the nation’s growing defense industries, however, he insisted that it be an “all-black” movement that excluded even white supporters. In announcing the planned march Randolph stated:

On to Washington, ten thousand black Americans…We will not call on our white friends to march with us. There are some things Negroes must do alone. This is our fight and we must see it through. (Herbert Garfiled (1969) When Negroes March. New York: Anetheum)

To the disappointment of many the march scheduled for July 1, 1941 was canceled when Roosevelt signed executive order 8802 establishing a “fair employment practices committee” to prevent discrimination in defense and government employment. Many felt 8802 was inadequate.

In the 1950s, Randolph organized the Negro American Labor Council (NALC), again an exclusively black organization, to fight specifically for the rights of black workers in the labor movement. The NALC was itself an umbrella organization of black caucuses that existed throughout the labor movement long before anyone had spoken of “black power,” much less “identity politics”. This included black caucuses in industrial unions such as the United Auto Workers and the United Steel Workers where, in both cases, blacks were largely excluded from skilled trades jobs despite (or because of?) the liberalism of the unions’ leaders.

Randolph and the NALC did constant battle throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s not only with George Meany and the exclusionary building trade unions but with liberals and the social democratic leaders of the garment unions as well. He was routinely attacked as undermining class solidarity, advocating dual unionism, and practicing “racism in reverse”. To these charges Rustin, then an aid to Randolph, replied in 1961 “Under present conditions—i.e., general segregation and discrimination, and the unreliability of today’s organized (or disorganized) liberalism—the Negro finds it necessary in many instances to organize independently.” Was this “identity politics” without the label? Or was it the recognition that in the struggle for black freedom and equality black self-organization was an indispensable tool even (or perhaps particularly) where unity and solidarity with whites was expected as in the labor movement but often denied?

Less than four years later Rustin was singing a different tune in his influential essay “From Protest to Politics” published in February 1965 in Commentary as well as in the subsequent articles cited by Johnson. In all of these Rustin argued for the strategy known as realignment already advocated by some socialists, notably Michael Harrington. The vehicle for and object of this realignment was, of course, the Democratic Party. As Rustin put it in the 1965 essay:

The future of the Negro struggle depends in whether the contradictions of this society can be resolved by a coalition of progressive forces which becomes the effective political majority in the United States. I speak of the coalition which staged the March on Washington, passed the Civil Right Act, and laid the basis for the Johnson landslide—Negroes, trade unionists, liberals, and religious groups.

Apparently, by that time the liberals, including yesterday’s discriminating white labor leaders had become “dependable.” In fact, the coalition Rustin described had already begun its disintegration as the movement reached a crossroads spurred by the dramatic events of 1964. These included the explosive campaign led by King and its repression in Birmingham, Alabama; the first of the urban riots in Harlem; the passage of the Civil Rights Act; and the rejection of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party’s (MFDP) at the Democratic National Convention at the hands of not only Lyndon Johnson, but the very liberals and union leaders who were supposed to be the major elements in this “coalition of progressive forces” that Rustin, Harrington, and others saw as the key to realignment. In “From Protest to Politics” Rustin defends the “compromise” offered the MFDP delegates as a victory.

Realignment as an electoral strategy was always a top-down project in which liberal office holders and pressure group advocates in the Democratic Party dominated and labor leaders were the junior partners who substituted for the working class or even the union membership. “The politics of insider negotiation” Johnson says Rustin later developed (Catalyst 2017: 66) were not an aberration in this version of coalition politics, but the modus operandi of the realignment strategy from the start. This was a political method that led to an alliance not just with liberals but with none other than George Meany, the labor leader who refused to endorse the 1963 march on Washington, backed the 1964 rejection of the MFDP delegation, and with whom Randolph had crossed swords just a couple of years earlier. That, in turn, led Rustin to support the war in Vietnam and later to oppose affirmative action in the building trades. It was never a class orientation, but an effort to make one of the nation’s pre-eminent cross-class, bourgeois-dominated institutions stand in for actual working-class political organization and even for a social democratic politics the Democratic Party was incapable of adopting.[2]

The rejection of the MFDP by Democratic big wigs, liberals, and labor leaders and the humiliating “compromise” they offered the black delegation was central to the new direction SNCC activists, most visibly Stokely Carmichael, would take in the next couple of years. Though the slogan “black power” would not be publicly articulated by Carmichael or anyone else until the spring of 1966, the idea that the civil rights, non-violent (or in Rustin’s terms “protest”) phase of the movement had reached its limits, and that deeper forms of power were needed to advance the interests of the black population were becoming universal. Rustin proposed one version, Carmichael and others another, Martin Luther King, Jr. still another a little later in the form of the Poor Peoples’ Campaign that led to his fatal presence in support of the Memphis sanitation workers’ strike. This latter direction being the closest to a genuine class politics.

The great irony of all of this is that by the late 1970s all the currents in black and coalition politics regardless of label or intention—the opportunist urban politicians, the “poverty pimps” of the short-lived War on Poverty and its community control aftermath, most of the Black Power (capital B, capital P) militants, and the top-down realigners—all ended up in the same place: the Democratic Party. That is, the party that escalated the War in Vietnam, that began its long journey to the political center and beyond in the mid-1970s, abandoned urban aid in the 1980s in tandem with Reagan, ended “welfare as we know it” and escalated the carceral state under Clinton in the 1990s, and deeply disappointed those who believed that “Yes, we can” under the neoliberal leadership of Barack Obama.

