

Ukraine and the War

written by Lev Yurkevych | July 24, 2025



Addressed to the Second International Socialist Conference, held in Holland, by the editors of the journal Borotba (The Struggle) and published in Geneva by a group of members of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers Party of Russia.¹

Comrades,

The Ukrainian question is one of the national questions which up to the present time European democrats have shown very little interest in. However, in recent years, after the Russian Revolution and above all during the present World War, this question has started to play a considerable role in the internal life of Russia and Austria—and without doubt will put itself on the order of the day when Europe addresses itself to finishing this present war.

That is why, comrades, our Ukrainian democratic socialist group in Russia says that it is its duty to explain before you, albeit briefly, the Ukrainian question in the hope that you will take note of our considerations in the debates and decisions taken by this conference.

I

The history of Ukraine is far from happy. The Ukrainian lands were on the route of Asiatic peoples moving toward the West. For long periods this prevented Ukraine from enjoying a tranquil life and from organizing itself freely, which let it fall under the domination of neighboring states. Thus it became part of the Lithuanian state up to the sixteenth century, and then when Lithuania was united with Poland it was annexed by the latter. Polish domination placed a heavy burden on the Ukrainian people and led Ukraine, which during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had increased its territory and organized itself militarily, to revolt during the middle of the seventeenth century, and, after a long war of liberation led by the Cossacks, to separate from Poland and form an independent Cossack republic.² Yet circumstances obliged Ukraine—menaced by its neighboring Turkish and Polish neighbors—to seek an ally. It found this ally in the Muscovite state, which it was tied to by a common religion but which differed from it through its ferocious despotism and extreme centralist politics.

The Union was made in 1654 and Ukraine allied itself to Moscow as a free and independent state, having its own army. Despite this convention, Moscow sought immediately to curtail the freedom of Ukraine and signed an accord with Poland, giving it western Ukraine (the right bank of the Dnieper)—which had just freed itself from Polish domination. The popular uprisings in eastern Ukraine (the left bank of the Dnieper) against the despotism of Moscow were put down by Muscovite force. After a fifty-year struggle, ended by the famous “treason” of the Ukrainian Hetman Ivan Mazepa who allied himself with Sweden and was defeated by the army of Tsar Peter the Great, one of the last blows struck against Ukrainian independence by the destruction of the autonomous

Cossack military organization. Toward the end of the eighteenth century the last vestiges of its political independence were destroyed. After the partition of Poland, eastern Ukraine was annexed by Russia with the exception of Galicia, which went to Austria; Ukraine was divided into governments [*gubernia*] and then crushed by Russian bureaucracy.

Ukrainian culture, which had undergone considerable development in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in parallel with Polish culture and under the influence of Western civilization and the Reformation, was destroyed by the despotic Muscovite state. The Ukrainian nobility which during the struggles against Polish domination had shown so much energy and love of liberty did not resist Russian centralism and finally submitted in exchange for hereditary noble titles and landed wealth. The popular masses reacted against this treason by the ruling classes to the cause of Ukrainian freedom by a series of cruel and bloody rebellions known under the name of "Haidamachchyna." This long series of popular social movements was suppressed in the last years of the eighteenth century by the Russian Empire, which introduced serfdom in Ukraine thus condemning them to silence for many years.³

During the end of the eighteenth and the first part of the nineteenth centuries, Ukraine—crushed by the heavy domination of the Russian bureaucracy [and] deprived completely of its past liberties—submitted, resigned to its fate. Yet during the early nineteenth century the libertarian ideas of philosophy and of the French Revolution penetrated Ukraine, where they took a democratic and Slavophile form adorned with romantic Cossack traditions. Eastern Ukraine in particular produced a number of writers who had concerned themselves with history and ethnography and who bequeathed a great number of scientific works.

But the Ukrainian movement didn't really appear until the so-called liberal era around the 1860s, marked by the emancipation of the serfs and a whole series of social reforms. While Poland was shaken by insurrectionary ideas, libertarian tendencies manifested themselves differently in Ukraine. The Ukrainian ruling classes, who under Polish domination were strongly influenced by its culture and had not successfully created a culture for themselves after liberation from Polish rule, Russified themselves rapidly after the annexation of Ukraine, so that by the middle of the nineteenth century these classes were separated from the people by an insurmountable barrier formed by a culture alien to the people so could not concern themselves with questions of national interest. As a consequence, the Ukrainian intellectuals of this period, who could not take their ideas to the upper classes, took on ideas of a *democratic* nature. Their nationalism, exempt from separatist and insurrectionist ideas, expressed itself above all in their desire to free the serfs, to raise their national consciousness, and to unite them.

Amongst the Ukrainian people the national revolutionary tendencies of the nobility had long since vanished, therefore the Ukrainian renaissance of the second part of the nineteenth century took the form of a bourgeois movement. The romantic Cossack traditions were no more than yesterday's "leftovers," which however held it back from total embourgeoisement and taking this position vis-à-vis the Russian Empire and its regime.

Whereas with other oppressed peoples such as the Czechs, or the Ukrainians of Austria, the transition of national development went from the insurrectional form of the old nobility to the modern bourgeois democratic form coinciding with the democratization of the ruling state, this was not the case with the Ukrainian awakening in Russia. There this awakening to a bourgeois and democratic form was born under an absolutist regime and remained there for a half century until the Russian Revolution.

This fact gave the Ukrainian renaissance in Russia an extraordinarily passive and powerless character, as for a long period it lacked a *free constitutional regime*, something absolutely

indispensable to any modern bourgeois and national movement.

This is why the Ukrainian movement manifested itself so weakly. It was behind in its development compared to the subject peoples of Austria, who long enjoyed their political liberty; the path to this was closed by despotic Russian centralism.

Russian Tsarism was always hostile to the Ukrainian movement and in its struggle against this movement resorted to the most severe means of repression. This can be explained by the role Ukraine played in the foundation of the Russian Empire. The Muscovite state could not transform itself into the Russian Empire until it had annexed Ukraine, from which it took the old name "Rus."⁴ It was not until after it had seized the black earth belt of Ukraine and the banks of the Black Sea that the Muscovite state, which occupied the northern part of Russia proper and which did not possess large natural resources, could take part in world economic life and become the Russian Empire. The Muscovite despotism which knew so well how to exploit Ukraine and disorganize its people, leading an intense and harsh life, knew how to Russify the Ukrainian ruling classes so that finally the Muscovite state succeeded in its official policy: to treat the Ukrainian people as one with the Russian people.

The Ukrainian nation formed with the Russians an overwhelming majority in Russia, which was a prop to the grandeur of Tsarism and Russian imperialism. But if the Ukrainian nationality came back to life, shaking off Russian bondage and forming an independent entity, the Russian nationality would be a minority of 43 percent in the Empire. It is understandable that Russian Tsarism was frightened of such a perspective, hence it constantly displayed total and thorough opposition to all Ukrainian movements.