In the last couple of years, the unexpected, unprecedented campaign of Bernie Sanders for the Democratic presidential nomination, the growth of DSA, and the election of democratic socialists Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (AOC) and Rashida Tlaib to the House of Representatives along with a number of like-minded leftists to lesser offices all as Democrats have helped to revive the effort to move the Democratic Party to places it has never been. Among those places where it once was under pressure of a massive labor upsurge now revived with a Green prefix, of course, was the other major source of social democratic nostalgia, the New Deal—the severe class and racial limits of which Dan La Botz and Mia White point out in their articles (New Politics No.66, Winter 2019). This recent resurrection of “boring within” the Democratic Party, without the anachronistic “realignment” branding to be sure, has been given even further encouragement by the apparent adoption of some left demands such a Medicare for All, Federal Job Guarantees, the Green New Deal, etc. by some of the candidates for Democratic presidential nomination besides Bernie. The genuine threat and practice of the Trump Administration adds fuel to this fire.

With this renewed hope has come a demotion of race as a subject of socio-economic analysis in the name of class that is, in reality, a return to America’s quintessential business-funded, neoliberal-dominated, undemocratic, cross-class social construction: the Democratic Party. As a Marxist who has put class at the center of my analyses over the years I naturally believe it will take more than the efforts of black Americans, or even blacks and Latinos combined to end economic and racial inequality. It will take a class-based movement and politics, with socialist politics at its center. But I also have seen both first hand through involvement in the civil rights and labor movements as well as through study and research that embedded racism requires the self-organization of the oppressed to shape or supplement the broader programs in such a way that that they do not simply reproduce racial inequality in new, sometimes less visible forms as they often have in the past; e.g., in the New Deal and the post-WWII GI Bill, etc.

Among other things, the geographic reality of de facto segregation means substandard education, housing, food, and services for blacks, along with punitive welfare and policing operations. Medicare for All, Federal Jobs Guarantee, a decent minimal or living wage, and a Green New Deal are all things we must fight for and that would improve the lives of everyone. But as they fail to alter the geography of race and leave the delivery of services and the content of jobs in private/capitalist hands, racial and gender discrimination, harassment, and violence, along with unequal implementation, delivery, and administration will remain embedded if not specifically rooted out. These “universal” programs also leave the harassment, bullying and violence that blacks experience in the workplace, “be their payment high or low” in the hands of managers who tolerate these even when they don’t actually participate in them—hence the 90,000 EEOC and countless law suits filed each year. Liberals, social democrats, and even unions have repeatedly failed to address these consequences of racism when oppressed people have not fought militantly for such change or when they have been too poorly organized or too weak to enforce it.

The sixties failed to produce the sort of class-based politics and political organization capable of brining serious social change. Nostalgia for that era cannot be a guide to the tasks of the present and future. As one who supported (and supports) the right of black self-organization and worked in coalition with the Panthers in Brooklyn in 1968 (a largely positive experience), I don’t mind saying that this goes for the hope that something like the Black Panther Party will “Save Us Now.” But it also goes for the more active contemporary fantasy and alternative bit of nostalgia that coalescing in the Democratic Party will be the salvation for a left long in the wilderness but now growing again. This time, we need to take both class and race seriously.

[1] All figures for jail and prison are from 2018 US Department of Justice reports. In these reports an important distinction is made between those considered “white” and “Non-Hispanic Whites” which gives a clearer picture of the role of race.

[2] One of the best answers to Rustin’s “From Protest to Politics” at that time appeared in New Politics (Vol. V, No. 4 (Fall 1966), pp. 47-65) by its editor Julius Jacobson under the mocking title of “From Protest to Politicking.”

 

The Angst of the 1%

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The New York Times (1/22/19) reported on a bleak letter by the billionaire investor Seth Klarman that was circulated at the World Economic Forum in Davos.  The letter warns about the coming financial crisis amid increased levels of social conflict. Read more ›

DSA’s Growing Pains

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Barely five years ago, if you asked someone where a new U.S. socialist movement might appear, I would wager that nearly no one would have said with the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA). Before 2016, DSA’s profile was largely that of a paper organization—a kind of socialist AARP that made it an unlikely candidate for a revitalized left. And yet, DSA is now an organization of over 55,000 members. Read more ›

A Preview of “What is Post-Modern Conservatism?: Essays on Our Hugely Tremendous Times”

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What is Post-Modern Conservatism: Essays on Our Hugely Tremendous Times is going to be released later this year by Zero Books.  Read more ›

Beyond The Nation State: A Critical Look At Venezuela’s Current Crisis

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Venezuela has made headlines in the last few weeks, as Venezuelan opposition leader and National Assembly head Juan Guaidó has declared himself interim President, throwing the country into turmoil. Current President, Nicolás Maduro has called the effort a coup. Meanwhile, thousands of people have taken to the streets on both sides, with a death toll of 26 and rising. The Trump administration, many Western European countries, and the right-leaning bloc of Latin American governments have recognized Guaidó as the legitimate president of Venezuela.  Meanwhile Russia, China and others are backing Maduro. A third bloc, most notably Mexico and Uruguay, are calling for a peaceful transition through new elections. Read more ›

Lyndon LaRouche

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When Lyndon LaRouche’s disciples began setting up literature tables at American airports in the late 1970s, his conspiracy theories were already in full bloom, though not yet widely known. The same might be said about his claim to the title of “world’s greatest economist” — or the urgency of his followers about putting him in the White House. He was, in short, an unknown quantity to all but a very small segment of the American public. And that is perhaps the most difficult thing to imagine about him now.

For most of the past four decades his name has been a byword for “the paranoid style in American politics”; his ideology, a punchline in search of a joke involving the Queen of England. Both the reputation and the mockery were richly merited and are sure to continue posthumously.

But with the barrier between fringe and mainstream now so porous that Alex Jones is a widely recognized media figure — and the New York Times Book Review publishes a famous novelist’s celebration of an author preoccupied with the influence of lizards from another dimension on world culture — it’s worth recognizing that LaRouche’s career involved more than embodying the archetypal kook. In his prime LaRouche, with his bow-tie and Boston Brahmin accent, cultivated the demeanor of a distinguished professor. Those behind his literature tables might have been taken for graduate students — as, indeed, many of them had until recently been. The books and pamphlets on offer (mostly written by LaRouche himself) put forward an agenda that was pro-nuclear, anti-feminist, prone to a sly bits of antisemitic innuendo, and rather viciously homophobic. But what really stood out were the bumper stickers. “Feed Jane Fonda to the Whales” read one of the most popular. Another said, “More people were killed at Chappaquiddick than at Three Mile Island.” The sarcasm was quite effective at liberal-baiting (not then the focus group- perfected science it has since become) and it won LaRouche a hearing — perhaps especially from the constituency soon to be known as Reagan Democrats.

For thirty years LaRouche called himself a Marxist economist, in ways tending to imply that he was the only real one. And while he stopped doing so around 1978, he retained one guiding concept: the constantly expanding forces of production. That meant new technology and new energy sources (especially nuclear fusion) and a strengthened infrastructure grid. All of which would require crash development programs under a leader who was part Renaissance man, part technocrat. The list of candidates for that position had just one name on it.

Many of LaRouche’s policies, at least, held a certain appeal, even if voters were not exactly swept away by his presidential campaigns. In 1986, the Wall Street Journal published as credible “the estimate that LaRouche-related entities are spending $25 million to $30 million a year worldwide, the majority of it in the U.S.” Some of the funding came in by swindling senior citizens, and woe to the supporter who bought a LaRouche publication with a credit card. But the worst of the white collar criminal activity came after the movement had built up, if not a political base, then at least a clientele interested in its ideas. And one that reached beyond the U.S. Beginning in the late 1970s, the movement’s publications present one photograph after another of LaRouche meeting with business leaders, diplomats, and heads of state around the world, often while touting crash economic development programs.

LaRouche-movement events held in Washington, DC routinely drew staff from various embassies who, to judge by their questions and comments, clearly regarded him as a kind of philosopher-statesman-in- exile. After witnessing it a couple of times, I was relieved to hear a story about LaRouche’s meeting with Indira Gandhi told by some of his disillusioned ex-followers. The world’s greatest economist could scarcely resist discussing India’s affairs as viewed through his patented kaleidoscope of conspiracy. At a suitable moment Gandhi extricated herself, and was heard telling her assistants, “Don’t let that crazy man near me again!”

This is how one prefers to imagine someone like LaRouche will arrive on the political scene: recognizably florid, and quickly to be removed. But even he was once an unknown quantity.

 

[Picture from Dennis King’s site]

Who’s for a Palestinian State?

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Labor Party leader Avi Gabai is right when he says: “The peace process vis-à-vis the Palestinians is interesting only for people over 50.” “Do you think,” he told his supporters, “that people care about a Palestinian state when [President Mahmoud] Abbas is irrelevant and does not even come to negotiate?” There is no reason young Israelis should care about a Palestinian state when their Palestinian peers have stopped believing in it. Abbas is irrelevant not only to Israelis but to Palestinians as well. With ample help from President Donald Trump and the Israeli Right, the Palestinian state has received a pauper’s funeral. Read more ›

Defend Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib!

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The vicious, dirty – and bipartisan – smear campaign against the first two Muslim women in the U.S. Congress, Ilhan Omar (MN) and Rashida Tlaib (MI), is just beginning. No one should imagine that Rep. Omar’s dignified apology for her tweets about the Israel lobby, which have been willfully twisted to accuse her of “anti-Semitic tropes,” will put an end to the attacks on her – or that Rep. Tlaib’s calling Donald Trump a “motherf****r” is what anyone is really upset about. Read more ›

On Alfonso Cuarón’s “Roma”

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On finishing a particularly annoying novel, a good friend of mine once gasped in exasperation: ‘The author’s fingerprints are all over this.’ I can’t say I remember now the book he was talking about, but the phrase has been with me ever since, because it encapsulates certain writers so perfectly.

Read more ›

Trump Takes Another Step Toward Authoritarian Government

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Socialists must organize a national movement against Trump’s national emergency. Read more ›

Peel Back Tulsi Gabbard’s “Progressive” Veneer

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Tulsi Gabbard is getting a pass from people who should know better, first from Glenn Greenwald and then from the folks at Democracy Now! They describe her as “progressive except that some leftists on some issues say…” Read more ›

The #MeToo Movement in the Middle East

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The #MeToo movement against sexual assault and rape has animated women throughout the world.  In the Middle East too, despite the wars led by authoritarian states, various imperialist powers,  and extremist religious fundamentalist forces, a #MeToo movement is rising. How is this movement expressing itself? Below we will take up nine countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Read more ›

As Macron Prepares New Repressive Measures, Yellow Vests and Red Unions Strike Together

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On Tues, Feb. 5, as the Macron government pushed harsh repressive laws against demonstrators through the National Assembly, the Yellow Vests joined with France’s unions for the first time in a day-long, nation-wide “General Strike.” Read more ›

The Exploitation of Part-Time Teachers in Higher Education

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A message put forward in our capitalist society is if people get a college education, they will likely get better-paying jobs. However, there are many with college degrees who endure insecure working conditions and are poorly compensated. They include part-time teachers in institutions of higher education, most of whom have advanced degrees. According to the American Association of University Professors, part-timers hold over 65% of faculty positions in two-year institutions and almost 50% at master’s and baccalaureate institutions.  They, along with adjuncts who teach full-time, make up over 70% of the instructional workforce in higher education and teach more than half the undergraduate classes in public institutions.[1]  A third of them make less than $2,000 per class.[2]  Many live in conditions of poverty  and rely on public assistance.[3]

In her 2015 Atlantic article, “There Is No Excuse for How Universities Treat Adjuncts,” Caroline Frederickson points out,

“Based on data from the American Community Survey, 31 percent of part-time faculty are living near or below the federal poverty line.  And, according to the UC Berkeley Labor Center, one in four families of part-time faculty are enrolled in at least one public assistance program like food stamps and Medicaid or qualify for the Earned Income Tax Credit.”[4]

A key reason why many part-time faculty live in poverty is due to the weakness of workers and their unions. For many years, the pay of workers has not been keeping up with increases in the cost of living despite gains in worker productivity. [5] The weakness of labor has been aided by government policies favorable to the rich that in the case of college teachers, are enforced by school administrators and, unfortunately, too often aided by leaders of teacher unions.