We have already said that the modern Ukrainian movement started to develop around 1860. It manifested itself at this time by the pacific desire to organize *popular Ukrainian education*. At this time Sunday schools were founded in different Ukrainian towns, particularly in Kyiv, its capital. Education was conducted mainly by high school students, who at the same time published textbooks for the people in their mother tongue. But Tsarism struck immediately against this inoffensive manifestation of the Ukrainian movement. In 1863 publication of Ukrainian literary works aimed at the people were banned and the minister Count Petr Valuev declared "the Ukrainian language doesn't exist, has never existed and never will exist"! The following year the Sunday schools were closed. This persecution greatly discouraged and weakened the young Ukrainian movement. But the Tsarist government didn't stop there. On the eve of the war against Turkey in 1876—undertaken under the name of "liberation of the Bulgarians"—a decree banned all Ukrainian-language publications.⁵

After this decree, the Ukrainian movement was deprived of printed matter and found it totally impossible to legally display its existence until the revolution; this was for a whole *thirty-year* period. Strange to say, this savage attack on Ukraine did not provoke any reaction on the part of Ukrainian leaders.

Despite the passive nature of the Ukrainian movement, the intellectuals of 1860 were infused with determined political ideals, the best known representative of which was the "Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood" founded in 1840. This association counted amongst its leaders the poet Shevchenko, the writer Kulich, and the celebrated historian Kostomarov. The Brotherhood, the aim of which was the abolition of serfdom, had a Slavophile character. This differed from Russian Slavophilism, which was always imbued with a centralizing pan-Russianism and advocated a Slav federation of which a free Ukraine would be part.

The Russian government quickly discovered the existence of this Brotherhood and persecuted

Shevchenko, who was exiled to Siberia for many years and forbidden to write; Kulich and Kostomarov were forbidden to live in Ukraine. But their ideas did not perish; they animated the Ukrainian patriots of 1860, particularly the youth involved in popular education. Yet these ideas were not at all revolutionary and faced with repression, particularly the 1876 law, the Ukrainian leaders renounced their political ideal, capitulating to Tsarism all along the line.

The most powerful of the leaders of the Ukrainian movement of 1860, M. Drahomanov, a professor at Kyiv University, emigrated to Switzerland, dedicating his life to the idea of Ukrainian liberation.⁶

In vain he exhorted his countrymen to struggle against Tsarism, to publish Ukrainian revolutionary papers in free Galicia, to be distributed throughout Russian Ukraine; his appeals were not heeded. The Ukrainian leadership within Russia would do nothing but submit to the censorship of Ukrainian manuscripts, which the government time and again refused permission to print. The watchword was "Conciliate the government." The recognized Ukrainian leaders sent reports to St. Petersburg, asking the government's permission to engage in popular education, with the assurance that this concession would weaken the revolutionary elements within the Ukrainian movement, which would retain an exclusively legal character. They also expressed the view that political struggle should be left to the Russians in Russia and that the Ukrainians should limit themselves to popular education and remain strangers to all politics.

Despite the humility of bourgeois Ukrainians, Tsarism continued to persecute with a cold and intransigent perseverance any manifestation of Ukrainian nationality, however inoffensive; at concerts singers were obliged to sing Ukrainian songs in French translation.

Thus the bourgeois Ukrainian movement, aspiring to a liberal constitutional regime with a view to organizing a reborn nation, was placed by circumstance in a position where all activity and all political initiative were without result. This bourgeois movement separated itself from the masses and was reduced to ultra-anodyne displays; one such was an edition of a journal published in Kyiv in Russian and dedicated to the Ukrainian past when theatrical representatives enjoyed a little liberty at the end of 1880.

The bourgeois Ukrainian movement distinguished itself in this case and to the highest degree by a trait common to all the modern bourgeois movements of oppressed nations. These movements could not adopt any of the proper characteristics of the bourgeois revolutions of Western Europe. Representing the interests of the *middle classes* at their beginning, the bourgeois movements of the oppressed nations had a policy without principle, a policy of compromise with the existing states which, ultimately, were a factor which ensured the capitalist development of oppressed nations, for the centralism of the great empires could retard the development of any nation but not ultimately stop it.

The revolution of 1905 was the force that obliged Ukraine to emerge from its inaction. The period before the revolution in the first years of the century performed a great role. Since the end of the last decade of the nineteenth century the workers' strike movement sparked among Ukrainian scholars a growth in hope. This growth, created on the one hand by Russian socialist literature and on the other by the revolutionary works of Drahomanov, caused the youth to indignantly condemn the old tactics of the leaders of the Ukrainian movement. At the university of Kharkiv, where the historical and ethnographic studies of the professors had been the base in the last century of the Ukrainian movement of 1860, there formed at the start of the twentieth century, this time among students, an energetic group of revolutionary and socialist Ukrainians who in 1900 founded the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party, the appearance of which was the starting point of a new period for the Ukrainian movement.

This party broke completely with all the traditions of the old leaders of the Ukrainian movement. It initiated its activity directly amongst the people, making use of an abundant literature published in Austrian Ukraine. This literature smuggled into Russia in dozens of kilos spread very rapidly throughout Ukraine. These journals and pamphlets excited the interest of the toiling masses and were received by them enthusiastically, happy to get the socialist truth in works published for the first time in their *muzhik* tongue; the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party [RUP] was the first to infringe clearly and openly the decree of 1876 banning Ukrainian publications.⁷

Although by its activity amongst the peasants the RUP broke with the traditions of the Russian social-democrats, who at this time were not interested in the toilers in the countryside but only industrial workers, it did not follow the tactics of the Narodniki, and constantly gave to its propaganda a *class character* addressing itself to the peasants and organized their strike movement.⁸ In this area the RUP had considerable success and it was due in great measure to them that the strike movement in the gubernias of Poltava and Kharkiv became one of the forerunners of the revolution in Russia.

The Revolutionary Ukrainian Party was a socialist party. But it was not so in theory or in its program, though on the eve of the revolution its activity also took place amongst urban workers. A second constitutional congress of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party took place in 1905 and adopted the maximum Erfurt program of the German Social-Democrats and the minimum program of the Russian Social-Democracy. It demanded extreme democratic autonomy for the territory within the ethnographic boundaries of Ukraine, with legal guarantees for the free development for the national minorities living within its territory. The principle of national organization was based on the organizational model of the Austrian Social-Democracy.⁹

With regard to tactics, the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party took the same position as the left wing of the Russian Social-Democracy (Bolsheviks), and instead of calling itself the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party, adopted the name Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers' Party, the name under which it still exists today, and to which the authors of this letter belong.

The role played by the young Ukrainian socialist movement in the national renaissance is very significant. This movement has connected the question of national emancipation to all the problems of the emancipation of the proletariat; it has raised this question to the level of those political problems which can be solved by no other means than democratic struggle, by the development of class antagonism in Ukrainian society. Thus has progressed Ukrainian socialism, always following the same route, confirmed by the undoubted truth that in all present-day liberation movements, political or national—both being the result of the same evolution which saw the transformation of feudal states into modern capitalist states—the working class appears as the sole revolutionary and democratic power. This in effect is what is happening in the Ukrainian socialist movement, which is developing in struggle shoulder-to-shoulder with the workers' movement in all of Russia.