Capitalism and Exploited Part-Time Teachers

Successful business owners in a capitalist society must maximize profits to foster growth through the accumulation of capital. For most businesses, exploiting workers–paying them as little as possible (which could be costly if there are few workers with needed skills,) and getting them to work as hard as possible increases potential profits.

Exploited teachers do not necessarily directly produce what Marxists would call surplus value, the basis for profits. However, they play a vital role in reproducing the system. They train the future workers with skills wanted by business. They also pass on the class-based capitalist culture that helps to create conditions in which workers can be effectively dominated and exploited. Additionally, they train the future managers and supervisors of the system–even future owners.

Many educators endure the same forms of worker degradation and domination by management described by Harry Braverman in his book Labor and Monopoly Capitalism. Administrators of schools will act to cheapen labor costs by enforcing policies to increase teacher productivity which is the teaching of classes with more students.  They also help in the undertaking of efforts to standardize what is taught rendering teachers more easily replaceable.  Administrators will also help with the introduction of cost saving technology to replace the paid work done by teachers.

Corporate-minded managers of teachers treat education like an assembly line–with teachers adding value by processing students through their classes. Management will assert that success is achieved when students end up as finished products—exploitable, compliant and obedient workers with a set of skills needed by business, or employees who can oversee and enforce the exploitation of others.

Management of higher educational institutions will act to hold down costs by hiring part-timers. From where do they find these teachers? Many have been “produced” by graduate programs. Those overseeing these programs justify their existence by enrolling an excessive number of students, many of whom seek to become full-time college teachers with tenure. Graduate students and recent graduates who have a goal of holding a secure full-time tenured position are more than willing to take on what they believe is temporary work as underpaid part-time teachers. Unfortunately for many, that full-time job with tenure will never be offered. Even if that ideal job is acquired, it may not last long.

Part-time Faculty

There is much variety among those who teach part-time. They can include retired full-time faculty returning to teach a class or two. In the past, part-time faculty were often educated wives of university tenured professors or, as is true today, people who had outside jobs and expertise.[6] The latter’s presence in the classroom is sought to provide students with knowledge from those with practical experience in particular fields. Their teaching work is a side job usually done for satisfaction, often at a low rate of pay that is not vital for their well-being.

Today, many part-timers work as teachers is their primary source of income.[7] Educational institutions have become increasingly dependent on a part-time workforce. The use of part-timers lowers a college’s operating costs. For example, many part-timers are not provided with office space. They will resort to using the trunk of their car for storing materials they need in order to do their job.

The lower cost of part-timers frees up money that can be used to hire more administrators, for financing new facilities and to increase the pay of full-time faculty to secure their loyalty.[8]

Frederickson describes the changes taking place at colleges as more full-time adjuncts and part-timers are hired.

“In 1969, almost 80 percent of college faculty members were tenure or tenure track. Today, the numbers have essentially flipped, with two-thirds of faculty now non-tenure and half of those working only part-time, often with several different teaching jobs…That colleges and universities have turned more and more of their frontline employees into part-time contractors suggests how far they have drifted from what they say they are all about (teaching students) to what they are increasingly all about (conducting research, running sports franchises, or, among for-profits, delivering shareholder value).”[9]

There are other incentives for hiring part-time teachers besides their lower labor costs. Part-timers tend to be heavily compliant workers. They have been “trained” in the system and generally accept its protocols and procedures that include respect for the existing institutions and the authority of those above them. Many part-timers avoid exercising their right to academic freedom. They will not risk losing work by expressing unconventional ideas that they believe people in positions of authority will find controversial, unacceptable or unprofessional.

Part-timers are a flexible workforce that is hired only when needed. They can be easily and quickly dismissed. They are qualified to teach the classes assigned. The grades they give students are as valid as those given by full-time tenured professors. The tuition charges and the money generated based on enrollment are the same whether a class is taught by a full-timer or part-timer.

Many part-timers are passionate about being teachers. They are often willing to make great efforts and many sacrifices to keep their insecure positions. They can be taken advantage of because many are hoping to be considered for that “ideal” full-time, well-paid, tenured-track position, and will volunteer to do extra unpaid administrative work.

Educational power hierarchies reinforce the subordinate position of part-timers. Within an educational institution, most power rests with the administration. Among educators, the remaining power is mostly held by full-timers with tenure who are involved in hiring, supervising and evaluating part-timers and non-tenured track full-time adjuncts. Adjuncts and part-timers do not hire, supervise and evaluate full-timers. Instead, they are highly dependent for their jobs on the goodwill of their full-time “colleagues.”  Furthermore, their subordinate position is reinforced when, as happens at many colleges, they are not invited to participate in faculty meetings and are the first to lose their jobs when management declares there is a budget crisis requiring cuts.

Unfortunately, some part-timers themselves, especially if they seek to move ahead, or are close to management, aid and abet this exploitative system.

Hierarchies exist among part-timers and create divisions that management can use to its advantage. Part-timers who have put in many years at a college generally have greater job security. They may have contracts that guarantee work for more than one term, or they benefit from a modest seniority system that guarantees their job over a less senior part-time faculty member. However, more “privileged” part-timers continue to be vulnerable since other part-timers can be hired to take their jobs at a lower rate of pay.

The Role of Unions

Unions are vital for improving the living standards and providing greater job security for workers. Without unions, workers would receive lower pay and benefits, be more dominated, endure inferior working conditions, and have less secure jobs.

Unfortunately, many teacher union leaders too often place a greater emphasis on helping the administration achieve its goals even when their goals are contrary to the interests of teachers, especially part-timers. These goals include keeping costs down, increasing productivity through the use of fewer workers, and maintaining labor peace.[10]

The recently retired communications director of the California Federation of Teachers (CFT) reflects this mindset of wanting to maintain stability in the workplace. In a column he authored before the Los Angeles teachers strike, he characterizes the states in which there were wildcat teacher strikes in the first part of 2018 as “less enlightened…right to work states” with “abysmally poor funding for education.”[11]  For him, these states had not caught up with his apparent model, California.  He contends that California, with its “collective bargaining laws,” has not had “a sustained wave of public employee militancy” in 40 years. Instead, it has had “public workplace stability,” something obviously desired by management.

California has what he states are “relatively strong education unions.” Yet, the conditions of part-time faculty have remained unjust. Voters in California approved a union sponsored tax bill in 2012 that was renewed in 2016 that the CFT claims is raising some $6 billion annually for public education and is supposedly preventing a “return to austerity.”[12]  However, many teachers, especially part-timers, represented by CFT locals have levels of pay that have not kept up with increases in the cost of living. (See appendix #1) [13]

Union Leaders’ Claims vs. Reality

Many teachers, including their union leaders, tend to see themselves as embracing social justice, fighting for equality and working on behalf of students who may face great obstacles in life. At their union meetings, they will encourage the passing of resolutions in support of organizations struggling for social justice throughout the world.

However, too many unions and their leaders make little or no effort to end the inferior treatment of part-time faculty members. An example is my own local union affiliate of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), AFT 2121. It represents faculty at the two-year community college, City College of San Francisco (CCSF) in a city overwhelmingly dominated by the Democratic Party that is known as a “union town” with politics considered far to the “left” of most of the rest of the country.

Past struggles of part-timers at CCSF have resulted in them having some job security protections and in being among the highest paid part-timers in the nation. For example, in 2017 in the nearby Contra Costa district, part-timers were paid $74.19 per hour in the classroom while those at CCSF were making $104.95.[14]  At City University of New York whose part-time faculty are also represented by an AFT affiliate, average pay for one teaching a three unit class is $3,500.  By contrast, at CCSF, the starting pay for a part-timer teaching a three-unit course is over $5,400 and can be over $8,000 for those who have taught at the college for more than 20 years.

Nevertheless, the pay and benefits part-timers at CCSF receive illustrate AFT 2121’s shortcomings.

The leaders of AFT 2121 assert that they favor equal pay for equal work meaning part-timers should receive the same rate of pay per class as full-timers.[15] AFT 2121 leaders endorse candidates for office such as Jane Kim (who ran for mayor of San Francisco in 2018) who, in response to a union questionnaire, stated, “Part-time faculty should have pay commensurate to full time faculty and be paid equal pay for equal work.”[16]

However, in recent contract negotiations, the union leadership has not put forward demands calling for equal pay for equal work.[17] This results in management not having to resist movement towards equal pay for equal work since the union leadership itself is helping to perpetuate the unjust and unequal treatment of part-timers.

The union leadership will state that the pay of part-time teachers at CCSF is 86% of that received by full-timers, not 100%, because full-timers, unlike part-timers, are expected to do additional work for their department and serve on committees.[18] However, when teaching, some full-time and part-time teachers put in many more hours than others for which they are not paid. Some full-timers, especially once they get tenure, do little besides teaching. When doing committee work, some are active participants and put in many hours while others will get credit for doing this work even if all they do is to passively sit through meetings.

Furthermore, some full-timers take on additional tasks to line themselves up for higher-paying jobs as administrators. They may even end up siding with management over the interest of teachers in order to secure a promotion into an administrative position. Paying these full-timers at a higher rate than part-timers is unjustified.

Many part-timers adhere to an unwritten rule that they must do unpaid administrative work in order to be seriously considered for a full-time position.

Almost all CCSF part-time teachers’ actual pay is much lower than 86% of what full-timers with the same educational level are paid. Full-timers move up the pay scale every year they teach. By contrast, part-timers move up every two years. The part-timer may start the first year at 86%, but that percent will soon decline. After ten years, the pro-rata percent is under 73% with the full-timer’s pay increasing by over $2,400 per three-unit class taught while the part-timer’s increase comes to less than $1,000. (For more details, see appendix #2.)

Over time, the work of part-timers compared to full-timers becomes relatively cheaper. Meanwhile, the college receives the same amount of money from the state whether a class is taught by a part-timer or full-timer. Were the college a business, over time, the part-timer’s labor that is similar to a full-timer’s labor generates more profits for the business.

Unequal Benefits and Unfair Burdens

Additionally, part-timers at CCSF lack many of the benefits provided to full-timers. Unlike full-timers, they do not receive retiree health coverage, paid sabbaticals, and life insurance.  Full-timers receive disability insurance.  Part-timers must pay for it.

If part-timers teach at least 50% of the class units taught by a full-timer, they are eligible for the same medical benefits as full-timers. However, to pay for this benefit, part-timers have the same amount of money taken from their pay as do full-timers, paying a larger percent of their lower income.

The percent of part-timers receiving medical benefits has declined from 50% in 2012 to 32% as of 2017 when fewer part-timers were employed.[19]  AFT 2121 favors a single payer medical system.[20]  However, its leaders have accepted the college reaping significant savings from fewer part-time faculty having medical coverage.  During the 2017-18 contract negotiations, union leaders failed to demand increases in the number of part-timers receiving medical benefits. Those demands could have included a call to lower the required units taught before one is eligible for medical benefits and to insist on coverage for those receiving it the previous term.

Part-timers at CCSF are more burdened when paying union dues. Dues are a regressive flat 1.5% of one’s income no matter how much one earns. Those least able to pay have to pay at the same rate as those making more money.

Upon retirement, full-timers will have greater economic security from larger pensions that are based on one’s earnings.  Lower paid part-timers will presumably have to work longer because, with lower payments in retirement, they will less likely be able to afford to retire.

Over time, taking benefits and pay into account, the total value of the salary and benefits package of part-time teachers relative to full-timers at CCSF is much below 86%, perhaps closer to 60%.