The bourgeois Ukrainian movement adopted an altogether different position vis-à-vis the revolution. During the preceding period, when the revolutionary forces were organizing, the Ukrainian bourgeois movement, which turned with scorn from Ukrainian socialism, formed, it is true, two liberal parties (democratic and radical), but these parties dissolved at the end of the revolution.

In 1905 there appeared openly the first Ukrainian journal in Russia and although this journal was suppressed (despite the freeing of the press in the Russian Empire) a more or less free Ukrainian press could exist from 1906, although the censor created greater difficulties for it than for the Russian press.

The year 1906 saw the return of reaction and the gradual weakening of the socialist movement in

Russia in general and in Ukraine in particular. The bourgeois Ukrainian movement, on the other hand, developed considerably, profiting from the liberties obtained by the revolution which it had done nothing to win. In the autumn of 1906, a large movement arose amongst the youth with the aim of nationalizing¹⁰ higher education and a campaign of petitions was launched which obtained over ten thousand signatures.

In the end the Ukrainian movement became infested with bourgeois ideas, socialism lost its former attraction, and antagonism between parties declined. To make this change the Ukrainian bourgeois parties fused into one and declared in 1907 that their press would no longer conduct inter-party struggle; socialist journalists were invited to work with them.¹¹ The majority of them voluntarily accepted this invitation.

However the Ukrainian movement had acquired such strength during the revolution that it was represented in the first two Dumas by two large groups of a progressive nature. These groups found themselves under the influence of the bourgeois parties without being their direct representatives. The law of June 3, 1909, limiting the rights of voters was applied in such a way in Ukraine that there were no longer any Ukrainian deputies in the Duma. Elsewhere the socialist movement grew weaker day by day. The socialist intellectuals passed en masse into the ranks of the bourgeois movement which after the final victory of reaction had adopted the principle of "limited affairs," that is to say it had entirely renounced political demands. The bourgeois movement always concerned itself with a *cooperation*, which united all the middle classes in seeking to fulfill domestic interests, and in organizing educational bodies whose development was constantly hindered by the government. Alongside this purely utilitarian outlook, the bourgeois movement also showed a modernist literary tendency, seeking to free itself from the conventions of the old Ukrainian "democratism"; this movement had extolled the cult of individualism, with an extreme and undisguised hatred of socialism.

These two new traits of the Ukrainian bourgeois movement contributed to the lowering of the level of its ideas which slowly continued to lose breadth. It reverted to a method of activity established during the somber period of the second part of the nineteenth century. It again completely submitted to Tsarism with a view to reconciliation and agreement with it. For its part the government reverted to its old ways and in order to destroy the Ukrainian movement it closed the educational institutions on even the weakest pretext, and to stop the Ukrainian press from having any effect in the province it persecuted newspaper subscribers. The well-known minister Stolypin, assassinated in Kyiv, declared that "the national and political tendencies of the Ukrainian movement are at this point so close that it is impossible to distinguish between them" and that the most innocent of educational bodies were at the same time "anti-statist" for "they tended to develop revolutionary tendencies at the very breast of the Russian people."¹² Stolypin's declaration followed a circular to provincial governors ordering them to refuse registration to Ukrainian educational institutions and followed with a redoubling of persecution, which was called by the government press "words of gold."

But the Ukrainian bourgeois press showed an extraordinary indifference to these events. It published articles claiming that the government "did not understand" the movement and the Ukrainian question; that it did not understand its importance from a cultural standpoint, even though teachers from around the world recognized that it was necessary to conduct education in the mother tongue. Only the Russian government, refusing to take account of this truth proclaimed by the entire world, obstructed the development of education amongst the Ukrainian people, contrary to the general interest and its own, and acted as if it were a mistake. In response to these assertions, repeated with an astonishing stubbornness, Tsarism relentlessly employed new repressions, augmenting the supplications of the Ukrainian bourgeois press. Russian liberals were favorable to

this, having become increasingly chauvinistic in the course of the reaction.

In these circumstances Ukrainian Social-Democracy remained impotent, although its press continued to exist and to protest against bourgeois politics. But given the small number of workers' organizations (Kyiv, Katerynoslav, Kharkiv) and the near total lack of intellectual elements, it was difficult for us, despite all our efforts, to break the influence of a bourgeois politics which finally reached complete and shameful political bankruptcy.

This bankruptcy started with the war. The Tsarist government, expecting the conquest of Austrian Ukraine to "liberate" the "Russian" Galicians, suppressed the *whole* Ukrainian press in the first days of the war.¹³ It closed nearly all of the Ukrainian scholarly establishments (at a time when they were nearly all closed already) and arrested and deported the best-known Ukrainian political personalities. The situation remained unclear until the end of 1914, but at the start of the following year the governor general of Kyiv outlawed all publications in the Ukrainian language as well as the use of Ukrainian orthography. It is said that the government saw this ban as the equivalent of imposing the decree of 1876 again, which it remembered and still considered to be in force. In any case, there had already been two years of hard fighting and all the tentative efforts at reviving the Ukrainian press had ended in fiasco.

The only organ actually representing the Ukrainian world in Russia and to the foreign press was the journal *Ukrainskaia zhizn*, published in Moscow in the Russian language. In reporting the war it took an apolitical and loyalist-patriotic attitude toward Russia.¹⁴

Thus it was that the Ukrainian movement in Russia found itself without a way out of its situation. The bloody conflict of the Great Powers in territory belonging to the Ukrainian people had caused the complete material ruin of the whole of Austrian Ukraine and part of western Russian Ukraine. As well as this the war had struck a hard blow at the Ukrainian liberation movement and had destroyed all it had gained, from both the cultural and the political points of view.

II

The best proof of the eclipse of socialist conscience, provoked by the European war, is the credence widely given in certain socialist circles to demagogic theories circulated among the masses in order to conceal from them the real aims of the war of conquest. The representatives of official socialism did nothing to reveal to the people, sent to the killing-fields, the odious undercurrents of European diplomacy; quite the contrary, they accepted the ignoble theories created by the leaders as their own; they put all their energies, all their goodwill at the service of the government cause.

But the scale of the collapse of official socialism among the socialists of the Entente is vast; witness especially their attitude toward the despot Russia and toward the role which its barbaric government is allegedly destined to play in the "war of liberation." Leaving aside the plight of Belgium and Serbia, which the Allied armies ought fully to restore, only Poland remains to be liberated by the governments of the Tsar and his allies when all this chattering is done. The manifesto of Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich serves as a base on which to re-create freely the triumph of Right and Justice.¹⁵

This blind and limitless confidence with which the Entente democracies receive the promises of the head of the Russian autocracy seems at times paradoxical, unbelievable even; it is unfortunately too well known to be called into question. The most abject regime in Europe has suddenly become, in the eyes of the democracies of the Entente, the chivalrous defender of the entire Slavonic race; all the miseries inflicted on Poland by the Russian government down the centuries have been forgotten. The prison-house of nationalities, as Russia was frequently called, has won over all those in France

and England whose hearts are touched by the love of oppressed nations. The flaw in all this rhetoric about the noble role of Russia is that it hides under the cloak of grandiloquence the vulgar interest of people greedy for conquest. Yet it has lost nothing of its vigor today, even though the Russian government has done everything to tarnish an already suspect reputation and to demonstrate, by its reactionary policy, the emptiness of promises extracted from it at the beginning of the war. Ah, no doubt the Russian ministers risk nothing in raining down tirades of irony on the Germans who founded the Polish University in Warsaw, but their mockery loses much of its value when the Polish deputies in the Duma are not prepared to take seriously the fine promises of the Russian autocracy and reproach it for its hypocritical policy which allows to persist the old inequalities between Russian subjects and the Poles who live within the Empire and pretends to be ignorant of the grievances of the Polish population.

Now, the socialists of the Entente, blinded by their narrow nationalism, are not interested in the betrayal by Tsarism in its engagements toward Poland at the beginning of the campaign. They are still more indifferent to the situation in which the Russian government has placed the Ukrainian people. All that Allied public opinion has wanted to see in the autocracy of Moscow is a great empire, united by the common seal of race and language, with inexhaustible resources in terms of men, whose victorious troops march like striking lightening across the distance which separates Berlin from Petrograd to deliver a mortal blow to "Prussian militarism." It is no exaggeration to say that it is this false impression which the Allies have nurtured about Russia which has determined their sympathy for the Muscovite autocracy. Even though this dream was not realized, even though the reverse occurred, even though Russia's military prestige was seriously shaken, the West has continued nevertheless to consider Russia as a united country, indivisible, whose vast territory is peopled by one great "Russian" nation. The joy manifested by the French socialist press when the Russian troops occupied Galicia and Bukovyna had to be seen to be believed. They saw the event as the triumph of the Muscovite empire, at long last restored to national unity; the Austrian Ukrainians were seen by the French socialists simply as "Russians" living over the border. The English press of all shades of opinion, which before the war had devoted long articles to the Ukrainian question, thought nothing of remaining silent over the crimes of Tsarism in Galicia. It was only after the defeat suffered by the Russian troops in Austrian Ukraine that the scandalous conduct of the Petrograd government in Galicia and Bukovyna was judged a little more severely by the socialists of the Entente. But this judgment was inspired by other motives than the defense of Ukraine, ruined and devastated by the barbarians from the East. If Russia was reproached for her conduct in Galicia, famously described by the liberal deputy Maklakov, as a scandal of European proportions, it was only because her savage policies had contributed to her military defeat.¹⁶ As for the fate of poor Ukraine herself, the attack on the rights of her people, this left the socialists of the Entente unmoved.¹⁷

This conspiracy of silence organized by the Allies over the Ukrainian question gave the Russian government an advantage in that it left them a free hand in their fight against the national movement in Ukraine, while at the same time disarming the movement by considerably weakening its powers of resistance to the Muscovite oppressor. The politicians of Russian Ukraine had always considered Galicia as a corner of land where the Ukrainian people could have lived confident of freedom. They knew the cost of the efforts of the Tsar's government to seize Austrian Ukraine, they knew about the seeds of corruption sown by the agents of Moscow to achieve this end and finish once and for all the Ukrainian threat. Yet they nevertheless renounced in advance all resistance and, under the menace of the iron fist, comforted themselves with the illusion that the annexation of Galicia by Holy Mother Russia would lead the Russian government to apply the same constitutional guaranties to the whole Ukrainian people as Austrian Ukraine had enjoyed under the domination of the Hapsburgs. They paid dearly for this illusion; unable to raise a single protest, they saw themselves condemned to the role of silent, passive witnesses to the downfall of the Ukrainian

people on the other side of the border.

Today's war has revealed the antagonism that exists between the bourgeois movement in Ukraine and the Russian political regime. There is no doubt that some of the goals pursued by Russian diplomacy in this war coincide with the vital economic interests of Ukrainian capital. Ukraine, with its fertile soil, holds first place in Russian agriculture; every year it sends its enormous stock of cereals abroad. According to the Russian economists, the center of economic life has for some time been shifting from north to south in Russia, that is, toward Ukraine. Thus, the young Ukrainian bourgeoisie cannot remain indifferent to the problem of free passage to the Mediterranean. Yet the overwhelming aim of all Russian imperial policy is to be master of the Straits.

However, the aspirations of the Russian government do not end there. Leaving aside its designs on Constantinople, the Muscovite autocracy wants to seize Galicia and Bukovyna in order to do away with the Ukrainian nation. It follows that the Tsar's government, which wants to make itself master of Constantinople, is putting itself and its great army at the disposal of the economic interests of Ukrainian capital; then again, its vigorous thrust toward Austria, having no other aim but the conquest of Austrian Ukraine, threatens the nationhood of the whole of Ukraine. To put obstacles in the way of the national revival of the country is to attack its economic progress and sacrifice the vital interests of Ukrainian capital while leaving intact the colonial status to which Russia has reduced Ukraine. Tsarism thus accomplishes its double task: on the one hand, it protects the economic rise of capital in Ukraine; on the other hand, it jeopardizes its very future, attacking Galicia which it will always consider as its own national Piedmont.

Constantinople and Galicia, Russian imperialism and Ukrainian freedom, these are the contradictions which history sets before the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and which the latter tries to resolve by betraying its national ideal. The bourgeoisie prefers to abandon the vision of a free and independent Ukraine rather than sacrifice the bait of growing riches. Passive and apathetic before the great Muscovite empire, it reaches out to it, ready to accept any compromise, to bend to the harsh demands of its conqueror and its executioner. And, so that our readers may form a true impression of this slave mentality, we take the liberty of quoting a passage borrowed from *Ukrainskaia zhizn*, the only magazine which continues to appear after the suspension of all Ukrainian press at the beginning of the war:

The Ukrainians [declares this paper, with a certain pride] will not be fooled by suspect manoeuvres or any sort of foreign provocation. They will do their duty to the end. They will do so not only as soldiers on the battlefield, fighting those who have provoked war and violated all the rights of humanity, but also as simple civilians, called *to contribute according to their strength to the great task which has fallen upon the Russian army*.¹⁸

It seems pointless to seek out the nature of this "great task" which the Ukrainian bourgeoisie professes as its civic duty. Constantinople or Galicia? Our own goal, as Ukrainian socialists, is very different. The task of social democracy in Ukraine is to reawaken the socialist consciousness of the exploited so that they may understand the antagonism that exists between their class interests and the aggressive ambitions of Ukrainian imperialism. The only fitting socialist response would be an all-out struggle against militarism in Ukraine, be it "Ukrainian" or "Russian." The triumph of democracy is the only possible guarantee under the capitalist regime against massacres and imperialist wars. This terrible war which has been unleashed on the world must make the Ukrainian workers understand that their own national bourgeoisie is sacrificing the interests of Ukrainian democracy, allowing the Russian government to conduct itself as master in Ukraine and to keep it in the grip of national and political slavery.