Lack of Job Security

Part-timers’ job security is far inferior to that of full-timers. At CCSF and at other colleges, full-timers are guaranteed a full schedule before any part-timer is assigned a class. When the administration at CCSF cuts a class of a full-timer due to low enrollment, the current level of pay is not cut. The full-timer is expected to teach an additional class in the future or do other acceptable work.  By contrast, a part-timer losing a class due to low enrollment loses pay and will not be given an additional class to teach in the future.

In many colleges, full-timers losing a class due to low enrollment have a bump right that allows them to take over and teach a scheduled class of a part-timer even after the part-timer has spent unpaid time preparing to teach the class.

At CCSF, when the previous contract was being negotiated in 2015, the administration announced plans to cut 25% of the scheduled classes at 5% per year over the next 5 years. These cuts would be predominantly absorbed by part-timers.  The union president said the planned cuts could not be negotiated—that the decision to cut classes is a prerogative of the administration.[21]

In other words, union leaders did nothing about the planned loss of work endured by the people they supposedly represent who pay union dues. Nevertheless, despite members losing work, union leaders declared the negotiated contract a “victory.”[22]

The leaders also touted how everyone would receive a pay increase.[23]  However, they did not acknowledge that part-timers losing classes, or even their jobs due to class cuts, would make less income.  These part-timers could have been doing better before this pay “increase” because they were teaching more classes.

Latest Faculty Contract at CCSF

In 2018, a new contract was negotiated. The leadership described the contract and its ratification as

“a great victory for public education and the entire San Francisco community. We are so happy that this will help our faculty continue to do the jobs they love and serve our students and all of San Francisco….We want to thank the Board of Trustees, the Chancellor and the District Negotiations team for working with us.”[24] (emphasis added)

Absent from this happy talk was an honest discussion of the contents of this contract.

Once again, the needs and interests of part-timers were largely disregarded even though they make up over 60% of the faculty. The contract resulted in increasing the pay gap between full-timers and part-timers, and also between the highest paid full-timers and more recently hired full-timers. (See appendix 3)

By not putting forward demands in negotiations and struggling to reduce unequal pay for the same work, union leaders like those in AFT 2121 could “be considered complicit in a violation of Human Rights.”[25]

Union Dues Enrich Union Officials

Much of the union dues paid to one’s local that is part of a national union end up being transferred to the union’s state and national organizations.  My own local’s fiscal year 2014 tax return shows that $1.03 million in dues was collected and over $730,000 was transferred to the statewide CFT and the nationwide AFT.[26]

The transfer of dues paid enables many top officials in the national and state union organizations to have large salary packages. In 2015, six top officials in the CFT each received salary packages in excess of $270,000.[27]  In 2016, AFT president Randi Weingarten’s pay package was for over $510,000, up more than 10% from the previous year.[28]

The leaders’ salary packages are being partly financed by impoverished, job insecure, part-timers and far exceed what most teachers earn. According to the National Education Association, the average public school teacher made $59,660 in 2016-17.

Troubles Ahead

Labor unions have been under attack for years resulting in fewer workers belonging to unions. A recent assault on public unions came with the June 2018 Supreme Court Janus decision. It eliminated the requirement that all public employees represented by a union, even those who are not members, pay fees/dues to the union.  Now, only union members will pay dues resulting in unions collecting less money and presumably becoming weaker unless every worker joins the union.[29]

Adding to the woes of teacher unions would be planned class cuts as are happening at CCSF and described in AFT 2121literature as, “massive.”  Class cuts will result in a further loss of dues revenue since faculty income that determines the amount of dues  collected will be lower.[30]

Obstacles Facing Part-timers

Part-timers need to be organized to struggle if they want to improve their conditions. However, they face many obstacles. They are often isolated from other faculty. Part-timers may have few, if any, connections or means to communicate with other part-timers. They frequently do not even know others teaching in their own department. Many teach in more than one college and have little, if any, time to devote to job-related struggles at a single college.

The working conditions, level of pay, and job security of part-timers can vary greatly and give rise to divisions among them. Some part-timers have reliable relatively higher paid jobs for many years while the most marginalized are given one class for only one term, and will not be hired to teach at the particular college again.[31] Many part-timers, facing difficulties supporting themselves and their families, will give up trying to work as teachers.

Part-timers are under tremendous pressure to not be involved in any activity around improving their conditions. By being active, they may put in jeopardy both their current employment and future employment when they need recommendations from where they previously worked.

Many faculty members, including part-timers, see themselves not as workers but as professionals who should have little involvement in union activities. They view unions as service agencies and not as organizations that struggle with management to secure better conditions for their members.

Part-timers seeking to improve their situation could benefit from the support of full-timers. This support is often not forthcoming.

Tenured full-time faculty are privileged compared to most workers. They do work that can be satisfying, enjoyable and stimulating. They have much job security and some autonomy. Their income is higher than that of most workers. Many full-timers see little reason for challenging management on any issue. Some full-timers hold attitudes of superiority over part-timers, even viewing them as losers.

Recently at CCSF, management has not needed to resort to creating more divisions between full-timers and part-timers. Many full-timers at CCSF view their relatively low pay (until the newest contract) compared to full-timers elsewhere as resulting from “overpaid” part-timers. They will even claim the union is too focused on championing the interests of part-timers!

An ongoing problem for organizers is that many faculty are unmotivated or legitimately claim they are too exhausted or too busy especially if their work load has been increasing.

Organizing Part-Timers

All of the above is not to make excuses, but to acknowledge the great difficulties faced by those trying to organize part-time faculty members.  Part-timers wanting to improve their conditions must struggle and change power relationships by building alliances with supportive full-timers, students, staff, and community members.

Key to making favorable changes is the formation of a core group of part-timers who are united around what they want. This core group needs to repeatedly assert their interests and put forward their demands. Other part-timers will support them since all want to be treated equally, and with dignity and respect.

The core group must both communicate with their supporters and integrate them into the core group. Members must be able to make decisions about goals and strategies in contrast to having decisions handed down as happens too frequently in unions. When members own the decisions made, they are more likely to struggle to implement them.

Over time, organizing beyond a single school or district will be necessary for success.  Building more effective regional, statewide, national and even international organizations beyond what currently exists is needed.

Demands to Put Forward

Job security and equal pay and benefits for equal work are at the heart of part-timers’ demands. Part-timers having the same seniority and tenure rights as full-timers should also be demanded so that a part-timer with more seniority than a full-timer gets class and scheduling priorities before a full-timer with less seniority does.

Principles of equality are violated when part-timers are exploited and treated as second class faculty members. Only when part-timers get organized and struggle can they bring an end to their exploitation.

[1] See California Federation of Teachers and Adjunct Faculty, Facts, and Characteristics of Postsecondary faculty.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Gee, Alastair, Facing Poverty, Academics Turn to Sex Work and Sleeping in Cars, Guardian 9/28/2017.

[4] Frederickson, Caroline, “There Is No Excuse for How Universities Treat Adjuncts,” The Atlantic, Sept. 15, 2015.

[5] Desilver, Drew, “For Most Workers, Real Wages have Barely Budged in Decades,” Pew Research Center, August 7, 2018, and “The Productivity-Pay Gap,” Economic Policy Institute, August 2018.

[6] Fredrickson op. cit.

[7] American Association of University Professors: Trends in the Academic Labor Force 1975-2015,   Chart, Background Facts on Contingent Faculty Positions

[8] Fredrickson op. cit. From this article:

“Even while keeping funding for instruction relatively flat, universities increased the number of administrator positions by 60 percent between 1993 and 2009, 10 times the rate at which they added tenured positions… So while college tuition surged from 2003 to 2013 by 94 percent at public institutions and 74 percent at private, nonprofit schools, and student debt has climbed to over $1.2 trillion, much of that money has been going to ensure higher pay for a burgeoning legion of bureaucrats.”

[9] Ibid.

[10] Gordon, Craig, “Which Side Are Union ‘Leaders’ On?” Counterpunch, 4/27/2018.

[11] Glass, Fred, “United Effort of Striking Teachers and Parents Can Raise Pay, School Quality,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/14/2018. Glass goes on to write that this view “misses the bigger picture” that includes “the resurgence of progressive political activism following Donald Trump’s election.”

[12] See CFT publication California Teacher, April-May 2018 pgs. 2, 13, 14.

[13] Even with California’s “relatively strong education unions,”  and $6 billion more in funding for public education, the February-March 2018 issue of the CFT’s own publication,  California Teacher, indicates that California ranks 43rd in preK-12 per pupil funding. And this is happening in a wealthy state dominated by elected Democratic officials, many of whom the CFT endorsed.

See Baum, Rick, “California Democrats Starve Public Education,” Counterpunch, 9/17/2015 and What Can We Expect From the Democrat “Alternative” Given Their Record in California?, Counterpunch, 11/19/18.

[14] See here, pp. 7, 8. Faculty in the Contra Costa district are represented by an independent union. When I taught in that district more than 25 years ago teaching classes about democracy in the United States, a vote on any matter cast by a part-timer counted for one-third. UC Berkeley is at the upper end of part-timers pay with starting pay at more than $8,500 per class.  However, most teach only one or two classes a term. See Burawoy and Johnson-Hanks, Second Class Citizens: A Survey of Berkeley Lecturers, pp. 8, 10.

[15] An AFT 2121 Bulletin dated April 23, 2018 sent out to members covers a 2002 parity agreement “defining part-time pay equity under California’s “equal pay for equal work” statute as 100% pro-rata.”

[16] http://www.aft2121.org/wp-content/uploads/Jane-Kim.pdf  p. 5. Labor contracts in California community colleges are negotiated in each district resulting in differences in pay and benefits for the same work within the state.

[17] The AFT 2121 sunshine document contained this statement: “Move towards pay equity for assignments currently paid less than 100%, such as lab, part-time…” Absent from the salary proposal put forward in negotiations was a provision for pay equity. see here and union salary proposal, Full AFT 2121 salary proposal.

[18] The AFT 2121 leaders do not publicize that the pay of part-time counselors and librarians start at 100% pro rata before declining. They have made no effort to bring part-time teachers to this level.

[19] Stand Together—The Only Way Forward, 5/30/17.

[20] Who Stole My Raise? 2/7/18

[21] Something to be thankful for: Union power!? AFT 2121 CCSF Pres Says Union Can’t Strike Over 26%,” YouTube, December 13, 2015. The union president’s remarks begin around 4:00.

[22] CCSF Faculty Reach Tentative Agreement with CCSF District Administration, 7/13/16.

[23] Faculty Union, CCSF Administration Reach Tentative Contract Agreement, 7/24/16.

[24] 94%!! Faculty Overwhelmingly Ratify Contract. 5/19/18. 421 faculty voted.  There are more than 1,300 faculty members.

[25] COCAL Proposal to End Contingency: Contingent Faculty Bill of Rights, 12/26/2016.

From page 6 Equal Pay. “The principle of “equal pay for equal work” shall be honored. All faculty shall be compensated according to a single salary schedule that recognizes length of service and professional development. If the disparity in tenured and non-tenured compensation rates are so significant that equal pay cannot be implemented in a single budget year, a multi-year phased-in solution shall be permissible.”

From page 7 Unions. “A union has the obligation to honor its duty of fair representation, which means calling for equality in working conditions. When a union does not strive to defend equal working conditions for those for whom it represent or favors one class of union member over another class of union member, that union shall be considered complicit in a violation of Human Rights.”

[26] See tax returns, p. 18 of the 2013 tax return, p. 17 of 2009 return.

[27] start here, click 2015 tax return, see p. 26.

[28] Foundation Center, p. 36, and Foundation Center, p. 30.