However, today's war has brought politicians from the Central Powers into contact with the

Ukrainian problem. And while Allied public opinion kept quiet about all signs of national life in Ukraine and even denied the existence of the Ukrainian problem, in Austria and Germany people were very sympathetic to the Ukrainian question; the press devoted long articles to it; everybody was talking about it. At the very beginning of the war, there was even a league formed under the name of "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine." This was created by a few former socialists, of Russian Ukrainian origin, who claimed the right to represent Russian Ukraine to the governments of the Central Powers. Special funds were put at their disposal by the Austrian government to enlist them in making propaganda in favor of the cause of the Central Powers. It was these somewhat tainted funds which enabled the agents of the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine" to go on a propaganda tour in Turkey and Bulgaria to persuade these countries to intervene in the conflict on the side of the Central Powers, on the pretext of helping the oppressed Ukraine. Such financial aid enabled the representatives of the Union, acting as paid agents of the Central Powers, to spread the hatred of war among the Turkish and Bulgarian peoples.

The situation of the Union was consolidated by the favorable reception it was given by the politicians of Austrian Ukraine. This is explained by the fact that in Austria (Galicia and Bukovyna), all the Ukrainian parties are united in a single organization under the banner of the "Austrian orientation"—whereas the "Russian orientation" is widespread among the Ukrainians in Russia.¹⁹ But while in Russia the loyalty of the Ukrainian population, persecuted and crucified by the Muscovite autocracy, is purely a matter of form, on the other side of the border, attached by constitutional ties to the monarchy of the Danube, Ukrainian loyalism has taken on an aggressively militaristic aspect, marked by propaganda in favor of the war against Russia, on the assumption that it will lead to the restoration of a free and independent Ukraine.

Yet the constitutional guarantees enjoyed by the Ruthenes in Austria did not stop the Poles taking the Ukrainian population under their political and administrative control, with the tacit consent of the government in Vienna. But the Austrian Ukrainians forget this reality in the exuberance of war: they imagined that the only goal of the Central Powers in this war was the liberation of Ukraine, and they put all their goodwill, all their courage at the service of Austrian imperialism. They believed, for example, that two thousand Ukrainian volunteers, enlisted in the Austrian army under the malevolent eye of the government in Vienna, were dying for the cause of Ukrainian independence. But most hideous of all is the energy and enthusiasm which Austrian Ukrainian Social-Democracy has expended on propagating these militaristic ideas, the collapse of the Ukrainian socialists in the face of the bourgeois political parties, even to the extent that the socialist organizations have merged with their class enemies.

However, the latest events have begun to sow seeds of doubt in the minds of the Austrian Ukrainians as to the value of this program. The territories of the Russian Ukraine (Volyn and Kholm), with a population of over two million, occupied by the Austrian army, have, on the orders of the Viennese government, been subjected to Polish and German administration. The latter, without any regard for the legitimate grievances of the Ukrainians, has notably proceeded to found Polish schools and has preferred to use Russian for administrative purposes, rather than the Ukrainian tongue. This example, only one of many, confirms the rumors currently circulating about a secret treaty agreed between the governments of the Central Powers on the matter of the reconstitution of Poland; it is alleged that, by virtue of this treaty, Poland would be attached to Austro-Hungary as a third state in the Hapsburg crown and that she would encompass, besides the former Polish state, Lithuania, together with White Russia, and the Ukrainian states of Volyn, Podilia, and Galicia.²⁰ It goes without saying that such a solution to the problem of Ukrainian "reconstitution" inspires some fears among the Austrian Ukrainians who would be condemned, along with the Lithuanians, the White Russians, and certain elements of Russian Ukraine, to play the part of puppets in the hands of powerful neighbors within a reborn Poland. This shameful role as a destructive element within the new state

does not seem to accord too well with the ideal of a free Ukraine. Moreover, Ukrainian Galicia is obsessed with threats of annexation to Russia. These threats provoke great anxiety among the Ukrainians of Austria.

Nevertheless, the Austrian Ukrainians continue to lend their support to the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine." This only serves to confuse the Ukrainian question; it is further confused by the fact that the Union's activities have received a cold reception in the Russian Ukraine. Our paper's revelations about the shameful schemes of the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine" and its financial resources, drawn from the secret funds of the Central Powers, which have been used as an excuse in a certain quarter of the French press and, above all, in the Russian press, to alarm public opinion with noisy rantings about the "treachery" of the Ukrainians, have led the Ukrainian bourgeoisie to declare their loyalty to the Muscovite autocracy.

However, the actions of the Union have had some positive results. It must be given credit for the interest displayed in the Ukrainian problem by military, governmental, and pan-Germanist circles in Germany, and, above all, by the partisans of outright war against Russia.

The movement is led by the German journalist P. Rohrbach, well known outside his own country and the most distinguished contributor to the *Osteuropäische Zukunft*, published in Munich by a group of clubs recently founded under the name of "Ukraine" for the purpose of contributing to the "liberation" of that country.²¹ The origins of this movement can be found in the economic antagonism between Russia and Germany, which in Germany has given rise to a fierce hatred of Russia. A few big capitalists and military chiefs who support the movement are preaching the necessity for imperialist Germany to crush Russia, even if that costs them a second war in the future. If Germany merely conquered Poland, Russia would not be sufficiently weakened from a military and economic point of view. In order to settle the matter for good, for Russia to cease to exist as a great imperialist state, Germany has to tackle the largest bit; Russia has to be relieved, by military force of her richest colony—the territories situated on the Black Sea coast, that is, Ukraine.

The territories thus "liberated" would constitute an independent state, where German capital could take over. It is true that some prophets of imperialism, like Kleinoff, are already, even now, somewhat worried about this state. They anticipate that the indeterminate national character of Ukrainian high society might be subject to cowardly intrigue and envy on the part of its strong neighbors. But the other advocates of expansion, the most aggressive and energetic, like Rohrbach, claim to see an element in the lack of national consciousness of Ukrainian high society which would favor the "civilizing" influence of Germany, which could provide the good people of Ukraine, free of charge, with "a European prince, schools, finance, engineers, teachers, bankers, generals and ministers."²²

It goes without saying that German democrats play no part in this kind of "liberation." The Ukrainian advocates of such German "civilizing work" have already criticized German Social-Democracy for its indifference to the Ukrainian problem and for disowning the whole policy of annexation. It is true that the German socialist press has had very little debate over the Ukrainian problem.

As Russian Ukrainian socialists, faithful to the principles of revolutionary socialism, we cannot but applaud this attitude on the part of German Social-Democracy, that is, of its minority, which is leading an energetic campaign against German imperialism. To deem all this rhetoric empty of any sense in its logical relations with the policy of annexation, to reveal to the masses the true intentions of the warmongers, this is the real work of socialists. And when a revolutionary minority of German Social-Democracy is waging a merciless fight on the pan-Germanist clique of "liberators," and reveals their annexationist projects, they are then lending their precious moral aid to Ukrainian democracy.