[29] In September 2018, the AFT 2121 leadership claimed “membership has grown to an all-time high of 88%!” However, unless they raise the size of the deduction for dues or the pay of members increases, the union will be receiving less revenue.  AFT 2121 Members in Action.

[30] Our concerns about class cuts continue.

[31] I taught at Chabot College for four terms. Towards the end of my time teaching there, I discussed with my department chair my future work prospects. With great indifference, she told me that there is no work. And this is a person who had a copy of the Marxist classic, Monopoly Capital, prominently displayed on her bookshelf!

______________________________________________________________________________

Appendix #1

Pay Lags Behind Increases in the Cost of Living

Below are the California State Chancellor’s salary figures for faculty members working in three community colleges in the San Francisco Bay Area that are represented by AFT locals. Average pay in 2007, before the Great Recession, is compared with 2017. According to The Association of Bay Area Governments, the cost of living increased by 27.5% from 2007 to 2017.

Cite:  Association of Bay Area Governments shows CPI from 2007-2017 going from   216 to 275.4

Full Time Faculty Average Salaries    2007                      2017        Percent increase

City College of San Francisco             $80,757                 $93,178           15.4%

San Mateo District                               $81,084                 $103,047          27.1%

Marin District                                       $87,659                 $103,059          17.6%

Sources:  http://employeedata.cccco.edu/avg_salary_17.pdf     pages 4-5

http://employeedata.cccco.edu/avg_salary_07.pdf      pages 4-5

 

Part-Time Faculty Average Salaries    2007                      2017        Percent increase

City College of San Francisco            $88.71/hour*          $104.95         18.3%

San Mateo District                              $84.94                     $92.47            8.9%

Marin District                                      $93.63                    $115.61**     23.5%

*The hourly pay is only for time in the classroom. One is not paid for preparation time or grading time.  At CCSF, the limit is for 10 hours of class time/week.

**This is for 2016 since the 2017 figure of $27.30 makes no sense.

Source:  http://employeedata.cccco.edu/avg_hourly_17.pdf  For Marin substitute 16 for 17.  Pages 7-8       http://employeedata.cccco.edu/avg_hourly_07.pdf   pages 5-6

According to these figures, full-timers in only the San Mateo district have experienced salary increases that appear to have kept up with increases in the cost of living. However, increases in pay have been undercut by additional deductions and givebacks. In 2017, all full-time faculty and others in the CALSTRS defined pension plan were subject to an increase in the deduction from their pay for their pension. For most, it went from 8% to 10.25% and is similar to a 2.25% pay-cut. Many may also be having more money deducted from their pay to cover the portion of medical insurance paid by employees. CCSF faculty have experienced other increased deductions from their pay including an increase in union dues of ¼% and, for full-timers, an increase in contributions to their retiree medical benefits of at least 1%.

Appendix #2

Pay of Part-timers at CCSF is Much Less than what Union Leaders Claim

The pay of faculty at CCSF is based on one’s placement on the pay scale. There are columns based on one’s education level with step increases that award one with higher pay the longer one teaches at the college. Part-timers looking up their pay find their column and step in the full-time pay scale and multiply it by 86% (or 100% if a part-time counselor or librarian.)  They then multiply that amount by their load–the percent they work (which cannot be more than 67% of the work of a full-timer.)

For example, if the annual pay of a full-timer is $80,000, the pay of a part-time teacher in the same column and on the same step who teaches 60% of a full load is $80,000 times 86% (the pro-rata rate) times 60% (the load) which comes to $41,280.

Using the July 2018-June 2019 salary schedule for part-time and full-time teachers illustrates how much each is paid and how the pay of most part-timers is less than 86% of a full-timer. This example is based on teachers who are in column F + 15 who have a BA degree plus 45 units and a Master’s Degree.  Step 1 represents the pay for each in their first year of work (assuming one is not initially placed on a higher step which, until recently, was only available to newly hired full-timers with experience.)  Step 10 is the pay of a full-timer starting their 10th year of work. The part-timer who has worked 10 years would be at step 5. The part-timer who has worked 20 years would be at step 10 while the full-timer is at step 20.

Annual Salaries

FT pay              Part-timers          Part-timer teachers’ actual percent

equivalent pay               of full-timers pay

at 100% load

Year 1                       $62,980                 $54,163                          86%

Both on Step 1

Year 10                     $87,010                 $63,348                          72.8%

On step 10              On step 5

Year 20                   $105,700                $74,829                           70.8%

On step 20             On Step 10

 

Gap in pay/class for each teaching one 3 unit class, at a 10% load

FT pay                        PT pay                        Difference

Year 1                 $6,298                         $5,416                              $872

Year 10               $8,701                         $6,335                           $2,366

Year 20              $10,570                        $7,483                           $3,087

Full-time pay scale

Full time salary schedules 3 years (1)

Part-time pay scale

http://www.aft2121.org/wp-content/uploads/86-Pro-rata-pay-scales-3-years-2.pdf

Appendix #3

Pay Gap between the lowest and highest paid full-timers at CCSF increased under new contract

Example 1 Column F

-BA plus 30 units with an MA

Pay of Full-Time Faculty Members

2017                             2018                       Pay increase

Old contract               New Contract        Under new contract

At Step 1                 $58,499                      $61,200                       $2,701

Highest Step          $101,217                    $111,930                     $10,713

 

Example 2 Column F Plus 45

-BA plus 75 units with MA

At Step 1               $62,507                        $66,540                        $4,033

Highest step         $105,222                      $117,270                      $12,048

__________________

–Increased gap in pay of faculty member on step one of column F compared to member in Column F Plus 45 at the highest step

Gap

Gap in 2018  $117,270 minus $61,200     $56,070

Gap in 2017  $105,222 minus $58,499     $46,723

Increase in Pay Gap under new contract     $9,347

 

Those with the most seniority and PhDs received the biggest pay increases.

links full-time pay in 2018-19 under the agreement

full-time pay for 2017-18

 

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