If the idea of a conquest of Galicia and Bukovyna by Russia seemed more dangerous to Ukrainians than an annexation of Russia's territories in Ukraine to Austria (but not to Poland), that signified that, in colonial politics, there are some very brutal modes of expansion, and others less so; but it is beyond doubt that all expansionist policies end up in brutality. It begins by exporting to the liberated country "European princes, ministers, generals and bankers," and ends by importing modern slavery for the indigenous population. That is why democrats among the oppressed peoples must oppose, with all their forces, the false and hypocritical game of the apostles of capitalist brigandage, as this game can do nothing but change the master, cannot resolve the national question, and is the origin of new international complications and new massacres.

But we must oppose with particular energy the intrigues of European statesmen who seek to conceal their expansionist ambitions by promising political independence to the oppressed nationalities. With the aid of these unreliable promises the bourgeois politicians deceive the masses, making them believe that miracles are being prepared by bloody weapons on the battlefields of Europe. Unfortunately, the oppressed peoples, obsessed by the memory of their sufferings, readily listen to these false shepherds who promise a regeneration of the peoples as the miraculous effects of their military success. People of good faith, who observed the hope of the Polish, Ukrainian, and other populations at the beginning of the war, are agreed that the belief that the hour of national liberation was at hand reached enormous proportions among the oppressed peoples, who succumbed to a general delirium, regarding the belligerent states with a kind of awe.

No doubt a great deal of the responsibility for the odious campaign of mystification lies with the bourgeois national movement of the oppressed peoples. We have already pointed out the obsession of this movement with its immediate interests, and how much it is concerned with making profits for the national capitalist bourgeoisie. If democrats hope, through the national awakening, to conquer wider political liberties; if the working class sees in these constitutional guarantees a precious seed for realizing its aspirations toward social justice; the bourgeoisie, in contributing to the national regeneration, sees nothing but a means to achieve political and social power for itself, and intensifying the exploitation of labor.

For the democratic movement and the working class the national awakening is a pure and noble idea, a source of enthusiasm and energy; for the bourgeoisie, to the contrary, national liberation is a business like any other, an enterprise which may bring benefits. So the bourgeois politicians, lacking a national ideal, are forced into recourse to demagogic phraseology to undermine the vigilance of the masses, to distract their attention and betray their national aspirations.

It is the decadence of the bourgeois national movement that explains the conduct of the politicians of Austrian Ukraine. Disregarding the true spirit of Russian Ukraine, which remains alien to all separatist projects, since the beginning of the war, in the midst of the tumult, they have lit the torches of Ukrainian independence—to light up the route of the Austrian armies toward Kyiv. But if one takes an objective view of the nationalist ritual, which is like a sideshow to the imperialist grand drama, one will understand that the Austrian promoters of Ukrainian independence are not really fighting for the liberation of the Ukrainian peoples, but seek to light the fire of German capitalist exploitation in Ukraine in order to warm themselves by it.

We all agree that any people will enjoy the best opportunities for their political, economic and social development when organized in a free and independent state. But for this liberty and independence not to be illusory, in an epoch when democracy plays so important a role, for the state to serve the task of social progress in the full sense of the word, the independent state needs to be brought about by the efforts of the nation itself, by its own will and action. The aspiration of the Ukrainian people for the reconstitution of their own state will have no solid basis unless the Ukrainian nation shows itself strong enough to take advantage of circumstances, to deliver a

decisive blow at the same time against Austria-Hungary and Russia and organize a free and independent Ukrainian democracy through its own efforts. In that case the Ukrainian democracy would be forced to conduct a desperate struggle, not only against the Entente but also against the Central Powers, that is to say against the whole of Europe.

At once one realizes the absurdity of such a scenario. One need only recall that to undertake such a colossal action the Ukrainian democracy would need a powerful army, organized on modern lines. Now, no oppressed nation under the domination of the great centralized powers is capable of creating its own army without first organizing as a state, and since without the state there can be no national army, it follows that national independence, the dream of oppressed peoples, seems to have no chance of realization at the moment when the capitalist world is massively militarized in pursuit of its imperialist goals. Today all attempts to revive nationalist separatist movements end in failure, more or less total; they are condemned to play the game of the great European states, they lose their democratic character and end up deteriorating into dubious adventures.

It can be said that the problem of national wars, which so agitated Europe in the course of the past century, already in that epoch, tied to imperialist politics, has been removed from the agenda of European democrats by the twentieth century and above all by the war that we now witness. Once we accept, as our point of departure, that war today cannot resolve the national problem, indeed that on the contrary the likely annexations will be the origin and source of new international complications; if we accept the idea that the evolution of the major capitalist states toward the centralization of military power excludes the whole possibility of a democratic separatist movement aiming for the formation of new national states; if we leave the scenario of war for the moment, to pose the national question in its full extent; we arrive at the conclusion that the solution to this problem *is the struggle for the complete democratization of states, adding to the democratic gains a struggle for decentralization, in order to liberate the oppressed peoples, establishing an accord between them, and to clear the way for class struggle against imperialism and militarism.*

Certainly, in the propaganda for the liberation of oppressed peoples, we cannot ignore the fact that their full liberation and real accord will only be possible under the socialist order, when the basis of all national oppression—the division of society into classes—will disappear. But this propaganda cannot shrink from the duty to struggle for reforms which even under capitalism will give nationalities greater guarantees of freedom for national development, and against new annexations and military brigandage.

This is why the socialist International must beware above all of the *Russian Empire*, which to date has been able to preserve the most reactionary regime and, with its vast reach and omnipotent bureaucracy, presents a massive threat to European democracy. It is an error to think that the downfall of Tsarism will profoundly change the political face of Russia. The reactionary tendencies of the Russian bourgeoisie, on one side, the weak development of the working class and the overwhelming mass of the peasant population, on the other, do not inspire real confidence in the future political liberation of the Russian Empire.

If French centralism, created under the *ancien regime* by royal power, remained throughout the nineteenth century an obstacle to victorious revolutions, it is all the more dangerous to create illusions about Russian centralism, whose political heritage will be taken over, after the fall of Tsarism, by the Russian bourgeoisie. Far from relaxing centralism, the Russian bourgeoisie will give it new strength by applying the principles of modern bureaucracy, extending its power base. In the Russian Empire, peopled by hundreds of different nationalities, the Russian bourgeoisie will find an extensive field of activity to Russify all those nationalities by means of centralism. The Tsarist policy of Russification has always come up against Russia's low level of general culture; it was aimed at a very restricted part of the population, given that the means of civilization at the disposal of the

Russian state are very deficient. So the progress in general culture and popular education, to be expected in a free Russia, will open up new horizons for Russification by the bourgeoisie; the bourgeoisie will, so to speak, democratize the methods of assimilation, extending them into every sphere of life, making national oppression more methodical and tangible.

We often hear it said that chaos and struggle between nationalities are peculiar to Austria and yet, to be honest, the only great state composed of different nationalities that has been able to assure its people the greatest freedom of development is Austria. And if Russia has, until now, not been greatly torn by national conflicts, if in the words of the Ukrainian poet Shevchenko, "from Moldova to Finland all in Russia is silent," this silence is solely due to the oppression of Tsarist centralism, and the nationalities in Russia being unorganized, unconscious and—so to speak—in a molecular state. But the winning of freedom in Russia will surely help organize the nationalities and provoke a struggle between them. Already the Russian revolution has allowed the peoples of Russia a brief mirage of liberty, has stimulated the development of their national consciousness and national movements. When the hour of political liberation sounds for Russia, the national conflicts of Austria, between seven small nationalities, will seem no more than child's play in comparison with the great struggle that will take place in Russia on the morrow of the fall of Tsarism.

Although Tsarism itself possesses only limited means of assimilation, it has succeeded over the centuries in preparing the ground for the Russian bourgeoisie, which will certainly know how to make use of centralism, to stir up national passions and poison the whole of social life. This national struggle within the Russian Empire will push the bourgeoisie into feverish imperialist projects, for its domination outside the country will increase its power within. It is sufficient to recall the desire for conquest shown by Russian liberals in the course of this war to be sure that the bourgeoisie, once in power, will push militarism to the limit and transform "Great Russia" from fantasy into horrible reality.

If the Russian and German reactionaries decide not to prolong the conflict, and prefer to turn their hatred against England, the antagonism between German and Russian bourgeois imperialism will grow ever more intense and threaten Europe with new conflicts in the future. The socialist International must take account of all these considerations. Just as the first International and all European democrats were committed to the liberation of Poland from the yoke of Russian autocracy, we are sure that the liberation of Ukraine will be the watchword of the third International and of the proletarian socialists of Europe in their struggle *against Russian imperialism*.

The Ukrainians form a nation which, within Russia, is only exceeded in population by the Russians themselves. This explains why the Russian government treats all Ukrainian organizations or associations wishing to carry out education among the people as organizations contrary to public order and dangerous to Russian unity. It explains also why the German imperialists, seeking Russia's defeat, want to separate Ukraine from Russia and send "a European prince to Kyiv." There is no doubt that the national regeneration of Ukraine will destroy the unity of "Russia" and disrupt the imperialist force of the Empire. This danger has been foreseen with great clarity by the Russian liberals whom while making certain concessions to the bourgeois Ukrainian movement in the area of culture, have disputed the Ukrainians' right to make political demands and have supported the anti-Ukrainian policy of Tsarism.

We have already had occasion to show how the general atmosphere of hatred against the Ukrainian movement weakened the latter. The passivity and obedience so dear to the Ukrainian bourgeoisie during the war have through force of circumstances penetrated the masses.

This is why we, as Social-Democrats of Russian Ukraine, address ourselves to the International Socialist Conference, calling upon it to take the Ukrainian problem into account, in the course of

debates on the international situation and the conditions of the future peace, and to proclaim in the conference motion the necessity for the liberation of Ukraine. Such a declaration from the representatives of revolutionary socialism will be not only a valuable support for all our socialist and anti-militarist propaganda in the Ukrainian working class, but also the expression of the objectivity and supreme justice of the new International. When Tsarism has been destroyed, when the Ukrainian socialist movement can advance freely, this support given today by the young socialist International to Ukrainian socialism shall forever serve the worldwide working class as an example of international socialist solidarity.

In summary, we call upon the second International Conference:

To appeal to the working class for a struggle for the liberation of oppressed nations, by means of revolutionary actions, against the centralism of great states composed of different nationalities, and to address this appeal to the proletarian socialists of Russia, wishing them success in their struggle against Tsarism, with the goal of the political liberation of Russia, and the conquest of democratic and autonomous rights for the oppressed nations.

To protest against Tsarist Russia's projects of annexation of Austrian Ukraine (Galicia and Bukovyna) because this annexation would result in the spoilation of all political and national liberties in this province, and the more intense oppression of the whole Ukrainian nation. To oppose the projects of Tsarism which seek to stifle Ukrainian regeneration, by demanding democratic autonomy of Ukraine within its ethnographic boundaries in Russia.

With socialist greetings.

By the editor of the Social-Democratic newspaper *Borotba*,

L. Rybalka

notes

1. Although the title of the brochure mentions the International Socialist Conference in Holland, Lev Yurkveych was writing to the Kienthal Conference (also known as the Second Zimmerwald Conference) held in the Swiss village of Kienthal, between April 24 and 30, 1916. For reasons of secrecy, the organizers of the Kienthal Conference first issued an invitation for the "Second Zimmerwald Conference" in Holland in the International Socialist Commission *ISK-Bulletin* Nr.3, issued on the 29th of Feb. 1916, participants were only informed later that the conference was actually to be held in the Swiss village. [Editor's note]

2. The Cossacks had various social and ethnic origins, but were predominantly made up of escaped serfs fleeing the oppression in the Polish-ruled areas of Ukraine. They established self-governing communities, one of the largest and most well-known being the Zaporozhian Sich. In 1648, a mass uprising of Cossacks and peasants led by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1648-57), against the Polish Commonwealth established the Ukrainian Cossack state known as the Hetmanate (the title of an elected Cossack leader), consisting of most of central Ukraine. [Ed. note]

3. B. Noble, *L'Ukraine sous le protectorate russe*. Paris, 1915.

4. "Kyivan Rus," the first state of the Eastern Slavs, lasted from the ninth to mid-thirteenth century, under Volodymyr the Great, it became a pre-eminent state of Europe, adopting Christianity in 988. It fragmented following the Mongol invasion giving rise to three powerful independent states, including Halych-Volhynia, in central and western parts of modern Ukraine. Russian imperialism has

attempted to establish historical continuity between Russia and Kyivan Rus to justify its rule over Ukraine. The Tsardom of Muscovy, founded in 1147, was for two hundred years a Mongol vassal state, renamed the Russian Empire in 1721 by Tsar Peter, who appropriated the name of Kyivan Rus. Catherine the Great declared the empire its successor. In 2022, Putin claimed Russia as the sole heir to Kyivan Rus. [Ed. note]

5. We publish in “extenso” this shameful document:

H. M. The Tsar has deigned to ordain this past May 18/30 (1876):

1. To ban within the borders of the Russian empire under the special authorization of the Higher Administration charged with printing affairs all books or pamphlets published abroad in the Little-Russian idiom.

2 The printing and publishing in the Empire of original works or translations in this idiom are banned with the exception of (a) historical documents and monuments, (b) works of fiction, with the condition that the orthography of the originals is upheld in the publication of historical works, and that works of fiction will not be tolerated in form other than the generally adopted Russian orthography. Publication of works of fiction will not be allowed without the manuscript having first been examined.

3 Also banned are all theatrical events and conferences conducted in this idiom as is the publication of musical texts in this idiom.

Head of the Administration in charge of printing affairs. *Grigoriev*.

Michael Drahomanov, “*Ukrainian literature banned by the Russian Government*,” Report presented to the Paris literary conference, 1878.

6. Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–1895) was a prominent figure in the secret society Hromada of Kyiv. Dismissed from his position at Kyiv University in 1875, he relocated to Geneva, where he established *Hromada* (Community), the first modern Ukrainian political journal, in collaboration with Serhii Podolynsky and Mykhailo Pavlyk. Together, they founded the Geneva Circle, which became the embryo of Ukrainian socialism. Influenced by figures such as Owen and Proudhon, Drahomanov advocate an agrarian socialism and a federalist system of self-governing communities and regions. His ideas significantly shaped the Ukrainian political movement in Galicia and influenced populist socialists in Russian-ruled Ukraine. His work had a major impact on the Ukrainian movement in the early twentieth century. [Ed. note]

7. The term *muzhik* means a peasant, particularly in the pre-revolutionary Tsarist period. [Ed. note]

8. Narodniks, *narodnitstvo* from “Narod” — the people or nation, also known as populists, were a radical movement that arose after the Crimean War. The main tenets of Ukrainian populism were federalism, emancipation of the peasantry, and the recognition of the cultural distinctiveness of the Ukrainian people, they saw the peasantry as the key force for change. Ukrainian populists were also known by their contemporaries as Ukrainophiles, most prominent among them were Volodymyr Antonovych and Mykhailo Drahomanov. [Ed. note]

9. Founded in 1889, the Social Democratic Workers' Party of Austria (SDAPÖ) was reorganized at the 1899 Wimberg Congress into a federative structure known as the "small international," granting national parties greater autonomy. Ukrainian, Polish, Czech, Italian, Slovene, Hungarian. [Ed. note]

10. "Yurkevych" means by "nationalizing" such as the use of the Ukrainian language in education. [Ed. note]

11. Ukrainian Democratic-Radical Party (UDRP) was a liberal party formed by a merger of the Ukrainian Democratic Party and Ukrainian Radical Party in 1905. It consisted mainly of members of the intelligentsia. Its program favored a democratic constitution and a preference for a "socialist order." Half of the Ukrainian caucus in the Russian State Duma were members of the UDRP, in the Second Duma (1907) the fourteen Ukrainian Social Democrats elected did not join the caucus. In early 1908 the UDRP collapsed and many of its members who also belonged to the Russian Kadets joined the clandestine Society of Ukrainian Progressives. [Ed. note]

12. Pyotr Stolypin, the Russian prime minister, was assassinated in Kyiv (then Kiev) on Sept. 14, 1911 (Sept. 1, Old Style). [Ed. note]

13. The Russian army occupied Austrian-ruled Ukraine from Aug./Sept. 1914 until mid-1915. Ukrainian organizations, publications, schools, and churches were closed. There were mass arrests and deportations; Jewish organizations were banned, and on Sept. 27, Russian soldiers staged a pogrom in Lviv, during killing forty-seven people. [Ed. note]

14. *Ukrainskaia zhizn* (Ukrainian Life) was a Russian-language journal published in Moscow from 1912 to 1917. Edited by Symon Petlyura (1879–1926), a member of the USDRP, along with Oleksander Salikovsky, it served as the unofficial organ of the Moscow branch of the clandestine Society of Ukrainian Progressives. In July 1914, Petlyura published an article criticizing the "Austrian Orientation," stating regarding the Ukrainian population: "May it remain steadfast in its mission, ensuring the unity of Russia and its diverse population—particularly in addressing the urgent resolution of national issues, including the Ukrainian question." "Viyna i Ukrayintsi." Symon Petlyura, *Ukrayins'ka suspil'no-politychna dumka v 20 stolitti: Dokumenty i materialy*, T. 1 T. Hunchak, Suchasnist, 1983, 207-10. [Ed. note]

15. In Aug. 1914, the Russian General Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich, issued the "Manifesto to the Polish Nation," addressing the Polish people. The manifesto promised the unification of Polish lands under the Russian Tsar and granted autonomy, including religious freedom, linguistic rights, and self-governance, to those living under Russian, German, and Austrian rule. This strategic declaration aimed to secure Polish support and loyalty during the war. [Ed. note]

16. Vasily Maklakov, a leader of the Russian Constitutional Democratic Party (Kadets), served as a deputy in the State Duma. Initially supportive of the war, he later became a vocal critic as Russia faced setbacks. He played a key role in the formation of the Progressive Bloc, a coalition of Duma factions that opposed the government's handling of the war. [Ed. note]

17. In this regard, it is useful to point out that, after the victories of the Russian army in Asia Minor, the question of Armenian liberation was put on the agenda. So, a meeting organized by Anatole France was held in Paris on April 10 at which representatives of the government and parliament made a solemn promise to the Armenian people to assure them of the complete liberation of their country in recognition of the dedication they had shown to the Allies' cause. In order to clearly understand the flimsiness and unimportance of these promises, which express elsewhere the solidarity of the French republican government with the interests of Russian Tsarism, it is sufficient to recall what the representative Miliukov stated to the Duma on March 11, 1916 on the subject of

the Armenians: "the fate of Armenia and of her people," he said "is as dear to us and as close to our hearts as that of all peoples who have suffered while fighting with us. Unfortunately, there are reasons for believing that *the fate of Galicia could be reproduced in Armenia*. We can see that people are beginning to be unscrupulous with the properties abandoned by their Armenian occupants. Without knowing the reasons, these properties have already been declared properties of the state." How, then can one not be surprised at the words of Anatole France when he said at the meeting that the allied armies "are fighting for justice and liberty"?

18. "The War and the Ukrainians," *Ukrainskaia zhizn*, No. 7, Moscow.

19. The Supreme Ukrainian Council was established on Aug. 1, 1914, by Galicia's major political parties: the National Democratic Party, the Ukrainian Radical Party, and the USDP. The Council declared, "Victory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy shall be our own victory." In 1915, it reorganized into the General Ukrainian Council in Vienna, advocating for Ukrainian territories under Russian rule to form an independent state, while those under Austrian rule would gain autonomy within a unified Ukrainian region. [Ed. note]

20. On Nov. 5, 1916, the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires issued the "Two Emperors' Declaration," proclaiming the creation of a "Kingdom of Poland" from former Polish territories of the Russian Empire. This announcement disappointed Austrian Ukrainian leaders, who had been informed just two months earlier that the Crown Council, chaired by Emperor Franz Joseph I, had decided to divide Galicia after the war and unite its eastern part with Volyn as an autonomous Ukrainian province. The establishment of a Polish state was primarily intended to bolster the German Army with Polish troops. While the Austrian emperor reaffirmed Galicia's "special" status, which effectively placed Western Ukrainians under Polish authority, a move that Ukrainian figures viewed as sanctioning their colonization. In response, the Ukrainian parliamentary representation in Austria declared on Nov. 7, 1916, that the Ukrainian people would never recognize submission to Polish rule. [Ed. note]

21. Paul Rohrbach (1869-1956) was a German political scientist and expert on Eastern European affairs. He advocated for the separation of western territories from the Russian Empire and led the German-Ukrainian Society until 1926. During the Weimar Republic, he moved away from pan-Germanic views, joining the liberal Democratic Party of Germany and becoming a critic of the Nazis. [Ed. note]

22. "Durch die Ukraine," *Hilfe*, No. 36, 1915.